Opinion
02 Civ. 8772 (LAK)
March 12, 2003
ORDER
Plaintiff in this motor vehicle accident case originally named as a defendant, on a vicarious liability theory, Ford Motor Credit Company ("FMCC"), which his counsel apparently believed was the owner of the vehicle that struck plaintiff. Plaintiff then learned from FMCC's mandatory disclosure that the owner of the vehicle was Ford Credit Titling Trust ("FCTT"). He now moves to amend the complaint, essentially to add FCTT as a defendant, to proceed against FCTT as the owner of the vehicle, and to modify its claim against FMCC to sue it on the theory that FMCC, which was FCTT's agent, nevertheless is liable as an "owner" pursuant to N.Y. Veh. Traf. L. §§ 128, 388. These defendants resist the motion, arguing that leave to amend would be futile because (1) the statute of limitations has run against FCTT and the proposed amendment would not "relate back," and (2) the newly modified theory of FMCC's liability is legally insufficient.
1. The parties agree that a claim asserted in an amended pleading "relates back" if it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject of the original pleading, the new defendant was omitted from the original complaint by mistake, and there would be no prejudice to the new defendant by the delay in naming it. E.g., VKK Corp. v. National Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir. 2001). These defendants concede that the first of these criteria is satisfied. The omission of FCTT from the original complaint obviously was a mistake, indeed a glaring one. And the two pronged prejudice argument — viz., that FCTT would be prejudiced because (a) the statute of limitations has run, and (2) it had no notice of the claim — is frivolous. The first contention is completely circular, as the only occasions on which relation back is material are those in which the statute has run; to adopt defendants' position in effect would be to repeal Rule 15(c). The second is absurd in view of the fact that FMCC is FCTT's agent. Its knowledge of the suit is imputed to FCTT. In any case, mere lack of notice would be insufficient to establish prejudice — FCTT has 2 failed utterly to establish that the conduct of its defense would suffer in any way as a result of any delay.
2. The claim that the new claim against FMCC is legally insufficient also is baseless. In Taughrin v. Rodriguez, 254 A.D.2d 735, 677 N.Y.S.2d 861 (4th Dept. 1998), the Appellate Division — in a case involving FMCC and FCTT — held that the owner's agent, FMCC, was subject to liability as an "owner" under N.Y. Veh. Traf. L. §§ 128, 388. In the absence of compelling reasons to believe that the New York Court of Appeals would reach a different result, this Court is obliged under Erie to follow Taughrin. E.g., Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 n. 3 (1988), quoting West v. Am. Tel. Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940); Pentech Int'l, Inc. v. Wall Street Clearing Co., 983 F.2d 441, 445 (2d Cir. 1993); Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Sobol, 948 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1991). There are no such indications.
It might be noted also, although plaintiff failed to raise the point, that FMCC and FCTT arguably are bound by the rule announced in Taughrin under the principles of issue preclusion.
The Court has considered defendants other arguments, none of which have merit. Plaintiff's motion is granted in all respects. The complaint is deemed amended as set forth in the moving papers as of this date without need for service.
SO ORDERED.