But the standards for KAAD claims are the same as they are for claims under Title VII. Dean v. Boeing Co., 260 F. App'x 124, 128 (10th Cir. 2008); Lewis v. Standard Motor Prod., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 n. 13 (D. Kan. 2002). Accordingly, to the extent a claim fails under Title VII, it also fails under KAAD.
To satisfy the prima facie elements of racially-based disparate treatment discrimination, a plaintiff must show "(1) membership in a protected class, (2) [an] adverse employment action, and (3) disparate treatment among similarly situated employees." Dean v. Boeing Co., 260 F. App'x 124, 128 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Orr v. City of Albuquerque, 417 F.3d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir. 2005)). "[A] claim of disparate treatment ... embod[ies] a situation where 'the employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion or national origin.'"
See, e.g., Bell v. Bd. of Educ. of the Albuquerque Pub. Schs., No. CIV 06–1137 JB/ACT, 2008 WL 4104070 (D.N.M. Mar. 26, 2008) (Browning, J.)(“The Tenth Circuit has yet to apply the continuing-violation doctrine outside of the context of Title VII employment cases.” (citing Dean v. Boeing Co., 260 Fed.Appx. 124 (10th Cir.2008) (unpublished)(Kelly, J.))).
These elements are the same whether the case is brought under § 1981 or Title VII. Dean v. Boeing Co., 260 F. App'x 124, 128 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (citing Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 1991)). In this case, it is not disputed that Plaintiff belongs to a protected class, as she is female and African American.
LAW REGARDING THE CONTINUING VIOLATION DOCTRINE The Tenth Circuit has yet to apply the continuing-violation doctrine outside of the context of Title VII employment cases.See, e.g., Dean v. Boeing Co., No. 07-3060, 2008 WL 102420 at * 2 (10th Cir. January 9, 2008) (affirming trial court's holding that "equitable doctrines such as the continuing violations doctrine that might be utilized in regard to a Title VII action were not applicable when considering [the plaintiff's] § 1981 claims."); Rassam v. San Juan College Bd., 113 F.3d 1247 (Table), No. 95-2292, 1997 WL 253048 at *3 (10th Cir. May 15, 1997) (noting that "[s]ome courts have observed that the `continuing violation doctrine' has rarely been applied outside of the Title VII employment discrimination context" and that "it is to be narrowly applied, and is not intended to excuse plaintiffs from diligently pursuing their claims.").