This is consistent with several other Georgia decisions which hold that statutory authority to contract is necessarily a statutory waiver of immunity to suit for breach. Hancock County v. Williams, 230 Ga. 723, 198 S.E.2d 659 (1973); Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 148 S.E.2d 414 (1966). Finally, an examination of Taylor v. King, 104 Ga. App. 589, 122 S.E.2d 265 (1961), reveals that the language relied upon by the plaintiffs was taken out of context.

This court has long construed these two statutes as permitting suits against counties based on contracts made pursuant to legislative authorization. Hancock County v. Williams, 230 Ga. 723 ( 198 S.E.2d 659) (1973); Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63 ( 148 S.E.2d 414) (1966); Decatur County v. Praytor, Howton Wood Contracting Co., 163 Ga. 929 ( 137 S.E. 247) (1927); Wagener v. Forsyth County, 135 Ga. 162 ( 68 S.E. 1115) (1910); Harris County v. Brady, 115 Ga. 767 ( 42 S.E. 71) (1902)."

This court has long construed these two statutes as permitting suits against counties based on contracts made pursuant to legislative authorization. Hancock County v. Williams, 230 Ga. 723 ( 198 S.E.2d 659) (1973); Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63 ( 148 S.E.2d 414) (1966); Decatur County v. Praytor, Howton Wood Contracting Co., 163 Ga. 929 ( 137 S.E. 247) (1927); Wagener v. Forsyth County, 135 Ga. 162 ( 68 S.E. 1115) (1910); Harris County v. Brady, 115 Ga. 767 ( 42 S.E. 71) (1902). The contract for the building of a tennis center is authorized by Code Ann. § 69-602, which permits counties to use county funds for "parks, playgrounds, [and] recreation centers."

The constitutional amendment under which the Municipal Court of Atlanta was created is almost identical with the present constitutional provision (Code Ann. § 2-4201) under which the State Court of Cobb County was created, and the ruling in Barnard v. Dupree is controlling in the present case. See also Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 66 ( 148 S.E.2d 414). It was not error to deny the appellant's motion to quash.

There is therefore no merit in the contention that § 25 of the MARTA Act, as amended, which authorized certain local governments to levy a sales tax, is void because the general sales tax law, which prohibited a political subdivision from levying a sales tax, had not been amended at the time the MARTA Act was amended to authorize the levy of a sales tax. Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 66 ( 148 S.E.2d 414). 11.

“[T]he payment of salaries of county officials and employees is not contractual within the provisions of this act.” First Nat. Bank of Atlanta v. Mann, 211 Ga. 706 , 707-708 (2) (88 SE2d 361 ) (1955) (construing the prior codification of the statute, Ga. Code Ann. § 23-1701 ); Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63 , 66 (1) (148 SE2d 414 ) (1966) (same). Mann involved the salary of a probate judge.

Smith, 167 Ga.App. at 461(2), 306 S.E.2d 720.See Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 65(1), 148 S.E.2d 414 (1966) (holding that police officer's claim against county for back pay sounded in contract and was not barred by county's immunity); Willis, 265 Ga.App. at 643(2), 595 S.E.2d 339 (holding that city employee's claim for back pay sounded in contract and was not barred by city's assertion of sovereign immunity, although grant of summary judgment in city's favor was correct for other reasons); Smith, 167 Ga.App. at 461(2), 306 S.E.2d 720 (holding that firefighter's claim for back pay sounded in contract and was not barred by city's immunity). Cf. Gold, 318 Ga.App. at 642–43(3), 734 S.E.2d 466 (holding that teachers' claim against county for retirement benefits sounded in contract and was not barred by sovereign immunity); Alverson v. Employees' Retirement System of Ga., 272 Ga.App. 389, 391–92(1)(b), 613 S.E.2d 119 (2005) (holding that state employees' claim challenging state's method of calculating employees' pensions sounded in contract and was not barred by sovereig

Smith, 167 Ga. App. at 461 (2). SeeDeason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 65 (1) (148 SE2d 414) (1966) (holding that police officer's claim against county for back pay sounded in contract and was not barred by county's immunity); Willis, 265 Ga. App. at 643 (2) (holding that city employee's claim for back pay sounded in contract and was not barred by city's assertion of sovereign immunity, although grant of summary judgment in city's favor was correct for other reasons); Smith, 167 Ga. App. at 461 (2) (holding that firefighter's claim for back pay sounded in contract and was not barred by city's immunity). Cf. Gold, 318 Ga. App. at 642-43 (3) (holding that teachers' claim against county for retirement benefits sounded in contract and was not barred by sovereign immunity); Alverson v. Employees' Retirement System of Ga., 272 Ga. App. 389, 391-92 (1) (b) (613 SE2d 119) (2005) (holding that state employees' claim challenging state's method of calculating employees' pensions sounded in contract and was not barred by sovereign immunity).

While Moon cites a number of Georgia cases allowing the assertion of claims for back pay against various governmental entities, none of these decisions involves the assertion of a claim by an at-will employee. Atlanta City School Dist. v. Dowling, 266 Ga. 217 ( 466 S.E.2d 588) (1996) (administrative appeal of nonrenewal of annual contract with school board); Turner v. Giles, 264 Ga. 812 ( 450 S.E.2d 421) (1994) (vendor licensee under Randolph-Sheppard Act, 20 U.S.C. § 107 et seq.); Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63 ( 148 S.E.2d 414) (1966) (county merit system employee); Henderson v. Sherrington, 189 Ga. App. 498 ( 376 S.E.2d 397) (1988) (same), overruled on other grounds. The Texas, Alaska, and Massachusetts decisions cited by Moon are irrelevant to the construction of a provision of the Georgia Constitution as applied to a Georgia statute.

Accord Rogers v. Ga. Ports Auth., 183 Ga. App. 325, 328 ( 358 S.E.2d 855) (1987). We reject Premo's urging to apply Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63 ( 148 S.E.2d 414) (1966) to these facts. That action was brought by a permanent county merit system employee for breach of a valid contract; whereas Premo was an hourly employee outside the protection of any merit system and without a written contract.