Opinion
7-23-1959
Elizabeth C. DE WITT, Evelyn Flick and Alice L. Naidl, Petitioners and Respondents, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF the County of SAN DIEGO, State of California, Respondent and Appellant. * Civ. 5893.
James Don Keller, Dist. Atty., Bertram McLees, Jr., Deputy Dist. Atty., San Diego, for appellant. Raymond F. Feist, Oceanside, for respondents.
Elizabeth C. DE WITT, Evelyn Flick and Alice L. Naidl, Petitioners and Respondents,
v.
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF the County of SAN DIEGO, State of California, Respondent and Appellant. *
July 23, 1959.
Hearing Granted Sept. 16, 1959.
James Don Keller, Dist. Atty., Bertram McLees, Jr., Deputy Dist. Atty., San Diego, for appellant.
Raymond F. Feist, Oceanside, for respondents.
SHEPARD, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment granting a peremptory writ of prohibition directed by the superior court of San Diego County to the board of supervisors of San Diego County forbidding that body to proceed further in a proposed change of the boundaries of the Carlsbad Union School District and Oceanside-Libby School District, except to implement a certain election respecting such change as ordered by said body on November 19, 1957. For clarity and brevity's sake the petitioners for the writ, who are the respondents in this appeal, will hereinafter be referred to as DeWitt and the respondent to said writ who is the appellant in this appeal, will hereinafter be referred to as Board.
The facts are not in dispute. From the record it appears that a petition under the provisions of Article 5, Chapter 7, Division 2 of the Education Code was presented to the county superintendent of schools of San Diego County in the first part of November, 1957, in accordance with the provisions of section 2502 of the Education Code of the State of California, requesting a change of certain territory from Carlsbad Union School District to Oceanside-Libby Union School District. The superintendent of schools having found it sufficient and signed as required by law, did transmit a copy of the petition to the governing board of each district affected by the proposed change of boundaries and filed said petition with Board, accompanied by his recommendation. on November 19, 1957, Board, in accord with the provisions of section 2504 of the Education Code, made its order that an election be held within the area affected in order that the voters of said area might make their own determination of the question of change of boundaries, as set forth in said petition and as is provided by section 2506 of the Education Code. On November 20, 1957, Board adopted a new order rescinding its action of November 19, 1957, and ordering the petition to be heard before the board of supervisors for the determination by that body of the question of change of boundaries in accord with the provisions of section 2505 of the Education Code. No steps were taken by the county superintendent of schools as is provided by Section 2506 under the order of November 19. Instead, he set the matter for hearing before the Board on January 14, 1958. DeWitt filed an action for a writ of prohibition and a peremptory writ ultimately ensued.
The primary question thus presented is, did the Board after considering the petition and making its order under said section 2504 that an election be held, thus having decided that the question of change of boundaries be passed upon by the vote of the electors of the area involved, have the power to arbitrarily make a new order changing to the alternative procedure of a decision by the Board on a hearing before that body.
The matters involved here are governed by the provisions of sections 2502 to 2506 of the Education Code. Section 2502 provides for the initiation of a proceeding for a change of boundaries by a petition of 25% of the registered electors residing in the territory proposed to be transferred. Section 2503 provides for an examination of the petition by the county superintendent of schools, the transmission of a copy of the petition to the governing board of each district affected, and the filing by him of the petition with the board of supervisors accompanied by his statement with respect thereto. Section 2504 provides for the determination by the board of supervisors as to which of two alternative procedures will be followed to determine the question of change of boundaries. Section 2505 provides the first alternative, being a hearing before the board of supervisors and a determination of the ultimate question by that board after notice, as is provided in said section. Section 2506 provides the second alternative, that is for submission to the electors of the area involved in the manner provided in said section.
We have no doubt that the inherent right exercised by the courts to correct mistakes caused by fraud or clerical error (Martin v. Ray, 74 Cal.App.2d 922, 926, 170 P.2d 75; Peterson v. Peterson, 135 Cal.App.2d 812, 816, 288 P.2d 171 is likewise extended to the board of supervisors in proper case when exercising any of its functions, and more particularly in quasi-judicial functions (Vernon v. Board of Supervisors, 142 Cal. 513, 76 P. 253), and that the governing board in the exercise of its legislative functions may in proper case rescind any call for an election on matters in which the board has continuing jurisdiction. In re Banta, 25 Cal.App.2d 622, 78 P.2d 243.
However, in the case at bar, no question as to the correction of a mistake caused by fraud or error in the facts presented to the Board nor of clerical error, is involved. It is purely a question of whether or not the Board, without any new hearing for cause, may arbitrarily rescind its former order and start off in a new direction.
It has frequently been held that the action of the board of supervisors in hearing facts upon which it must determine which of two alternative procedures to take is quasi-judicial in character. Imperial Water Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 162 Cal. 14, 18, 120 P. 780; Anaheim Sugar Co. v. County of Orange, 181 Cal. 212, 221, 183 P. 809; Crane v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Cal.App.2d 360, 366, 62 P.2d 189; Firestone Tire etc. Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 166 Cal.App.2d 519, 333 P.2d 378. In the case at bar Board was directed by statute to perform the limited function in this instance of determining whether the petition was sufficient and to then determine whether or not the ultimate decision on change of boundaries should be made by the electors of the territory involved or by the board of supervisors. In so acting it was limited by statute to the particular purpose then involved, and was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. When it made its formal decision and concluded that phase of its function its power was exhausted. Firestone Tire etc. Co. v. Board of Supervisors, supra; Heap v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 405, 407, 57 P.2d 1323. As was said in Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal.2d 303, 323, 144 P.2d 4, 15: 'The only question to be determined is when action becomes final. That is in every case a question dependent for its answer upon the scheme of the law by which power is conferred.' In Olive Proration Program Committee v. Agricultural etc. Comm., 17 Cal.2d 204, 209, 109 P.2d 918, 921 the court said: 'Where orders which relate to what may be rather broadly defined as individual rights are concerned, the question whether the administrative agency may reverse a particular determination depends upon the kind of power exercised in making the order and the terms of the statute under which the power was exercised. * * * The determination depends upon the provisions of the particular statute.'
In Peart v. Board of Supervisors, 145 Cal.App.2d 8, 10, 301 P.2d 874, 875, the court said: 'It is an oversimplification to group together all acts of a board of supervisors in the creation of a new city or district, and stamp all such acts, as a group, as either within or beyond the scope of court review. Rather, each statute authorizing such action places upon the subordinate legislative body some restrictions which are conditions for its exercise of jurisdiction, and which require finding of specified facts. Thus, a board's finding as to sufficiency of the notice of hearing [citations], or of the petition, Borchard v. Board of Supervisors, 144 Cal. 10, 77 P. 708, whether such findings be termed 'judicial,' 'quasi-judicial,' or otherwise, are clearly subject to some review by the courts under sufficient pleadings in a proper form of proceeding.'
We do not have here a case of matters which lie within the continuing jurisdiction of the board of supervisors, such as is the subject of Lavine v. Jessup, 161 Cal.App.2d 59, 326 P.2d 238 (selection of a site for a court house) or Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Offner, 86 Cal.App.2d 92, 194 P.2d 33 (contract let after rejection of old bids). The case of Vernon v. Board of Supervisors, supra, is cited in support of DeWitt's position. That case was one in which a fraud had been practiced on the board of supervisors and it undoubtedly had the power to correct a mistake resultant from fraud.
We think the trial court's decision is correct. The judgment is affirmed.
MUSSELL, Acting P. J., concurs. --------------- * Opinion vacated 2 Cal.Rptr. 1, 348 P.2d 567.