Opinion
C080555
06-12-2018
ROSS DE LIPKAU et al., as Cotrustees, etc., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. OWEN RICHARD HANNA et al., Objectors and Appellants.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 39-2014-00308591-PR-TR-STK)
This appeal arises from a dispute between trustees charged with maintaining a collection of John Muir's personal papers and four beneficiaries of the trust who object to the trustees' efforts to donate the collection to a university so that it can be properly maintained for the public at large to enjoy. We conclude the trial court did not err in modifying the trust to permit donation of trust assets. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Sometime around 1970, descendants and heirs of conservationist and Sierra Club founder John Muir loaned a collection of approximately 6,700 letters, 78 journals, and more than 3,000 photographs and drawings, among other items (the collection), to the University of the Pacific (the University) library, where they were housed. The loan was of an indefinite period. Under the terms of the loan agreement, any royalty fees would be split evenly by the family and the University. The loan agreement, by its terms, did not alter the ownership of the collection.
As described by the trial court, the collection includes "personal papers of John Muir, including, inter alia, correspondence to and from John Muir, a collection of John Muir's drawings, John Muir's photograph collection, John Muir's journals from trips around the world, and John Muir's publish[ed] and precursor works . . . ."
Thereafter, the then owners of the collection established and transferred their interest in the collection to the Muir-Hanna Family Trust (the trust) under a trust agreement dated March 17, 1984. In addition to the collection, the trust assets included John Muir's cemetery site, other real property, a checking account, and rights to publishing royalties. The trust agreement states that its purpose is "to establish an effective management vehicle for certain assets held by various members of the John Muir family." It further provides that the trust "is created in the best interest and for the sole benefit of the family members who are beneficiaries of the trust." With respect to the disposition of the trust assets, the trust provides that "[u]pon termination, the trust estate then remaining shall be distributed to the descendants of Thomas R. Hanna and Wanda Muir Hanna [(Wanda being the daughter of John Muir)] who are living at the termination, by representation."
The settlors of the trust included the various family members and beneficiaries of the trust, including Edna S. Hanna (1/18th), Susan Flynn (1/27th), James S. Hanna (1/27th), David Hanna (1/27th), John M. Hanna (1/6th), Richard R. Hanna (1/6th), Mary Hanna (1/18th), Timothy R. Hanna (1/27th), Dennis Hanna (1/27th), Neil Hanna (1/27th), Ross E. de Lipkau (1/18th), Isabel Gaines (1/18th), Louise Powell (1/18th), and Ross E. Hanna (1/6th). The initial trustees of the trust were Richard R. Hanna and Ross E. de Lipkau.
The trust endows the trustees with broad discretion in administration of the trust. Specifically, the trustees have "discretion and complete power to administer the trust," and are specifically permitted to receive assets, "[t]o abandon, charge off, or otherwise dispose of any property which is of no value or of insufficient value to justify collection, care, administration, or protection," "[t]o grant options to sell and to sell" personal property for cash or on credit, or "[t]o lease the same, even for a term extending beyond the duration of the administration of the trust," to enter into contracts reasonably incidental to administration of the trust, and to carry out the terms of valid agreements entered into concerning trust assets, among other enumerated powers. Additionally, the trust provides that "[t]his agreement may be amended from time to time and may be revoked partially or fully by Ross E. de Lipkau or Richard R. Hanna [(the original trustees)], or if neither of us is living or is able to act, then by a majority of the adult beneficiaries, by a writing delivered to the trustee which shall specify the terms of such amendment or revocation."
In March 2014, Ross E. de Lipkau and William T. Hanna, great-grandsons of John Muir and then cotrustees of the trust, petitioned the court to modify the trust pursuant to Probate Code section 15409 and common law to permit them to donate the collection to the University. They alleged the trust "created a tool by which the Collection could be kept intact for the public to enjoy and study," which "was done in the best interest and for the benefit of the family members who are also beneficiaries of the Trust." They also alleged "[t]he complexity of proper archival and the cost and sophisticated technology of providing the public with digital accessibility to the materials together with the trustees' age and desire to be sure the collection has a permanent home all contributed to the decision to make the gift to [the University]." Thus, they alleged it was proper to modify the trust because "[t]he settlors did not know or anticipate that properly showcasing the Collection in the long run would not be feasible for the trustees but would be feasible for [the University]." They asserted the collection has "tremendous historical significance," but that "[i]ts intrinsic value is difficult to determine because it is unique . . . ." They claimed the "purpose of the donation would be to preserve the Collection intact for the public to enjoy and study, thereby fulfilling the purpose and intentions of the six (6) children of Tom and Wanda Hanna, together with their heirs. The donation would avoid the potential for having the Collection divided upon ultimate Trust termination—something that would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the Trust with respect to the Collection." Thus, the trustees sought modification of the trust to add a new section that would give the trustees sole discretion to transfer the collection to the University.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.
An amended petition, which is the operative pleading here, was subsequently filed in July 2014.
Four beneficiaries (comprising a collective 1/9th beneficial interest in the trust) opposed the modification. They claimed that to donate the collection to the University would violate the express language of the trust because it would not be in the "best interest" of or "for the sole benefit" of the family members. They additionally argued that the existence of a loan, rather than a gift, of the collection to the University prior to the establishment of the trust agreement was evidence "that the settlors' original intent was to preserve the family members' ownership of the Collection . . . ." The objecting beneficiaries further asserted that "any concern that the Collection will be divided upon termination of the Trust can easily by allayed or mitigated by the University" through the University's purchasing the objecting beneficiaries' interests in the collection, as contemplated by the trust agreement.
The objecting beneficiaries are some of the heirs of Richard R. Hanna: Owen Richard Hanna, Thomas Rea Hanna, Kevin Michael Hanna, and Laurie Hagglund Marchessault.
During the three-day trial on the petition for modification, evidence was presented regarding whether it was the intent of the settlors to permit the trustees to gift the collection to the University. Much of the evidence related to the views held and professed by family members prior to and at the time of the loan of the collection to the University. For example, at that time the family recognized that the collection was "hugely important" but that it was being inadequately stored by family members and was not being made available to scholars. The family members, who viewed themselves as stewards of the collection, were pleased to have the collection housed at the University, where it would be properly catalogued, stored, and made accessible to scholars and the public. A representative of the University who corresponded with the family at the time they loaned the collection to the University understood "very clearly that the Hanna Family wanted to protect the papers and preserve the papers and bring the papers together under one entity, to give them both protection of processing and development." At the time the loan was made, the family members "wanted [the University] to be the repository. They wanted [it] to bring the papers together. They wanted visibility for Muir's work and they believed that the University of [the] Pacific was the best place in order to do that and accomplish that and make sure that the fundamental preservation needs of those papers were fulfilled." It was also explained that at that time a loan rather than a gift was contemplated because the family wanted to retain control in light of a concern there may be material damaging to Muir's or the family's reputation in the collection, to ensure the University lived up to its part of the loan agreement, and due to existing copyright issues. Those concerns, however, had dissipated by the time the petition was filed.
When John Muir's eldest daughter, Wanda Muir Hanna (and mother or grandmother of the settlors of the trust), passed away in 1942, the collection was at the family home in Martinez. It was then disbursed, with some of the collection remaining in that home, some having been previously sent to the University of California, Berkeley (Bancroft Library), some going to her children, and some subsequently having been sent to Yosemite. The parts of the collection that had been distributed to family members were in boxes in their garages and basements. Some portions were in various states of disrepair, with indications of pest invasion and exposure to animal urine.
Muir's granddaughter, Jean Hanna Clark (a 1/6th beneficiary, who had stored boxes of Muir's documents in her garage), "was interested in protecting the reputation of John Muir as a scholar, as a student of nature." Muir was described as a "controversial figure" who had "explored ideas that . . . were sensitive to many Americans in late 19th Century and early 20th Century. He had gotten into great controversies over the Hetch Hetchy Movement between San Francisco and preservationists. There was a great deal of . . . propaganda . . . floating around during the time of the Hetch Hetchy Movement. And that was something that had caused concern about the personal reputation of John Muir, because there were things that were said that may not have been appropriate to the image of Muir." The family wanted to ensure "that things that were not what they considered to be in the public interest were removed from the papers" and to "be sensitive to [Muir's] standing as a person of great integrity and quality."
As time went on, management of the various Muir inheritance assets, including the collection, without a structured arrangement amongst the family was "burdensome and unsustainable," so the family established the trust to aid in payment of property taxes on real property and distribution of royalty checks. At that time title to the real property was also not clear, so Richard R. Hanna proposed that a trust be created to be a perpetual vehicle to manage all the assets, and that all family members deed their interest in the real property to the trust rather than going through the process to quiet title. Ross E. de Lipkau discussed the trust with Richard R. Hanna as it was being drafted, and de Lipkau testified "[t]here is no way the material [(the collection)] ever was intended to come out [of the trust]. We thought 50 years was reasonable. [Fifty] years in those days was just forever. It should have been 99 years or perpetual. But we specifically worked on [section] 3.9 [of the trust agreement, which allows for amendment and revocation of the trust by either of the initial trustees or by a majority of the adult beneficiaries] to make sure the Trust does not terminate and let—and the material [be] pulled out, period."
In the years since the loan to the University, other family members had also individually donated their own personal Muir memorabilia to the University, both prior to and after establishment of the trust. Richard R. Hanna had donated various items, including bookcases and books that were collectively referred to as "the library." Laurie Marchessault, one of the objecting beneficiaries and stepdaughter to Richard R. Hanna, testified that he had specifically requested the library as his inheritance from his parents, and that he treated it "in such a precious way." He "felt very strongly about the heritage of the Muir Family." Marchessault recalled that "we were always aware that we had this sort of great gift . . . amongst us. We were encouraged to use it, but it was—we took very good care of it. It was very sacred. You didn't highlight in a book. You didn't lend it to a friend. You know, you didn't leave it in your room. . . . I think he taught us to really have a great deal of respect for the Collection." It was Ross E. de Lipkau's understanding that "by giving what is called the library and then following it up with the Trust material [(the collection)], obviously he [(Richard R. Hanna)] intended the material to all be together. He didn't certainly want to donate some material and then have the rest sold or whatever." Marchessault also testified that they [(Richard R. Hanna's children)] believed the library "would probably be paid forward eventually because how would you—you know, he had it in terms of it being—you know, just a collection. You know, we wouldn't have split it up. We all knew that this part of his inheritance would be paid forward by having it go to a university or such." He had in fact told her that the "Library would be passed on to a museum or university"; however, he had never suggested to her that the collection would be donated.
Both trustees testified that the modification would carry out the intent of the settlors, who "considered themselves stewards of [the collection], not owners, stewards. And part of that stewardship was their intent in preserving and disseminating information contained in the [collection] . . . ." Ross E. de Lipkau testified that in his opinion "our parents, my uncles and mother, under no circumstances thought this material should be sold." This, he testified, was in line with Muir's own beliefs, as "Muir expressed disdain in many of his books about greed" and "Muir himself did not sell things that he felt were a benefit to mankind because he thought his ability to do things like that was a gift from God." Indeed, de Lipkau believes "the perpetual gift [to the University] will preserve the intention of our parents [(the settlors)], which is to forever preserve the Muiriana [(the collection)] for posterity, with no member or individual being capable of selling any part of it for personal gain." He even went so far as to express his belief that it would be "sacrilegious" to separate the collection from the rest of the Muir memorabilia that has been collected by the University from a variety of sources.
The trustees explained that the unanticipated circumstances supporting the need for modification are that "the settlors had no idea at the time of the formation of the Trust of the cost or the technology that would be involved in the preservation and the dissemination or making available for public use the materials." Additionally, with the passage of time and the looming termination of the trust, there was a concern that "one of the purposes of the Trust, which was to preserve the papers, might be jeopardized if at the end of the term the loan ceased and the properties had to be distributed amongst the heirs." William T. Hanna opined that if those circumstances occurred, it would be contrary to the settlors' intent, which "was the preservation and protection and the scholarship of the papers, and we [were] afraid that if it got split up, that would cease, and we would not fulfill the original intent of the Trust."
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the petitioners, thereby granting the sought modification. It simultaneously issued a statement of decision concluding that the express purpose of the trust was to serve as an "effective management vehicle" for certain assets, and that the statements that the trust was " 'created in the best interest and for the sole benefit of the family members' " is not declarative of an intent that the trust or the family retain ownership of the collection indefinitely. The trial court concluded that "the concept of stewardship underlies that Trust" and that "the intention of the Trust was to preserve the [collection], intact, for altruistic reasons." The trial court found support in the broad grant of discretion to the trustees, and the fact the trustees could have amended the trust to permit donation even without court approval. The trial court further found inclusion of this language was contrary to the objecting beneficiaries' contention that the family members would retain ownership under any and all circumstances. The trial court additionally concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the position that the modification was necessary to fulfill the settlors' intention and the purpose of the trust. The trial court found it particularly persuasive that Richard R. Hanna (the predecessor to the four objecting beneficiaries and one of the original trustees) had donated other John Muir-related materials that he owned to the University.
The objecting beneficiaries timely appealed.
The matter was assigned to the panel as presently constituted in February 2018. --------
DISCUSSION
The objecting beneficiaries contend the trial court erred in modifying or reforming the trust in contravention of precedent, contrary to the language of the trust, and in the absence of evidence indicating a mistake in drafting or intent of the settlors to allow for donation. They further contend the court's judgment amounts to an unconstitutional taking, impairs their contractual rights, and violates their due process rights. Additionally, the objecting beneficiaries argue there was no justiciable case or controversy before the trial court, that the judgment should be reversed because it amounts to unjust enrichment to the University and a sanction on the objecting beneficiaries. We are not persuaded.
1.0 Justiciability
We first address the objecting beneficiaries' claim that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter because there was no justiciable case or controversy before it. The essence of the objecting beneficiaries' claim is two-fold: First, they argue the court does not have the authority to permit someone to donate the property of another, and, second, they argue there is no controversy because the University can purchase the objecting beneficiaries' interests in the collection. We disagree.
To be justiciable, there must be an " 'actual controversy,' " meaning "one which admits of definitive and conclusive relief by judgment within the field of judicial administration, as distinguished from an advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts." (Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 117 (Selby Realty Co.).) Here, the petition asked the trial court to modify the trust to permit donation of an asset of the trust based on the assertion that was the intention of the settlors, or would have been their intention, had they foreseen the circumstances as they now are. The objecting beneficiaries disputed that was or would have been the intent of the settlors of the trust; therefore, there was an actual controversy before the court. And, as the trial court sitting in probate has statutory and common law authority to decide whether a trust should be modified, the matter was properly before it. Whether there may have been other means for the University to obtain the collection is not pertinent to the question whether a justiciable issue was presented. Thus, we conclude the petition filed by the trustees did present a justiciable case or controversy to the trial court.
2.0 Propriety of Trust Modification Order
Having concluded the trial court properly heard the matter, we address the objecting beneficiaries' contention that the trial court erred in modifying or reforming the trust to allow for donation of the collection. This contention implicates the related claims that the trial court's judgment was in contravention of precedent, thereby making it void and in excess of the trial court's jurisdiction for failing to adhere to stare decisis; was contrary to the express language of the trust; and was not supported by sufficient evidence indicating a mistake in drafting or that the settlors did or would have allowed for donation of the collection. We conclude the trial court did not err in ordering modification of the trust.
In addressing the objecting beneficiaries' contention, we must keep in mind the pertinent standards of review. As the trial court has discretion in deciding whether to modify a trust pursuant to section 15409, we review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. (See § 15409, subd. (a) [the court "may" modify a trust, under certain circumstances]; see also Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478 ["The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason."].) To the extent the trial court's decision relies upon an interpretation of the trust agreement itself, we apply the de novo standard of review, meaning we are not bound by the trial court's construction of the document. (See Estate of Russell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 200, 213; see also Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254.) In doing so, however, we must keep in mind the intent of the settlors of the trust as expressed in the trust agreement itself, and read the document as a whole to effectuate its "general scheme and dominant purpose" (Estate of O'Connell (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 526, 531-532), giving each expression some effect and giving each word its ordinary and grammatical meaning (§§ 21102, subd. (a), 21120-21122; see Estate of Duke (2015) 61 Cal.4th 871, 876 [permitting admission of extrinsic evidence to establish and clarify ambiguity in a testamentary instrument]). And, to the extent the trial court made any factual findings based on its evaluation of extrinsic evidence, we review those findings for substantial evidence, meaning we resolve any conflicts and draw all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment. (See Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311, 318; Estate of Bristol (1943) 23 Cal.2d 221, 223.)
Section 15409, subdivision (a) provides that "[o]n petition by a trustee or beneficiary, the court may modify the administrative or dispositive provisions of the trust or terminate the trust if, owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by the settlor, the continuation of the trust under its terms would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust. In this case, if necessary to carry out the purposes of the trust, the court may order the trustee to do acts that are not authorized or are forbidden by the trust instrument." Additionally, under the common law, " 'California courts have . . . the equity power to modify the terms of a trust where such modification is necessary to preserve the trust or serve the original intentions of the trustor. . . .' " (Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 51, 80; see id. at p. 82.)
We first address the objecting beneficiaries' claim that the trial court's interpretation of the trust conflicted with the express language of the trust. The trust agreement provides the following statement of purpose: "This trust is created to establish an effective management vehicle for certain assets held by various members of the John Muir family. . . . These various family assets . . . compose the initial trust estate of this trust. This trust is created in the best interest and for the sole benefit of the family members who are beneficiaries of the trust." Petitioners and the objecting beneficiaries disagree about the meaning of this statement of purpose. The objecting beneficiaries seize upon the language of the final sentence of the statement of purpose as an unambiguous declaration of the settlors' intent, which, they contend, would preclude the trustees from ever having the ability to donate the collection.
However, as the trial court recognized, in interpreting the language of the trust instrument, we do not consider that phrase in isolation, but in the context of the document as a whole. (Ike v. Doolittle, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 73 [" ' "In construing a trust instrument, the intent of the trustor prevails and it must be ascertained from the whole of the trust instrument, not just separate parts of it." ' "].) This includes a consideration of extrinsic evidence to demonstrate the context in which the trust document was drafted to determine whether there is some ambiguity and meaning to which the document is reasonably susceptible. (Ibid.)
In this instance, though the trust does indicate that it was "created in the best interest and for the sole benefit" of its beneficiaries, it also grants broad discretion to the trustees, up to and including amendment of its terms by the original trustees. It further permits the trustees to maintain the trust assets without liability for any loss or depreciation in value resulting from retention of the assets, and specifically authorizes the trustees to hold real property without the need "to make such real estate a productive asset of this trust." Thus, the trust contains language suggesting that the trustees do not in all respects have to act in the best interest of or for the sole benefit of the beneficiaries. Neither does the trust expressly preclude a transfer of the trust's assets, even donation. Indeed, the trustees are granted "complete power to administer the trust," and are expressly permitted to "abandon, charge off, or otherwise dispose of any property which is of no value or of insufficient value to justify collection, care, administration, or protection." While there is no contention that the collection lacks value, this demonstrates that, contrary to the objecting beneficiaries' interpretation, the trust instrument does not unambiguously prevent the trustees from donating assets to a third party as conflicting with the beneficiaries' interests. Thus, we are not persuaded that the trial court's interpretation is disallowed by the trust language.
Neither are we persuaded by the objecting beneficiaries' claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the settlors would have intended for donation of the collection to the University. In considering the trust agreement in the context of the circumstances in which it was entered into by the settlors, we conclude the trial court did not err in concluding that the purpose of the trust and the settlors' intent, at least with respect to the collection, was to preserve and protect the collection as a unified asset for altruistic purposes. There was evidence presented that John Muir himself disdained greed and believed that his works should be shared with the rest of humanity rather than sold for profit. Additionally, ample evidence demonstrated that at the time the loan was made and continuing thereafter, the family members viewed themselves as stewards of the collection and of other inherited assets. The family members viewed the collection as highly important, sacred, and for posterity. They had taken care to gather the collection and loan it to a university, where it could be protected and shared with the scholarly world, though at that time a gift was not contemplated because of concerns that have since been alleviated. Extrinsic evidence also showed they treated the University as the final repository for the collection and donated their own personal Muir memorabilia to the University to be stored, cataloged, and shared along with the collection.
We also reject the objecting beneficiaries' argument that the trial court's order modifying the trust contravenes existing precedent and is "a gross violation of long-established legal authorities" because that argument is not based on any authority related to the application of section 15409. The objecting beneficiaries rely on Bilafer v. Bilafer (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 363, 366 (expressly does not relate to a modification based on section 15409, but instead relates to whether a trustor of an irrevocable trust has standing to petition to reform an irrevocable trust on the basis of a mistake in drafting), Ike v. Doolittle, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at page 82 (a court may modify or reform a trust, under common law, where, as a result of drafting error, the expression of the trustor's intent is ambiguous), and Estate of Duke, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pages 893, 896 (rejecting categorical bar on admission of extrinsic evidence in interpreting or reforming unambiguous wills). As we have oft-stated, a case is not authority for a proposition not considered. (Siskiyou County Farm Bureau v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 411, 437, fn. 11.) Thus, none of these decisions are apposite to the present matter. Finally, we are not persuaded by the objecting beneficiaries' claim that a trust modification "may never harm the rights and interests of the beneficiaries." Section 15409 contains no such restriction, and "the paramount concern in construing [a testamentary instrument] is to determine the subjective intent of the testator." (Estate of Duke, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 890.) For instance, at times modification of a trust to carry out a trustor's intent may benefit some beneficiaries at other beneficiaries' expense, as in the case of adjusting the distributions to income beneficiaries at the expense of corpus beneficiaries.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting the trustees' petition to modify the trust to allow for donation of the collection to the University.
3.0 Constitutional Rights
We turn next to the objecting beneficiaries' claim that even if the trial court could modify the trust to permit donation based on statutory or common law authority, the trial court's order amounts to an unconstitutional governmental taking, infringes on their contractual rights, and violates their substantive due process rights. We conclude their constitutional claims are meritless.
The United States Constitution provides that no "private property [shall] be taken for public use, without just compensation." (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) The California Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property may be taken or damaged for a public use and only when just compensation . . . has first been paid to . . . the owner." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19, subd. (a).) For both purposes, a governmental taking occurs when the government sufficiently interferes with a person's property rights. (See Selby Realty Co., supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 119-120 ["to state a cause of action for inverse condemnation, there must be an invasion or an appropriation of some valuable property right . . . "]; see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104, 123-124 [57 L.Ed.2d 631, 637] [weighing the "economic impact" on the property owner, "interfer[ence] with distinct investment-backed expectations" and the character of governmental action in determining whether there was a taking].) Here, the objecting beneficiaries claim they have contractual property rights that were infringed by the trial court's order modifying the trust. However, the trial court did not direct or compel donation of the trust assets, otherwise transfer or in any way diminish the existing property rights of the objecting beneficiaries to any of the trust assets, or affect any of their rights under the loan agreement. Neither is the value of any trust asset affected by the trial court's judgment. Accordingly, the objecting beneficiaries have not shown any unconstitutional taking.
For the same reasons, the objecting beneficiaries have not established a violation of their substantive due process rights as protected by section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law") or article I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution ("[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . "). Here, the objecting beneficiaries have not been deprived of any property right as a result of the trial court's order modifying the trust. The beneficiaries continue to hold the same beneficial interest in the trust assets as they did prior to entry of the trial court's judgment.
Similarly, we reject the objecting beneficiaries' claim that the trial court impaired the obligations of contracts in contravention of article I, section 9 of the California Constitution, which provides that the Legislature may not pass any "law impairing the obligation of contracts." By modifying the trust to grant its trustees discretion to donate certain trust assets, the trial court did not impair any contractual obligations of the University, of the beneficiaries, or of the trustees. The loan agreement remains in full force and effect, as does the trust agreement, including the trustees' obligation "to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries." (§ 16002, subd. (a).)
4.0 Unjust Enrichment
Finally, we reject the objecting beneficiaries' claim that the trial court's order amounts to unjust enrichment of the University and a sanction on the objecting beneficiaries. "Under the law of restitution, '[a]n individual is required to make restitution if he or she is unjustly enriched at the expense of another. [Citations.] A person is enriched if the person receives a benefit at another's expense.' " (McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 389.) Here, because the trial court's order modifying the trust agreement has not transferred any interest in the collection to the University or away from the objecting beneficiaries, the objecting beneficiaries have not shown any benefit has been awarded to the University (who is not a party in this action) at their expense. Accordingly, they have not demonstrated any unjust enrichment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
BUTZ, J. We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J. MAURO, J.