Opinion
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, et al. Real Parties in Interest.
A132172 California Court of Appeal, First District, First Division September 2, 2011NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. JD09-3196
Marchiano, P.J.
D.B. (Mother) seeks extraordinary relief from an order of the San Francisco City and County Superior Court, Juvenile Division that terminated her reunification services and set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select a permanent plan for the minor J.B. (born October 2005). Mother challenges a finding in that order, that the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) offered or provided her with reasonable services, claiming the Agency unreasonably failed to arrange for transportation costs to cover visitation between her and the minor. As discussed below, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding of reasonable services. Accordingly, we deny Mother’s petition for an extraordinary writ on the merits.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Section 366.26, subdivision (l)(1)(A), bars review on appeal if the aggrieved party has not made a timely writ challenge to an order setting a hearing for selection and implementation of a permanent plan. The statute also encourages the appellate court to determine all such writ petitions on their merits, as we do here. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(4)(B).)
Background
On May 27, 2009, the Agency received a referral from a person who reported Mother had left the minor J.B.—then three years of age—in her care in January and had never returned to pick her up. The Agency detained J.B. on June 29, and filed a petition under section 300 the following day. The petition alleged, among other things, that Mother had left J.B. in the care of another without provisions for support (§ 300, subd. (b)), and her whereabouts were unknown (§ 300, subd. (g)).
The juvenile court ordered J.B. formally detained on July 1, 2009. In subsequent reports, the Agency said it had still not been able to locate Mother, and the alleged father appeared not to have any interest in parenting D.B. At a jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on August 27, conducted in the absence of both parents, the juvenile court sustained jurisdiction and placed D.B. in out-of-home care. It also made nonreunification findings and set the matter for a hearing under section 366.26. In October, J.B. turned four years of age and was placed with D.C., the family friend in whose care Mother had left J.B. in January 2009.
On December 2, 2009, the juvenile court vacated the scheduled section 366.26 hearing. In a report signed the following week, the Agency stated Mother had “surfaced” in late September and had expressed a desire to have J.B. returned to her care. It recommended the court order reunification services for her. On December 17, the court vacated its previous jurisdictional/dispositional orders.
The juvenile court appointed counsel for Mother on September 29, 2009.
On April 2, 2010, after a second jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the juvenile court sustained the allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), summarized above. The Agency continued J.B. in out-of-home care and ordered reunification services for Mother. Mother began to engage in services in May 2010. On July 1, 2010, Mother visited J.B. for the first time since the initiation of the dependency proceeding a year previously, on June 29, 2009.
Mother’s case plan required that she have regular visitation with J.B. as arranged by the assigned social worker; engage in individual therapy; keep the social worker apprised of her whereabouts at all times; complete a parenting education program; obtain and maintain stable housing for herself and J.B.; and, obtain a substance abuse evaluation.
At the six-month status review hearing, the assigned social worker reported Mother had completed a parenting education program and a psychological evaluation, and was participating in case management services and therapeutic visitation. She recommended continuing Mother’s services. The juvenile court adopted this recommendation on September 29, 2010.
In a report admitted at the 12-month permanency hearing (the 12-month hearing), dated March 30, 2011, the assigned social worker stated Mother continued to lack stable housing. Mother told the social worker in mid-December 2010 she was living in Vallejo and Sacramento. Although the social worker had set up visits for Mother and J.B. at the Bayview Family Resource Center, Mother had not attended visits there. She visited J.B. for a period of only four months, beginning July 1, 2010 and ending November 8, 2010. Mother had not kept the social worker apprised of her whereabouts, last met with the social worker in mid-December 2010, and missed a scheduled meeting with the social worker in January 2011. While Mother completed a parenting education class, and had parenting skills, her skills lacked consistency and appeared to be hindered by Mother’s pattern of abandoning J.B. Mother engaged in only six sessions of individual therapy between July and November 2010, and stopped participating afterward, contrary to the treatment recommendation included in her psychological evaluation. Mother had completed a substance abuse assessment in May 2010, but had not followed through on treatment recommendations including drug testing. Concluding Mother had “participated minimally in some services, and ha[d] not yet begun other services[, and had] not gained the stability needed to raise a child, ” the social worker recommended that the juvenile court terminate Mother’s reunification services and set the matter for a hearing under section 366.26. At the conclusion of the contested 12-month hearing, on May 12, 2011, the juvenile court adopted these recommendations.
In addition to leaving her daughter with D.C. in January 2009—which led to this proceeding—Mother had previously left the child with D.C. “off and on” for a period of time ending in January 2008. J.B. had also been placed in D.C.’s care for nine months in 2006, during an earlier dependency that concluded with Mother successfully reuniting with J.B.
Mother’s petition followed. (§ 366.26, subd. (l).)
Discussion
At the conclusion of the 12-month hearing, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence the Agency had offered or provided reasonable services to Mother. Mother contends there was no substantial evidence to support this finding. Specifically, she argues she could not obtain stable housing in the Bay Area, and moved away in order to do so in compliance with her case plan. She began living in Sacramento, and informed the assigned social worker that she had no funds to travel to San Francisco to visit her daughter. The Agency offered her transportation funds, but required that she travel to San Francisco to obtain them.
In reviewing this finding, our task is to determine whether substantial evidence shows that the Agency made a good faith effort to provide reasonable services. (In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 306.) This review standard applies even though the trial court was required to utilize the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. (In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75 (Jasmine C.).) In applying it, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s ruling, resolving conflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the finding. (See In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 46.) We do not reweigh the evidence. (Jasmine C., supra, at p. 75.)
Services may be deemed reasonable when the case plan has identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, the Agency has offered services designed to remedy those problems, has maintained reasonable contact with the parents, and has made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas in which compliance has proven to be difficult. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) Here, Mother objects only to the services the Agency offered or provided with respect to transportation funds to assure her access to visitation services.
The relevant evidence submitted by the Agency at the 12-month hearing indicates it began to provide transportation checks to Mother as early as November 15, 2010, when she picked up one such check at the Agency’s offices, evidently for the month of October. The assigned social worker testified Mother was receiving these checks because she had “never really” lived in San Francisco, but had stayed in a “lot of different places” during the review period. A month later, on December 14, Mother came by and picked up two more checks for the months of November and December. In January 2011, Mother twice failed to show for scheduled appointments—her transportation check for that month expired when she did not pick it up.
The social worker said she spoke with Mother by telephone on February 17, 2011, when she learned for the first time Mother was now living in Sacramento. At this time, Mother said she did not have funds to travel to San Francisco. The social worker explained she did not send funds to Mother, at this point, because the Agency does not mail checks. Also, Mother received transportation funds on November 15 and December 14, 2010, yet had not used these funds in order to travel to San Francisco to visit J.B., because her last visit occurred on November 8. Thus, the social worker reasoned Mother had already received sufficient funds to travel to San Francisco to obtain a transportation check for the month of February.
Mother met with the social worker’s supervisor on March 30, 2011, and received a transportation check for the month of February at that time. The social worker contacted Mother by telephone and mail in an unsuccessful attempt to meet with her in April. The social worker did meet with Mother in early May, the week before the 12-month hearing, in order to provide Mother with her monthly transportation check and to encourage her to engage in her services.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s ruling, we conclude the foregoing evidence shows the Agency made good faith efforts to provide Mother with the transportation funds she needed to access her visitation and other services in San Francisco. The issue is not whether the Department could have provided better services in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the Agency offered or provided Mother with reasonable services.
Disposition
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894; Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024.) The decision is final in this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.454(a), 8.490(b)(3).)
We concur: Margulies, J., Dondero, J.