A person who is not a party to a judgment may collaterally attack the judgment only if his interests were affected by the judgment. Dean v. First National Bank of Athens, 494 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Thus, the issue presented is whether the "burdensome tasks" imposed by the deposition notice and the subpoena duces tecum constitute an interest in Jorgen that the law protects from the enforcement of this judgment.
To allow it to be shown on the trial that it was not intended to be, and was not in fact, what it purported to be, would violate one of the first and most elementary rules of evidence. Sections 3553, 3554, Comp. Laws; Dean v. First Nat. Bank, 6 Dak. 222, 50 N.W. 831; Thompson v. McKee, 5 Dak. 172, 37 N.W. 367; Van Brunt v. Day, 81 N.Y. 251." Strunk v. Smith et al., 8 S.D. 407, 66 N.W. 926; Mettel et al. v. Gales et al., 12 S.D. 632, 82 N.W. 181. See, also, Reed v. Coughran et al., 21 S.D. 257, 111 N.W. 559.
Grynberg v. Christiansen , 727 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1987, no writ). "Examples of nonparties whose interests are affected by a judgment are persons having an interest in land (such as an owner, a cotenant, or a person in lawful possession) who are not made a party to an action involving the land ... a holder of a junior lien who has been ignored in a suit foreclosing a prior lien on the same property, and a creditor whose rights are prejudiced by a judgment pursued for the purpose of delaying, hindering, or defrauding the creditor." Id. at 667, citingDean v. First National Bank of Athens , 494 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Conversely, having only a tangential or indirect interest in the judgment is insufficient to bestow standing upon a non-party for purposes of allowing a collateral attack on the judgment.
The Comptroller is not bringing a direct attack; she need not have been a party to the Retailer Suits to bring a collateral attack. See Grynberg v. Christiansen, 727 S.W.2d 665, 666–67 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (holding that judgment may be collaterally attacked by one who was not party to but who has substantial interest in subject matter of judgment (citing Dean v. First Nat'l Bank of Athens, 494 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.))). She seeks to avoid the prior judgments' effect in the administrative refund proceedings.
The Comptroller is not bringing a direct attack; she need not have been a party to the Retailer Suits to bring a collateral attack. See Grynberg v. Christiansen, 727 S.W.2d 665, 666-67 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ) (holding that judgment may be collaterally attacked by one who was not party to but who has substantial interest in subject matter of judgment (citing Dean v. First Nat'l Bank of Athens, 494 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.))). She seeks to avoid the prior judgments' effect in the administrative refund proceedings.
A person who is not a party to a judgment may collaterally attack the judgment only if his interests were affected by the judgment. Grynberg v. Christiansen, 727 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ); Dean v. First National Bank of Athens, 494 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We have already determined that the order granting expunction was not subject to collateral attack.
A person who is not a party to a judgment may collaterally attack the judgment if his interests were affected by the judgment. Dean v. First National Bank of Athens, 494 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Grynberg v. Christiansen, 727 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1987, no writ). The interest affected must be substantial to justify the attack of a valid judgment. Grynberg, 727 S.W.2d at 667.
However, the part of that judgment sealing the records did affect the rights of Times Herald; therefore, it may attack that portion by direct or collateral proceedings. See Dean v. First National Bank of Athens, 494 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Southern Lumber Co., 145 Tex. 151, 196 S.W.2d 387 (1946)); Standard Oil Co. v. State, 132 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1939, writ dism'd judgmt cor.). See also Meyer v. Wichita County Water Improvement Dist., 265 S.W.2d 660, 665 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bussan v. Donald, 244 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).