Opinion
06-29-1887
DE WITT and others v. BRANDS and others.
Chauncey H. Beasley, for complainants. J. G. Shipman & Son, for defendants Isaac Brands, Catharine Green, and Hannah Reed. Geo. A. Angle, for defendants James, Jacob, and Abraham Brands.
On bill for relief.
Chauncey H. Beasley, for complainants. J. G. Shipman & Son, for defendants Isaac Brands, Catharine Green, and Hannah Reed. Geo. A. Angle, for defendants James, Jacob, and Abraham Brands.
BIRD, V. C. David Brands died intestate January, 1883, leaving seven children him surviving, seized in fee of about 117 acres of land and of somepersonal estate. His son Isaac was made administrator, and soon after sold all of the goods and chattels. In the month of November, 1883, the said children, excepting only Jacob X., agreed to sell said farm, and did sell to one of their own number, Abraham. After this sale, but on the same day, as the testimony stands, Isaac, the administrator, discovered three releases which are the cause of this controversy. He discovered them in an old desk which he bought at the sale of the personal property of his father some time before. He was looking in this desk for the title deeds of the land, and while thus engaged found three releases and the deeds in one package; one given by Jacob X., one by Abraham, and one by James to their father. The two latter bear date March 30, 1853. The recitals in these show that he had sold to each certain lands. In the releasing part each one "releases, discharges, and forever quitclaims all right, title, interest, or claim whatsoever to him, the said David Brands, and to his other children and heirs at law, of all the estate, both real and personal, that may be left at the decease of my father; I being fully satisfied and content on the reception of the above-mentioned deed for all legacies that now or ever hereafter might descend to me from the estate of my father, David Brands, * * * and that all of the estate of my father at the time of his decease may be divided among his other children and heirs at law or otherwise, without any claim or demand either by myself, my heirs, executors, and administrators," etc. The consideration moving Jacob X. to give the release was $2,500 in money. The release given by him was substantially the same as the other two. It was executed October 1, 1853.
The complainants file their bill setting up these releases, and ask the court to declare them binding and effectual, and to decree that Rachel De Witt, one of the complainants, is entitled to one-fourth of the estate of which her father died seized. Isaac and the other two daughters answer, admitting the principal matters set up in the bill, and ask that the estate may be divided into four parts. James, Abraham, and Jacob X. by their answer insist that their father never intended that said releases should be operative. They also insist that all of the other children gave releases; that their father did not intend to exclude any of his children from an equal share of his estate with the rest; and that, after these releases were given, he made equal divisions among them. There is no proof that releases were executed also by the other children. There is no testimony to warrant any such belief.
I am quite free to say that I have looked into this case with great care, in the belief that I would find some evidence going to show that these releases had served the purpose for which they were designed, and that now they should not be regarded as binding. And to this same end all of the testimony that seemed at all relevant was admitted. It occurred to me that these releases might have been intended to be used by the father to preserve some equality between the children until the last one should receive his or her portion; but this theory is unavailing, since there is no release produced from any of the daughters who took their portions of the division about the time Isaac and Abraham took theirs, and years before Jacob X. executed his release; nor is there any evidence, as above stated, that they ever executed any release. And the father survived the execution of the release by Jacob X. about 30 years, during which long period he neither destroyed the said three releases, nor, exacted one from his other children, and during which period he gave to each, as will be seen, $300, and loaned to Jacob X. $1,000, taking his note therefor.
The counsel for James, Abraham, and Jacob X. insist that, if these releases are sustained as effectual, it will work inequality, and will defeat the intention of the intestate. These considerations are based upon the general treatment of the children by the father. It is said that there is nothing in all his life to warrant the view that he intended to favor one more than the other. I am very much impressed with this consideration. The evidence shows nothing of the father's dealings with his children prior to 1850; butfrom that year onward every important transaction except the releases tends to show that the father sought to make nearly equal distribution of his estate. I say nearly, because in the conveyance of the farm to Isaac he seems to have a somewhat larger portion than any of the rest. This first distribution was made in 1850-53, and about 10 years later another distribution was made, each child receiving $300. Upon the whole, I am quite clear that nothing follows towards annulling the releases from the distribution of this $300 to each; for it may well be said that he had fixed the basis of equality or of right in his own mind before, by the releases. And beyond doubt it was all his own, and he could then do what seemed to him good, without undoing what he had caused to be done before.
But, after all, there are the releases. I am confronted with them. Does anything appear to impeach or destroy them? Can I declare them void by the supposition of an intention which was never declared, but which rests alone in other transactions? Can I say that to give these releases the effect which their language imports would work inequality and injustice? How can I say that? Who is to make distribution of an estate,—the owner during his life-time, if he wishes so to do, or the courts, after his death, according to their views of justice and equality? And if the courts may do it, as is urged in this case, then when or at what period shall the work begin? Can the court put itself in a father's place, and take into the account, not only the innumerable items of expenses which, like a mill-race, drain a well-filled purse, but also the thankless conduct of a wayward, reckless child? No. There are the releases. The father had a right to take them. The money paid and the land conveyed to his sons were his own. He had the right of absolute disposition of them, by gift unqualified, or with exacting conditions. And what seems to many like an exacting condition may have been to him the very limit of generosity. From a legal standpoint, above all, it is to be considered that the sons saw fit to accept of the consideration and to execute the releases. Having thus, under seal, executed a formal release which clearly expresses the consideration, and also the object of it, and the persons in whose favor it shall operate, the sons are bound. See Havens v. Thompson, 26 N. J. Eq. 383, and cases cited.
But when the father died there was a judgment against Jacob X., and it is claimed that that became a lien on Jacob X.'s interest in the land. His alleged interest was levied on and sold by the sheriff. Abraham, one of the brothers, purchased. He had given a release, and he now claims against his own release, and also against this release of Jacob X. I have concluded that Jacob was bound by the release to his father, "and to his other children and heirs at law, of all the estate, both real and personal, that may be left at the decease of my father;" and I think that none of Jacob's creditors can enjoy a better or stronger position. If such agreements between a parent and child could be overcome so easily, then an unfortunate or an unfaithful child could always thwart the wisest provisions of the parent. Most obviously, in such case, the loss should fall on the creditor, rather than on the innocent children, whose interests, and it may be rights, have been guarded by the wisdom and forethought of the parent. In my opinion, Abraham took nothing under his purchase from the sheriff.
Again, it is urged that the complainant Rachel is estopped, because her husband advised Abraham to purchase Jacob's interest at the sale to be made by the sheriff. It is enough to say that the husband could not bind the wife in this behalf, had he known of the existence of the releases; but there is no proof that either of the complainants had any knowledge of them until after the sheriff's sale.
An effort was made at the hearing to establish a compromise or settlement of the controversy; but it was not concluded, so far as the complainants are concerned, and therefore not binding on them.
I conclude that Rachel is entitled to one-fourth of the estate of which her father died seized, after the payment of his debts, funeral expenses, and the expenses of settling his estate. I think this same relief should be extended to Isaac, Susan, and Hannah, but I can scarcely think they can have it by answer simply. However, since the case is so fully presented in all its details, nothing can be gained by delay, and I will therefore allow the answer of these three to be so amended by way of cross-bill as to give them a right in this suit for the relief which they seek.
I will not advise costs to either party.