Opinion
NO. 4-16-0378
10-11-2016
In re: D.D., a Minor, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. STEVEN DAVIS, Respondent-Appellant.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of McLean County
No. 15JA64
Honorable Kevin P. Fitzgerald, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Holder White and Appleton concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, which terminated respondent's parental rights.
¶ 2 In December 2015, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent, Steven Davis, as to his daughter, D.D. (born June 18, 2015). Following an April 2016 fitness hearing, the trial court found respondent unfit. At a best-interest hearing held immediately thereafter, the court terminated respondent's parental rights.
¶ 3 Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court's fitness and best-interest determinations were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 A. The Events Preceding the State's Motion
To Terminate Parental Rights
¶ 6 In June 2015, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that
D.D. was a neglected minor in that her environment was injurious to her welfare (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2014)) because in July 2011, respondent had his parental rights terminated as to his oldest child, I.D. (born July 2009), in McLean County case No. 10-JA-46. Following a shelter-care hearing conducted immediately thereafter, the trial court entered a temporary custody order, finding that an immediate and urgent necessity required D.D.'s placement in shelter care based on respondent's admission to the State's neglect allegation. The court then placed D.D. in the temporary custody of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶ 7 Following a July 30, 2015, adjudicatory hearing, the trial court determined that D.D. was a neglected minor based on respondent's stipulation that his parental rights had been terminated in McLean County case No. 10-JA-46, which respondent conceded placed D.D. in an environment injurious to her welfare. Following a September 2015 dispositional hearing, the court made D.D. a ward of the court and maintained DCFS as her guardian.
¶ 8 B. The State's Petition To Terminate Respondent's Parental Rights
¶ 9 In December 2015, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent's parental rights, alleging that he was unfit within the meaning of section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2014)). Specifically, the State alleged that respondent was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities as supported by competent evidence from a clinical psychologist of a mental impairment, mental illness, or an intellectual disability respondent possessed and sufficient justification existed to believe that the inability to discharge his parental responsibilities would extend beyond a reasonable time period (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(p) (West 2014)).
¶ 10 1. The April 2016 Fitness Hearing
¶ 11 a. The State's Evidence
¶ 12 Judy Osgood, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation on respondent in (1) February 2011 in case No. 10-JA-46 and (2) November 2015 in the instant case. Both of those evaluations consisted of a mental-status examination, clinical interview, intelligence testing, and numerous psychological and personality tests.
¶ 13 Osgood's February 2011 psychological evaluation report explained that in March 2010, DCFS took protective custody of 19-month-old I.D. because respondent was unable to adequately care for her due to a previous report that he lacked critical parenting skills. At that time, I.D.'s biological mother had an order of protection against respondent due to domestic violence.
¶ 14 Following administration of the aforementioned testing and interview procedures, Osgood diagnosed defendant with the following mental disorders: (1) depressive disorder not otherwise specified, (2) post-traumatic stress disorder, and (3) partner relational problem. In addition, respondent had an intelligence quotient (IQ) of 82, which Osgood considered lowaverage. Osgood recommended, in part, the following:
"It is strongly recommended that all contact between [respondent] and his 19-month[-]old daughter[, I.D.] remains supervised ***. [Respondent] presents with severe mental disorders, a learning disability, and chronic instability resulting in a high risk [of] harm to [I.D.] [if] she is left alone in [respondent's] care."
¶ 15 With regard to the November 2015 evaluation, Osgood testified that respondent's interview and testing took three hours to complete—two of which she spent interacting with respondent. Based on respondent's test results, Osgood opined that respondent suffered from the following mental disorders as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5): (1) "intermittent explosive disorder," (2) "history of spouse/partner
violence physical," (3) "parental/child relational problems," and (4) "borderline intellectual functioning." Osgood explained that the DSM-5 is the current reference publication used by clinical psychologists and numerous other medical professionals to determine whether a patient satisfies specific criteria, which indicates the existence of a mental-health condition. Osgood stated that respondent's mental disorders impacted his ability to parent.
¶ 16 As to her intermittent explosive disorder diagnosis, Osgood noted respondent's chronic failure to control his aggressive impulses. Osgood relied on reports from the police, DCFS, and the Illinois Association of Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA), which documented respondent's history of (1) verbal aggression; (2) property destruction; (3) domestic disputes with D.D.'s biological mother, Angel Hicks-Davis; (4) failing to comply with an order of protection filed against him by his former paramour (I.D.'s biological mother); and (5) berating DCFS staff during supervised visits with D.D. Osgood noted that respondent's "incidents of explosive verbal aggression" and "failure to control [his] aggressive impulses" during visitations caused D.D. to become "very upset and difficult to soothe." Osgood added that respondent's behavior significantly impacted his relationship with D.D.
¶ 17 Osgood stated that respondent's interfering conduct and belligerence toward the DCFS staff caused "significant" problems during his supervised visits with D.D. Osgood recounted a September 2015 joint-supervised visitation where respondent and Hicks-Davis refused to relinquish custody of D.D. to DCFS, and instead, they engaged in a physical altercation, which required police assistance. Osgood opined that respondent's "failure to control his aggressive impulses" was an example of respondent's intermittent explosive disorder. Osgood commented that respondent demonstrated an inability to recognize how his negative reactions would affect D.D.
¶ 18 In addition to D.D., Osgood noted that (1) DCFS had been involved with respondent's other children and (2) respondent had failed to parent any of his other children for any substantial period of time. Although Osgood could not recall the specifics circumstances, she stated that in "the original DCFS case involving [I.D.], there were some of these problems. So the parent/child relational problems involve[], certainly, [D.D.] as well as previous children." (Osgood's November 2015 psychological evaluation report documented that (1) the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights as to I.D., (2) respondent relinquished his parental rights to his second child, N.D. (born in 2013), and (3) respondent claimed to have monthly visitation with his third child, K.M. (unknown birth date).) Osgood reported that respondent had an IQ of 75, which indicated borderline intellectual functioning.
¶ 19 Osgood opined that respondent did not have the ability to discharge his parental responsibilities based on (1) DCFS' involvement with all of his children, (2) respondent's demonstrated inability to refrain from engaging in domestic disputes, and (3) respondent's borderline intellectual functioning. Osgood added that when she met respondent, he denied that he had (1) anger and aggression issues, (2) parenting deficiencies, or (3) engaged in domestic disputes. Respondent accused DCFS of lying and claimed that no reason existed for DCFS' involvement.
¶ 20 Osgood also opined that respondent would not benefit from treatment or services based upon his history, current circumstances, and recent reports indicating that these significant risk factors persisted. Osgood noted that even if respondent did consistently participate in recommended treatment, she would require respondent to show "years of consistent stability" before she could conclude that the aforementioned risk factors were no longer present. In this regard, Osgood opined that even if she had 40 reports that respondent visited with D.D. with no disruptions, her conclusions regarding respondent's inability to parent D.D. would not change. Osgood
explained that such reports would indicate only that respondent could control himself for one hour in the controlled setting of a supervised visit conducted in an agency setting with agency assistance, if required.
¶ 21 Osgood acknowledged that (1) respondent successfully completed a parenting class, (2) she had not observed respondent interact with D.D., and (3) she had not visited respondent's home.
¶ 22 At the State's request, the trial court took judicial notice of case No. 10-JA-46, in which respondent's parental rights as to I.D. were terminated under section 1(D)(p) of the Adoption Act.
¶ 23 b. Respondent's Evidence
¶ 24 Sharon Thomas, respondent's mother, testified about her observations of respondent's loving and caring demeanor while interacting with D.D. during the six hours immediately following D.D.'s birth. During that hospital visit, Sharon did not see respondent display any emotions that she considered adverse to D.D. Sharon also recalled that she had observed respondent interact with D.D. for approximately 10 minutes at the end of an April 2016 supervised visit between respondent and D.D. In 2009, respondent and his former paramour lived in Sharon's home for approximately 18 months. During that time, Sharon described respondent's temperament with I.D. as one of a normal father who would feed, read to, play with, and teach appropriate things to I.D. Sharon never observed respondent take out his anger against a child and believed that respondent had the mental acuity to parent D.D.
¶ 25 Respondent testified that he has "anger problems sometimes" but denied that he displayed that anger in D.D.'s presence or in the presence of any of his other children. Respondent acknowledged DCFS' involvement with his other children, but he stated that with "two of my
kids[,] I didn't know nothing about [them] until it was too late." Respondent claimed that the reason D.D. was initially removed from his care was because of inadequate shelter. Respondent believed that his two-bedroom residence would provide a safe and clean environment for D.D. Respondent stated that he would apply lessons learned from his parenting classes, noting that appropriate punishment does not include physical contact such as hitting, slapping, or spanking. Respondent detailed the steps he would take to parent D.D., which included (1) comforting D.D., (2) reading to D.D., (3) sending D.D. to the best schools, and (4) providing D.D. appropriate guidance.
¶ 26 With regard to DCFS' account of the September 2015 incident, respondent denied that he refused to relinquish custody of D.D. at the end of the visitation. Although respondent had initially testified that "I didn't mean to push, shove the caseworker or anything[,]" during his later testimony, respondent denied pushing the caseworker who was attempting to regain custody of D.D., calling DCFS' account "a lie." Specifically, respondent made the following statements:
"Well, if I pushed [the caseworker], I didn't mean to. *** I don't remember exactly what happened that day. That's the day *** [the] visitations [with D.D.] stopped. I was upset. And I was trying to calm [Hicks-Davis] down from going off the deep end.
You guys—I'm sorry, Your Honor, but I gotta [sic] say this or else I'm gonna [sic] go off on everybody in this courtroom[,] and I don't mean to. I'm going to say this and I don't care what happens. But [Hicks-Davis] has problems. [Hicks-Davis] is disabled, but you guys can't use that stuff against her."
¶ 27 Thereafter, the State challenged respondent about his understanding as to why
D.D. was removed from his care in June 2015. When the State attempted to confront respondent with the trial court's July 2015 adjudicatory order, the following exchange occurred:
"[THE STATE]: This is the adjudicatory order that was entered in [this] case, right?
[RESPONDENT]: Okay.
[THE STATE]: And what it's saying is that—
[RESPONDENT]: 'The environment,' right there (indicating).
[THE STATE]: 'The environment.' And why was there an environment? Because you were not found fit in the last case and—
[RESPONDENT]: Because of [I.D.], really?
[THE STATE]: Yeah.
[RESPONDENT]: You guys are going to use that against me?
[THE STATE]: Well[,] that's—
[RESPONDENT]: That happened six years ago.
[THE STATE]: You already admitted to that, sir.
* * *
[RESPONDENT]: I admitted to the environment thing. That's the only thing I admitted to. ***
[THE STATE]: Let me just wrap this up, [respondent]. ***
[RESPONDENT]: Well, you guys better hurry up because I'm about to walk out of this courtroom.
[RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL: Respondent].
[THE STATE: Respondent].
[RESPONDENT]: I'm—I'm very frustrated with you guys because you guys want to use [I.D.] against me."
¶ 28 c. The Trial Court's Judgment
¶ 29 Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled respondent was unfit under section 1(D)(p) of the Adoption Act. Specifically, the court found that respondent suffered from a mental impairment or mental illness, adding that (1) "Osgood was very clear on the definition of that" and (2) "no contrary evidence whatsoever presented here to contradict that finding." The court also provided the following rationale:
"If you look at *** Osgood's opinion, I think it's supported by all the evidence. I think her opinion with respect to [respondent's] intermittent explosive disorder was supported by his own testimony today when *** having been asked some questions[,] which I would describe in a very professional manner by [the State, respondent] said, 'I better get off the stand. I'm going to go off on you people.' I just think he does not have the ability to control his anger."
¶ 30 As to the issue of whether respondent's mental deficiencies would extend past a reasonable period, the trial court noted that in July 2011, respondent had his parental rights terminated in case No. 10-JA-46, under the same section of the Adoption Act presented in the in
stant case, which the court stated showed that in the five years that have since passed, respondent has been unable to overcome his mental deficiencies.
¶ 31 2. The Best-Interest Hearing
¶ 32 At a best-interest hearing conducted immediately thereafter, the trial court considered the following evidence provided by the State.
¶ 33 a. The State's Evidence
¶ 34 After the State called its first witness, respondent moved for a continuance because Sharon, who had transported respondent to the hearing, had to leave. After the State objected, respondent explained that if Sharon left, he had no transportation home. Respondent added, "Sorry, Your Honor, if you guys don't like it, I'll walk out of the courtroom right now because I'm not going to deal with this anymore." After the trial court denied respondent's oral motion to continue the best-interest hearing, respondent stated, "You either continue it or Aunt Jamie will end up at the bottom of the lake." (The record shows that Sharon testified out of order at the best-interest hearing to accommodate her work schedule. Jamie Schmit is respondent's maternal aunt and was D.D.'s foster parent at the time of the best-interest hearing.)
¶ 35 Jamie, who was 44 years old, testified that in March 2015, her father had esophageal cancer. Jamie and her husband of nine years, Joseph, assumed responsibility for her father's care, which was a logistical challenge because of the driving distance involved. To minimize this problem, in June 2015, the Schmits and Jamie's father moved into the same residence.
¶ 36 Jamie testified that even during childhood, she was not close with Sharon and "bad blood" existed between them in the ensuing years. Despite their relationship, Jamie returned an urgent phone message from Sharon. Upon doing so, Jamie learned of D.D.'s birth. Six days after D.D.'s birth, Jamie met with Sharon and respondent at a public park, where Sharon
asked Jamie if she and Joseph were willing to care for D.D. Jamie recounted that after Sharon informed respondent that Jamie and Joseph were licensed foster care parents, respondent was adamant that they care for D.D. At one point, respondent asked Jamie if she was willing to adopt D.D. if that was a possibility. Jamie assured respondent that she would raise D.D. as her own child if the opportunity arose. In July 2015, DCFS placed D.D. with the Schmits.
¶ 37 Jamie described D.D. as a blessing and a big part of their family, adding that D.D. seeks her comfort. In March 2016, Jamie's father died, but during their short time together, D.D. had bonded with her "papa." Jamie works as a stay-at-home mother to D.D. and Joseph financially supports their family. Jamie considered D.D. her child and confirmed that she and Joseph were willing to adopt D.D. Jamie believed that it was in D.D.'s best interest to remain with them. Jamie noted that given respondent's threat that they would find her at the bottom of a lake, she did not believe it would be a good idea to maintain a relationship with respondent.
¶ 38 Joseph, who was 33 years old, testified that he worked for the past 3 1/2 years as a project manager for a company that provides mechanical support services to heavy industries, such as oil and gas refineries. Joseph confirmed that he had been in that industry for the past 13 years and considered his employment secure. Joseph confirmed that he was willing to adopt D.D. and let respondent have contact with D.D. if respondent demonstrated that he had turned his life around. Joseph called D.D. a blessing and stated he could not remember his life before D.D. arrived. Joseph confirmed that D.D. was completely integrated into their family.
¶ 39 Erica Fogarty testified that she assumed management of the instant case four days after D.D's birth. Fogarty believed that (1) it was in D.D.'s best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights and (2) Jamie and Joseph provided a good and loving environment for D.D.
¶ 40 Sue Sengsay, a CASA representative, testified that (1) it was in D.D.'s best inter
est to terminate respondent's parental rights; (2) based on her observations, Jamie and Joseph provided D.D. a loving and appropriate environment; and (3) permitting Jamie and Joseph to adopt D.D. would be in D.D's best interest.
¶ 41 Sengsay noted that during her observation of about 15 weekly supervised visits respondent had with D.D., respondent's interaction with D.D. during the scheduled hour was appropriate. Sengsay observed, however, that after he leaves the visitation building, respondent and Hicks-Davis "are always arguing."
¶ 42 b. Respondent's Evidence
¶ 43 Sharon testified that she had concerns about D.D.'s current placement with Jamie, explaining that Jamie had power of attorney over their father's affairs, and Sharon felt that Jamie had taken financial advantage of that fiduciary relationship. Another family member informed Sharon that their father had drafted a new will that Sharon acknowledged she never saw. Sharon accused Jamie of isolating her father—who had recently died—from the rest of the family by prohibiting any contact after their father began living with Jamie. Sharon claimed that Jamie was isolating D.D. in the same manner.
¶ 44 Sharon acknowledged that her relationship with Jamie was strained "for a few years" before her fiduciary claims arose. Despite this, Sharon confirmed that she asked if Jamie could put their differences aside and care for D.D., whom DCFS had placed with a traditional foster family. Sharon confirmed that during the two aforementioned instances she had observed respondent interacting with D.D., respondent did so in D.D.'s best interest.
¶ 45 c. The Trial Court's Judgment
¶ 46 Following argument, the trial court found that it was in D.D's best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights. (The court also terminated the parental rights of Hicks
Davis, who is not a party to this appeal.)
¶ 47 This appeal followed.
¶ 48 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 49 A. The Trial Court's Fitness Determination
¶ 50 1. The Applicable Statute and the Standard of Review
¶ 51 Section 1(D) of the Adoption Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"D. 'Unfit person' means any person whom the court shall find to be unfit to have a child, without regard to the likelihood that the child will be placed for adoption. The grounds of unfitness are any one or more of the following, except that a person shall not be considered an unfit person for the sole reason that the person has relinquished a child in accordance with the Abandoned Newborn Infant Protection Act:
* * *
(p) Inability to discharge parental responsibilities supported by competent evidence from a psychiatrist, licensed clinical social worker, or clinical psychologist of mental impairment, mental illness or an intellectual disability as defined in Section 1-116 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, or developmental disability as defined in Section 1-106 of that Code, and there is sufficient justification to believe that the inability to
discharge parental responsibilities shall extend beyond a reasonable time period. However, this subdivision (p) shall not be construed so as to permit a licensed clinical social worker to conduct any medical diagnosis to determine mental illness or mental impairment." Id.
¶ 52 "The State must prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial court's findings must be given great deference because of its superior opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility." In re Jordan V., 347 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1067, 808 N.E.2d 596, 604 (2004).
¶ 53 2. Respondent's Fitness Claim
¶ 54 Respondent argues that the trial court's fitness determinations were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
¶ 55 Determining whether a parent is unfit due to a mental disability requires a two-part analysis. In re M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1114, 762 N.E.2d 701, 705 (2002). "First, competent evidence from the designated category of experts must show the parent suffers from a mental disability which prevents him or her from discharging parental responsibilities. Second, sufficient justification must be established to believe the inability to discharge parental responsibilities will extend beyond a reasonable time period." Id. "[I]n cases involving the termination of parental rights, each case is sui generis and must be decided based on the particular facts and circumstances presented." In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 422, 752 N.E.2d 1112, 1121 (2001).
¶ 56 In this case, the trial court found that respondent was unable to discharge his parental responsibility as to D.D. because he suffered from a mental disorder that was supported by
competent evidence from a clinical psychologist, who provided sufficient justification to believe that respondent's inability to parent D.D. would extend beyond a reasonable time period. Specifically, the court found that Osgood's opinion that respondent suffered from intermittent explosive disorder was supported not only by competent expert evidence, but also by respondent's unwarranted angry outbursts during the fitness proceedings, which demonstrated his failure to overcome the mental deficiencies that formed the basis of Osgood's relevant diagnoses five years earlier. We conclude that the court's finding on that particular ground was supported by clear and convincing evidence.
¶ 57 We note that in his brief to this court, respondent challenges the reliability of the State's expert evidence on the basis that (1) Osgood met with respondent once in November 2015 to perform her psychological evaluation and (2) Osgood's direct contact with respondent during that evaluation lasted only two hours. In this regard, respondent contends that the State's evidence was "too flimsy a pretext" to substantiate the trial court's fitness finding. We disagree.
¶ 58 In this case, Osgood detailed the assessment procedures she employed, which included a clinical interview, a mental-status examination, and a battery of psychological and intelligence testing to evaluate respondent's mental health. Based on (1) police, DCFS, and CASA reports; (2) the results of respondent's November 2015 clinical testing; and (3) Osgood's behavioral observations, Osgood determined that respondent satisfied certain criteria as outlined in the DSM-5 reference manual to warrant diagnoses of (1) "intermittent explosive disorder," (2) "history of spouse/partner violence physical," (3) "parental/child relational problems," and (4) "borderline intellectual functioning." We note that respondent neither challenges the specific procedures Osgood employed nor the substance of her opinions. Instead, respondent challenges only the overall time Osgood interacted with him, which he essentially claims was inadequate to sub
stantiate Osgood's diagnoses.
¶ 59 As to this claim, we note that respondent conveniently disregards that the evidence presented showed that Osgood had a February 2011 baseline from which she could gauge respondent's mental progress. Coupled with (1) numerous reports of respondent's tumultuous behavior with subsequent partners, and more importantly, how that behavior affected his relationships with his other children in the five years that followed; and (2) the results of Osgood's November 2015 psychological evaluation, we agree with the trial court that Osgood's clinical opinions were clearly and convincingly supported by the evidence presented. In addition, respondent's unwarranted outburst as his April 2016 fitness hearing buttressed Osgood's opinion that respondent's inability to parent D.D. because of his intermittent explosive disorder would extend beyond a reasonable time period.
¶ 60 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's finding that respondent was unfit within the meaning of section 1(D)(p) of the Adoption Act was supported by clear and convincing evidence.
¶ 61 B. The Trial Court's Best-Interest Determination
¶ 62 1. Standard of Review
¶ 63 At the best-interest stage of parental-termination proceedings, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. In re Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071, 918 N.E.2d 284, 290-91 (2009). Consequently, at the best-interest stage of termination proceedings, " 'the parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life.' [Citation.]" In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 959, 835 N.E.2d 908, 912 (2005).
¶ 64 "We will not reverse the trial court's best-interest determination unless it was
against the manifest weight of the evidence." Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d at 1071, 918 N.E.2d at 291. A best-interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the facts clearly demonstrate that the court should have reached the opposite result. Id.
¶ 65 2. The Trial Court's Best-Interest Finding in This Case
¶ 66 In this case, the evidence presented at the best-interest hearing showed that DCFS placed D.D. with relatives, specifically, Jamie, D.D.'s cousin, and her husband Joseph, which, at the time, respondent encouraged. Both Jamie and Joseph testified about the stable and loving environment they provided for D.D., adding that D.D.'s introduction into their lives was a blessing. Jamie and Joseph also expressed their willingness to provide D.D. permanency and stability by pledging their intent to adopt D.D. Respondent, on the other hand, was not reasonably capable of caring for D.D. in the foreseeable future, given his mental disorders.
¶ 67 Based upon the evidence presented, we agree with the trial court's finding that the evidence warranted termination of respondent's parental rights.
¶ 68 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 69 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 70 Affirmed.