Fulp argues that the appointment of a receiver was not authorized because John Holt, through Fulp Holt, P.C., has an adequate remedy at law under quantum meruit, but if "corporate assets were dissipated because no receiver was appointed, any remedy at law would be meaningless." D.C. Micro Development v. Lange, 259 Ga. App. 611, 614 (3) ( 578 SE2d 251) (2003). There was evidence that: Fulp used funds of Fulp Holt, P.C., for his personal use in the months prior to the decision to dissolve the firm; the day following the decision to dissolve the firm, Fulp borrowed money on the firm's line of credit without John Holt's permission, and without disclosing to the bank that the firm was to be dissolved; and, that he took numerous records from Fulp Holt, P.C., including most personal injury files.

Additionally, "[i]f [Unity's] assets were dissipated because no [injunction was granted], any remedy at law would be meaningless." D.C. Micro Dev. v. Lange , 259 Ga. App. 611, 614 (3), 578 S.E.2d 251 (2003). (b) Whether the threatened injury to Anabaptist and Unity outweighs the threatened harm that the injunction may do to Aliera.

Fulp , 284 Ga. at 753, 670 S.E.2d 785 (citation and punctuation omitted). See D. C. Micro Dev. v. Lange , 259 Ga. App. 611, 614 (3), 578 S.E.2d 251 (2003). Our Supreme Court's decision in Coe Manufacturing Co. v. Dublin & Laurens Bank , 160 Ga. 675, 128 S.E. 908 (1925), which the defendants cite for the proposition that the trial court erred in this conclusion, is inapposite.

This is the second appearance of this case before us. In D.C. Micro Dev. v. Lange, 259 Ga. App. 611 ( 578 SE2d 251) (2003) ( "D.C.I"), we affirmed the trial court's appointment of a receiver over the corporate defendants, D.C. Micro Development and TopDog Software, Inc. Id. at 613-614 (2).

(Citation omitted.) D. C. Micro Dev. v. Lange, 259 Ga. App. 611, 612 (1) ( 578 SE2d 251) (2003). (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

[Cit.]" D.C. Micro Dev. v. Lange, 259 Ga. App. 611, 612(1) ( 578 S.E.2d 251) (2003). "The return can only be set aside upon evidence which is not only clear and convincing, but the strongest of which the nature of the case will admit.