Day v. Staples, Inc.

89 Citing cases

  1. Van Asdale v. Intern. Game Techn

    577 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009)   Cited 491 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that, to demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief of shareholder fraud, "the complaining employee's theory of such fraud must at least approximate the basic elements of a claim of securities fraud" (quoting Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2009))

    In Platone v. FLYi, Inc., 25 IER Cases 278, 287 (U.S. Dept. of Labor Sept. 29, 2006), the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor ("ARB") held that, to constitute protected activity under Sarbanes-Oxley, an "employee's communications must `definitively and specifically' relate to [one] of the listed categories of fraud or securities violations under 18 U.S.C.[] § 1514A(a)(1)." The three circuits that have addressed the issue have all agreed with the ARB's interpretation, see Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) ("The employee must show that his communications to the employer specifically related to one of the laws listed in § 1514A."); Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 2008) ("[A]n employee must show that his communications to his employer definitively and specifically relate to one of the laws listed in § 1514A.") (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted); Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 476 (5th Cir. 2008) ("We agree with the ARB's legal conclusion that an employee's complaint must definitively and specifically relate to one of the six enumerated categories found in § 1514A.") (internal quotation marks omitted), and we similarly defer to the ARB's reasonable interpretation of the statute. We agree with the district court that Shawn's conversations with Brown and Pennington satisfy this "definitively and specifically" standard.

  2. Wiest v. Lynch

    710 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2013)   Cited 246 times   21 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a protected report may pertain to an SOX-violation that has not yet occurred "as long as the employee reasonably believes that the violation is likely to happen."

    The Court of Appeals cases cited by the District Court in support of its application of the “definitive and specific” standard either relied upon or cited with approval Platone 's standard. See Van Asdale v. Int'l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 996–97 (9th Cir.2009) (deferring to Platone's “definitive and specific” standard as a reasonable interpretation of the statute); Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting the Fourth Circuit's opinion affirming the ARB's decision in Platone in which the court employed the “definitive and specific” standard); Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 476–77 (5th Cir.2008) (“We agree with the ARB's legal conclusion that an employee's complaint must ‘definitively and specifically relate’ to one of the six enumerated categories found in” Section 806). In Sylvester, however, the ARB abandoned the “definitive and specific” standard announced in Platone.Sylvester, 2011 WL 2165854, at *15.

  3. Wirth v. Salesforce, Inc.

    Civil Action 23-CV-11718-AK (D. Mass. Sep. 13, 2024)

    Specifically, “SOX protects ‘whistleblower' employees of publicly-traded companies by prohibiting employers from retaliating against employees because they provided information about specified potentially unlawful conduct.” Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2009). Before turning to the merits, this Court must first consider the applicable standard for analyzing the Wirth's claim.

  4. Stewart v. Doral Fin. Corp.

    997 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.P.R. 2014)   Cited 11 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Determining that Day was no longer good law in light of the ARB's reversal of its position and adopting the Sylvester standard

    To set forth a prima facie case under the whistleblower protection provision of Sarbanes–Oxley, a plaintiff must plead, and ultimately prove, that: (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity or conduct; (2) the employer knew or suspected that the employee engaged in the protected activity; (3) the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances were sufficient to raise the inference that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable action. See29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(e)(2); Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir.2009); Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 129 (3rd Cir.2013); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Administrative Review Bd., 717 F.3d 1121, 1129 (10th Cir.2013); Van Asdale v. Int'l Game Technology, 577 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir.2009). In 2002, Congress enacted the whistleblower provision in order to “encourage and protect [employees] who report fraudulent activity that can damage innocent investors in publicly traded companies.”

  5. Gillis v. Warner Bros. Home Entm't. Inc.

    B231922 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2012)

    This "whistleblower" protection "serves to 'encourage and protect [employees] who report fraudulent activity that can damage innocent investors in publicly traded companies.'" (Day v. Staples, Inc. (1st Cir. 2009) 555 F.3d 42, 52.) "Whistleblower" protections such as that provided by Sarbanes-Oxley reflect fundamental and substantial public policy concerns.

  6. Lawson v. FMR LLC

    670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012)   Cited 27 times   19 Legal Analyses
    Noting that no appeals court had ruled on the related issue of whether § 1514A applies to contractors of the parent company

    OSHA has promulgated regulations regarding § 1514A in its capacity as the body with delegated authority to enforce its provisions.We accepted in dicta in Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 54 & n. 7 (1st Cir.2009), that certain DOL regulations concerned with a two-part test for what constituted “reasonable belief” under SOX were entitled to Chevron deference. That test was also contained in the relevant case law.

  7. Rock v. Lifeline Sys. Co.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-11833-MBB (D. Mass. Oct. 23, 2015)   Cited 2 times

    The purpose of SOX is to "[protect] 'whistleblower' employees of publicly-traded companies by prohibiting employers from retaliating against employees because they provided information about specified potentially unlawful conduct." Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). As explained in Day:

  8. Barker v. UBS AG

    888 F. Supp. 2d 291 (D. Conn. 2012)   Cited 13 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding that plaintiff's “education and background” did “not indicate any particular expertise which would make it objectively unreasonablefor [plaintiff] to believe that [defendant's] failure to properly disclose its exchange assets constituted a violation of securities regulation”

    To demonstrate a violation of section 1514A, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of setting forth a prima facie case. See Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir.2009). To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer knew of the protected activity; (3) she suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and (4) circumstances exist to suggest that the protected activity was a contributing factor to the unfavorable action.

  9. Andaya v. Atlas Air, Inc.

    10 CV 7878 (VB) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012)   Cited 6 times

    As several courts have observed, the employee's allegations of wrongdoing must resemble the allegations of shareholder fraud. See Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2009); Van Asdale, 577 F.3d at 1001 (9th Cir. 2009); but see O'Mahony v. Accenture Ltd., 537 F. Supp. 2d 506, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (reading Section 1514A as applying to any conduct which violates 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348 even if it does not relate to shareholder fraud). In addition, "the complaining employee's belief that his employer's conduct violated one of the enumerated categories must be both objectively and subjectively reasonable."

  10. Lawson v. FMR LLC

    724 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D. Mass. 2010)   Cited 13 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding that "it would not be absurd to permit [the plaintiff] to proceed with his federal claim" even though his administrative claim proceeded all the way to the ARB

    The First Circuit has recently concluded that the term "reasonable belief" has both a subjective and objective component. Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 54 (1st Cir. 2009). To demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief, the plaintiff does not need to cite a particular code provision, but the plaintiff "must show that his communications to the employer specifically related to one of the laws listed in § 1514A."