Opinion
NO. CV-04-0192-EFS, [NO. CV-05-0280-EFS].
August 28, 2008
Before the Court are two motions. Plaintiffs and State Defendants jointly ask the Court to vacate its rulings declaring unconstitutional RCW 4.24.350(2) (Ct. Recs. 289 and 518) and also, as a condition of the Class Settlement, to vacate its rulings declaring unconstitutional RCW 74.15.030(7), RCW 74.15.080(1), WAC 388.296.0450, and WAC 388.296.0520 (Ct. Recs. 511 745). Ty Duhamel and Joachim Morrison appeared on behalf of the Fernandez Plaintiffs, and Katrin E. Frank appeared on behalf of the De La O Plaintiffs. Several Plaintiffs also attended. Appearing for State Defendants were Carrie Bashaw and John McIlhenny, Jr.
A. Background
On August 12, 2008, the Court entered an Order Approving Class Settlement. (Ct. Rec. 828.) In a separate Order, the Court indicated that it would grant the motions asking for vacatur of its Orders holding the pertinent statutes and regulations unconstitutional if it approved the proposed Class Settlement. (Ct. Rec. 830.) The Court intended to enter that Order some weeks ago but overlooked it. Having approved the settlement, the Court now addresses the basis for vacating the pertinent Orders as identified above.
B. Standard
The Court's authority to vacate these Orders is found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which states:
[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (2008). A court has complete power over interlocutory orders made therein and has authority to revise them when it is "consonant with equity" to do so. Simmons v. Brier Bros Co., 258 U.S. 82 (1922); see U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Pac. Award Metals, 2006 WL 1825705 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (agreeing to vacate an interlocutory order at the parties' request).
Where, as here, the Court is being asked to vacate its rulings finding state statutes and regulations are unconstitutional, the remaining parties' interests to a lawsuit is only one of several factors that the Court considers. In considering vacatur of its ruling(s), a district court should evaluate whether all parties involved in the ruling(s) request and agree to vacatur as a condition of a proposed settlement of the action; whether the ruling(s) held a law or regulation unconstitutional and, if so, what public interest inheres in the ruling; whether laws or regulations have been enacted that remedy the constitutional defect found by the judge thereby securing the public interest in the constitutionality of the laws; whether a former party to the action would be adversely affected by vacatur; and whether the costs of continuing the action with uncertain results are outweighed by the benefits of the proposed settlement of the action. These considerations immediately present themselves in this case though there may well be other considerations in a different case.
C. Application and Analysis
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in order to prevent the State child care and fraud inspectors from wrongfully entering and searching day care provider homes and seizing personal documents. The Court found RCW 74.15.050, RCW 74.15.080, WAC 388-296-040, and WAC 388-296-0520 unconstitutionally overbroad. (Ct. Rec. 511.) The State represented that it needed time to go through the traditional process to adopt emergency regulations to remedy the defects found in those regulations. The State further represented that it would abide the Court's ruling on those regulations and would not conduct activities under those regulations or statutes that would violate the Court's rulings. Based on those representations and the benefit to all parties from such State action, the Court held in abeyance for several months a motion to enjoin enforcement of those statutes and regulations in order to allow the State to draft, file, and ultimately adopt the necessary emergency regulations to remedy their constitutional defects and those of the related statutes. (Ct. Rec. 511.) The State Defendants promptly promulgated emergency regulations effective December 18, 2006, which effectively narrowed the time and place of inspections. (Ct. Rec. 513.) Ultimately, the Court declined to enter an injunction because, "[T]he amended provisions sufficiently narrow the time and place of inspections to render the warrantless searches constitutional, if conducted in accordance with the revised regulations." (Ct. Rec. 745, p. 8, ll. 8-10.) This provided the Plaintiffs individually and as a Class with the result sought.
The Proposed Class Agreement provides the Class with specific enforceable protections against the Department of Early Learning (DEL), which agreed to be a party to the agreement, including (1) the right to receive a Home Entry Letter setting forth the provider's rights and (2) modifications to the Department of Fraud Investigations investigator manual that limit an investigator's authority. Importantly, the Proposed Class Agreement provides these protections upon Court approval. In comparison, the State Defendants' appeal of the qualified immunity rulings will likely not be resolved until 2010 and then trial will likely not occur until 2011. The certain cost of continuing the case will be significant and the results of both the current State appeal and the action itself are uncertain with considerable risk of an adverse outcome for Plaintiffs. Additionally, the remedial regulations enacted by the State benefit both the Plaintiffs and the public interest in the constitutionality of the laws of the State of Washington. Further, the Proposed Class Agreement provides the individual Plaintiffs with compensation for past constitutional violations. Each of the named Plaintiffs will receive $45,000.00; Columbia Legal Services will receive $350,000.00 in fees and costs for its diligent representation of Plaintiffs. The Court has read with considerable attention the Declaration of D. Ty Duhamel In Support of Joint Motion to Tentatively Approve Class Settlement (Ct. Rec. 801) and is persuaded by the detailed description of the work of counsel and the benefits to Plaintiffs and Class that vacatur is just. Based on the above, the Court finds vacatur of the Orders finding unconstitutional the specific statutes and related regulations will better serve the Class, the individual Plaintiffs, and the public.
The Home Entry Letter is in English on one side and in Spanish on the reverse side.
Next, the Court turns to RCW 4.24.350(2) — the statute that was the basis for the counterclaim filed by the individual Mattawa Defendants. RCW 4.24.350(2) gives judicial officers, prosecuting authorities, or law enforcement officers the right to file a claim(s) or counterclaim(s) for what amounts to malicious prosecution against those who sued them. The Court found that section of the statute unconstitutional. (Ct. Rec. 289.) That ruling and the Court's ruling denying individual Mattawa Defendants qualified immunity under § 1985 were appealed. (Ct. Rec. 568.) The State Defendants filed a separate appeal (Ct. Rec. 574), which was later dismissed by the Ninth Circuit (Ct. Rec. 653).
In due course, the Plaintiffs and the individual Mattawa Defendants reached a satisfactory resolution. They filed a stipulation to dismiss their claims and counterclaims against each other. (Ct. Rec. 720.) The Court permitted Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to remove those claims; the complaint was amended, and the individual Mattawa Defendants along with their counterclaims under RCW 4.24.350(2) were effectively removed from the case. This settlement thereby mooted the appeal by the individual Mattawa Defendants of the Court's ruling holding RCW 4.24.350(2) unconstitutional. The result is that the State is not now in a position to appeal the Court's interlocutory ruling declaring RCW 4.24.350(2) unconstitutional. See Blair v. Shanahan, 919 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Indisputably, however, the constitutionality of RCW 4.24.350(2) is of considerable importance to the State because of its impact on state judicial officers, prosecuting authorities, and law enforcement officers. The State's inability to challenge the Court's RCW 4.24.350(2) ruling is an unintended result of the settlement between the individual Mattawa Defendants and the Plaintiffs, i.e., their dismissal mooted the appeal challenging the Court's RCW 4.24.350(2) counterclaim ruling. Further, vacatur works no injustice to the now non-party individual Mattawa Defendants. It achieves the very result sought in appealing the Court's ruling. Under these circumstances, the Court believes that justice requires the vacatur of this ruling.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The Joint Motion to Vacate Orders Declaring RCW 4.24.350(2) (Ct. Rec. 807) Unconstitutional is GRANTED. The Court's September 25, 2006 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part De La O Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Declaring RCW 4.24.350 Unconstitutional and Dismissing Counterclaim (Ct. Rec. 289) and January 3, 2007 Order Ruling on Motions for Reconsideration (Ct. Rec. 518) are VACATED.
2. As previously memorialized, the Joint Motion seeking vacatur of Orders declaring RCW 74.15.030(7), RCW 74.15.080(1), WAC 388.296.0450 and WAC 388.296.0520 unconstitutional (Ct. Rec. 798) is GRANTED. The Court's December 20, 2006 Order Entering Rulings from November 2, 2006 Hearing (Ct. Rec. 511) and Order Ruling on Motions for Reconsideration, Oral Motion for Clarification, and Injunction Requests Held in Abeyance (Ct. Rec. 745) are VACATED. IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to counsel.