Opinion
C.A. No. 06A-11-001 WLW.
Submitted: May 7, 2007.
Decided: August 17, 2007.
Upon Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Reversed and Remanded.
Jeffrey J. Clark, Esquire, Schmittinger Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, Delaware; attorneys for the Petitioner.
James G. McGiffin, Jr., Esquire, Community Legal Aid Society, Inc., Dover, Delaware; attorneys for the Respondent Fannin.
Ralph K. Durstein, III, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware; attorneys for Respondent J.P. Court 16.
ORDER
Procedural History
Delaware State Housing Authority/Clark's Corner ("DSHA" or "Petitioner") filed a Complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court No. 16 ("JP Court") seeking summary possession of a rental unit occupied by the Tenant Respondent Angel Fannin. The Complaint was dismissed and DSHA appealed the decision to a three-judge Panel within the JP Court. The three-judge Panel, on de novo review, granted Ms. Fannin's pretrial Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. The Panel dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint, without prejudice, because the Panel determined that DSHA failed to comply with 25 Del. C. § 5708.
DSHA petitioned this Court for Writ of Certiorari for review of the Panel's October 31, 2006 judgment dismissing the Petitioner's Complaint. Ms. Fannin filed a Motion to Dismiss DSHA's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which this Court denied by Court Order dated January 25, 2007 . The Parties have completed briefing, pursuant to the Court's request, and the matter is now ripe for judgment on certiorari.
Delaware State Housing Auth. v. J.P. Ct. 16 and Fannin, 2007 WL 625901 (Del.Super.).
Standard of Review
On certiorari, the Court's review is on the record and it may not weigh evidence or review the lower tribunal's factual findings. Rather, the reviewing court considers the record before the lower tribunal to determine whether it: (I) exceeded its jurisdiction; (ii) c ommitted errors of law; or (iii) "proceeded irregul arly." In these situations, the decision of a lower tribunal will be reversed: (I) for exceeding the tribunal's jurisdiction only if the record fails to show that the matter was within the lower tribunal's personal and subject matter jurisdiction; (ii) for an error of law committed by the lower tribunal when the record affirmatively shows that the lower tribunal has "proceeded illegally or manifestly contrary to law;" and (iii) for irregularities of proceedings if the lower tribunal failed to create an adequate record for review.
Reise v. Board of Bldg. Appeals of City of Newark, 746 A.2d 271, 274 (Del. 2000).
Id. (citing 1 Woolley's Delaware Practice, § 896 (1906)).
Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2004 WL 2921830, *2 (Del.Supr.) (citations omitted).
Discussion
The JP Court dismissed DSHA's Complaint by Court Order, dated October 31, 2006. The JP Court's Order provided in full:
"The Court has entered a judgment or order in the following form:
October 31, 2006: Three Judge panel held this date before Judges Darling, Murray and Arndt. A pretrial motion to dismiss made by Defendant, Plaintiff failed to file the suit as required by 25 Del Code section 5708 (2) and (3); was granted. The issue before the Court was if the Defendant was late paying her rent within a 12-month period. While Plaintiff, in their filing, specified when the rent was due and when two of the payments were made, they failed to specify when the third payment was made. (A material fact of the alleged breach).
Therefore Plaintiff's suit is dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to comply with 25 Del Code section 5708."
This Court's certiorari review in this case is limited to a review of the record that was before the JP Court to determine whether the JP Court committed an error of law in dismissing DSHA's Complaint. The JP Court dismissed the Complaint because the Court decided that the Complaint failed to meet the requirements set forth in 25 Del. C. §§ 5708(2) and (3). Title 25 Del. C. §§ 5708(2) and (3) provide that "If possession of the rental unit is sought on the grounds that the tenant has violated or failed to observe a lawful obligation in relation to tenant's use and enjoyment of the rental unit, the Complaint shall, in addition to the requirements of the foregoing section: (2) Allege with specificity the facts constituting a breach of the rule or provision of the rental agreement and that notice or warning as required by law was given to a tenant; and (3) Set forth the facts constituting a continued or recurrent violation of the rule or provision of the rental agreement . . ."
DSHA sought possession of Ms. Fannin's rental unit on the grounds that Ms. Fannin paid her rent late three (3) times in a twelve (12) month period, in violation of the lease agreement. Sections 5708(2) and (3) require that facts constituting a breach of the rental agreement be set forth and alleged with specificity in the Complaint. It appears undisputed that Ms. Fannin made late payments in October 2005 and January 2006. However, the JP Court dismissed DSHA's Complaint for its noncompliance with §§ 5708 (2) and (3) because DSHA failed to specify when Ms. Fannin actually made the third "late" payment, which the Panel considered a material fact of the alleged breach.
DSHA argues that Ms. Fannin's third late payment in a twelve month period occurred in June 2006.
The JP Court articulated that the "Plaintiff, in their filing, specified when the rent was due and when two of the payments were made." However, the lower Court dismissed the Complaint for its lack of specificity, under § 5708, because the Court found that DSHA's failure to expressly state "when the third payment was made" was a "material fact of the alleged breach." The lower Court was apparently satisfied with the Plaintiff's representation that rent was due on the first of the month because the only mention of due dates in the Amended Complaint were statements contained in the late notices sent to Ms. Fannin, which were incorporated into the Amended Complaint by reference. The late notices sent to Ms. Fannin, dated October 13, 2005, January 12, 2006 and June 16, 2006, all stated: "Since your payment is due on the first of every month, you are considered a delinquent tenant and in violation of your lease." The JP Court's recognition, on the face of its October 2006 Order, that the Plaintiff "specified" when the payments were due necessarily means that the Court took no issue with the first of the month due date. The JP Court's Order expresses that the Court was merely concerned with the lack of an actual date of payment concerning the third (June 2006) payment.
The Respondent contends that the lease agreement is ambiguous as to when the rent payment is actually due for purposes of terminating the lease. This Court will not address these substantive arguments which may be raised before the JP Court.
DSHA claimed that the June 2006 payment was the Respondent's third "late" payment in a twelve month period. The JP Court may not have known (as it may not have been pled) when the Respondent actually made her payment in June 2006. That being said, the record before the lower Court reflects that the June 2006 payment had not been made "as of June 9, 2006." The third payment could not therefore have been paid as of June 1, 2006. The record is clear that the June 2006 payment (third payment) would have been made after the first of the month and it is of no consequence whether or not the actual date of the third payment was pled. Therefore, the Amended Complaint did not lack the statutorily required specificity and the lower Court incorrectly dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint for Summary Possession as a matter of law.
DSHA's June 16, 2006 late notice sent to Ms. Fannin, which was incorporated into the Amended Complaint by reference.
Based on the foregoing, the Court's Judgment on certiorari is that the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court is reversed and remanded, in accordance with this decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.