As a result, the trial court correctly held that LaFontaine had waived his right to challenge the citation. Andrew v. State, 216 Ga. App. 819, 820 ( 456 S.E.2d 227) (1995); Dean v. State, 214 Ga. App. 768, 770 ( 449 S.E.2d 158) (1994). See generally OCGA § 17-7-111.

We hold that the case was improperly terminated, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court denying Puplampu's plea of double jeopardy. See Dean v. State, 214 Ga. App. 768, 770 ( 449 S.E.2d 158) (1994). Judgment reversed.

See Rachell v. State, 210 Ga. App. 106 (2) (b), 107 ( 435 S.E.2d 480). That is, according to the judge who called defendant's case for trial in the probate court, jeopardy did not attach in the probate court because no witnesses were sworn to testify at the bench trial. OCGA § 16-1-8 (a) (2). Compare Dean v. State, 214 Ga. App. 768 ( 449 S.E.2d 158). Further, this judge's testimony indicates that defendant waived his right to object to termination of the probate court proceedings by requesting the probate court judge to bind the case over to the superior court.

This court recently held that a defendant is placed in jeopardy when a "trial was terminated after the first witness was sworn and before findings were rendered by the trier of fact, and [defendant], having failed to obtain a ruling on his special demurrer before the start of the trial, waived his right to challenge the citations and therefore submitted to be tried under the citations." Dean v. State, 214 Ga. App. 768, 770 ( 449 S.E.2d 158) (1994). However, in that case, unlike the case at bar, there was no question that the trial of defendant was underway when the proceedings were terminated.

And "[o]ur Supreme Court has previously found that such a strike, based on a prospective juror's relationship with people who have been in trouble with the law, was race neutral. Hall v. State, 261 Ga. 778, 779(2) ( 449 S.E.2d 158) (1991)." Christian v. State, 244 Ga. App. 713, 715(3) ( 536 S.E.2d 600) (2000). "