Opinion
No. 1-474 / 00-1724.
Filed January 9, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, LINDA R. READE, Judge.
Respondents appeal from the district court ruling which affirmed a decision by the industrial commissioner granting petitioner workers' compensation benefits, but remanded for a clarification of the commissioner's reasons for reducing the amount awarded by the deputy commissioner. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
Thomas Henderson and Maureen Roach Tobin of Whitfield Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellants.
Dennis L. Hanssen of Hopkins Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and MILLER and HECHT, JJ.
I. Factual and Procedural Background. On April 12, 1996, Ronald Day was injured while working in the course and scope of his employment with R.G. Elder Son Co., Inc. (Elder). At the time of his injury, Day was operating a large earth-moving machine. The seat on which he was sitting collapsed and fell, causing compression fractures of two vertebrae. In June of that year, Dr. Daniel McGuire rated Day's resulting permanent impairment at 5% of the body as a whole. Although he expressed "real trepidation" about Day's future work as a heavy equipment operator, Dr. McGuire released Day to return to work.
After his return to work as a heavy equipment operator, Day continued to complain of severe back pain for which Dr. McGuire prescribed codeine. On January 19, 1997, Dr. McGuire reported a 7% impairment arising from the injury. Day was again released from Dr. McGuire's care. Upon the doctor's recommendation, he sought and obtained certification and a license to operate large commercial vehicles.
Day continued to experience back and leg pain while working as an over-the-road truck driver and a grain truck operator. On February 23, 1998, Dr. McGuire opined that the pain Day was experiencing was caused by his truck driving activities rather than the injury sustained in April 1996. Day consulted Dr. Leth, a board certified pain management specialist. The doctor diagnosed mechanical back pain from facet joint syndrome caused by the compression fractures. Dr. Leth administered radio frequency denervation treatments during the spring of 1998, providing significant pain relief and allowing Day to get through most days without pain medication.
Day began working seven days per week as a heavy equipment operator for T.J. Lambert in the fall of 1998. In December of that year, Day again consulted Dr. Leth complaining of pain in his back and legs. The doctor testified at the workers' compensation hearing that Day's work during the last half of 1998 was a "substantial part" of the cause of the patient's back complaints.
An arbitration decision was filed by a Deputy Workers' Compensation Commissioner on April 16, 1999. Day was found to have sustained a 50% industrial disability as a result of the 1996 injury. Elder petitioned for intra-agency review. On January 31, 2000, the Workers' Compensation Commissioner filed her appeal decision, finding that Day had sustained a 25% industrial disability. Day sought judicial review of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner's appeal decision.
In his petition for judicial review, Day asserted the Commissioner's finding of 25% industrial disability was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence because the appeal decision failed to specify in detail the reasons for the determination. In their answer and cross-petition, Elder and Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. (Hawkeye) (the workers' compensation insurance carrier) asserted the Commissioner erred in concluding Day's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. The district court affirmed the Commissioner's decision with regard to the liability of the employer and insurance carrier but remanded the case to the Commissioner "to make specific findings as to why the industrial disability should be reduced from 50% to 25%." Elder and Hawkeye appeal, contending (1) they have no liability as a matter of law because Day's disability did not become manifest until more than two years after April 12, 1996, when Day was working for a subsequent employer; (2) substantial evidence does not support the Commissioner's finding that Day's industrial disability was causally related to the injury of April 12, 1996; and (3) if an industrial disability award is supported by the facts in the record and the applicable law, the Agency's findings and conclusions were sufficient to support its decision. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
II. Scope and Standard of Review. We review decisions of the workers' compensation commissioner under Iowa Code Chapter 17A. See Iowa Code § 86.26 (1995). Our review of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner's decision is for errors at law, not de novo. Second Injury Fund v. Braden, 459 N.W.2d 467, 468 (Iowa 1990). We broadly and liberally construe the commissioner's findings to uphold, rather than defeat the commissioner's decision. Second Injury Fund v. Hodgins, 461 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Iowa 1990). We must examine whether the commissioner's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when the record is viewed as a whole. Second Injury Fund v. Shank, 516 N.W.2d 808, 812 (Iowa 1994). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion. John Deere Dubuque Works of Deere Co. v. Weyant, 442 N.W.2d 101, 105 (Iowa 1989). An agency's decision does not lack substantial evidence because inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the same evidence. Shank, 516 N.W.2d at 812. In reviewing the commissioner's interpretation of the statutes governing the agency, we defer to the expertise of the agency, but reserve for ourselves the final interpretation of the law. Braden, 459 N.W.2d at 468.
III. The Causation Issue. Elder and Hawkeye contend they have no liability in this case as a matter of law because Day did not establish legal causation. They contend Day's injury developed gradually or as a result of a succession of accidents such that a subsequent employer is liable for the entire disability. See McKeever Custom Cabinets v. Smith, 379 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Iowa 1985). Although Dr. McGuire opined that Day's pain complaints in February of 1998 were the result of truck driving activities, and Dr. Leth opined that long hours of heavy equipment operation for a subsequent employer were a substantial factor in causing Day's continuing back complaints in December of 1998, we conclude a reasonable fact-finder could find on this record that the April 12, 1996 injury was the cause of the claimant's functional impairment and industrial disability.
Dr. Leth testified that the April 12, 1996 trauma applied "thousands of pounds of force . . . directly to [Day's] spine." That this trauma caused permanent physical impairment to Day's body is uncontroverted. Although Day enjoyed substantial relief of his back pain following the denervation procedure administered by Dr. Leth, the treatment did not cure the physical impairment and the pain relief it produced was expected to last only two to three years. The Commissioner could reasonably have credited Day's testimony that he had ongoing back pain and intermittent leg symptoms after the April 12, 1996 injury. On this record, the agency was not required to find as a matter of law that Day's back injury and resulting industrial disability developed gradually or as the result of an injury that occurred after his employment with Elder terminated.
Elder and Hawkeye further contend the injury sustained by Day on April 12, 1996 was aggravated by, and became disabling during, subsequent employment with T.J. Lambert. This contention also must fail because the Commissioner's finding that Day's industrial disability was caused by the April 12, 1996 trauma is supported by substantial evidence in the record. We first note that the 1996 trauma was sufficient to cause two vertebral fractures. Day testified that except during a temporary diminution of pain following the denervation procedures, his back pain was persistent with physical activity after April 12, 1996. Although Dr. Leth testified that Day's work activities in 1998 were a substantial factor in producing the pain symptoms the patient was reporting at that time, the doctor did not opine that Day's physical impairment was increased by those activities; nor did he testify that those activities were the sole cause of the symptoms. Moreover, the Commissioner was not bound to credit the testimony of Dr. McGuire who opined that Day's pain in 1998 was caused by truck driving activities rather than the injury sustained in April of 1996. Causation generally presents a fact question for the Commissioner. The Agency resolved the causation issue against Elder and Hawkeye based upon substantial evidence in the record, and we are constrained by our standard of review to affirm on this issue.
IV. Sufficiency of the Commissioner's Findings and Conclusions. The district court remanded this case to the Commissioner with directions to make "specific findings as to why the industrial disability should be reduced from 50% to 25%." Elder and Hawkeye contend the Commissioner's appeal decision award of 25% industrial disability is (1) supported by substantial evidence in the record and (2) adequately explained in the agency's decision. Day counters that the district court's remand order was proper because the Commissioner's decision (1) failed to state the reasons for the industrial disability award and "detail the path she took through the evidence" to arrive at the award and (2) failed to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law to assist this court and the parties in understanding the Agency's rationale for the award.
Our discussion of this issue begins with the proposition that our judicial review must focus upon "final action" of the Agency. The decision of the Deputy Workers' Compensation Commissioner awarding compensation for a 50% industrial disability was not final agency action because a timely intra-agency appeal was taken to the Commissioner. Iowa Code § 17A.15(3); Myers v. F.C.A. Services, Inc., 592 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Iowa 1999) (holding "the deputy [workers' compensation] commissioner's proposed findings are not a consideration on judicial review"). Thus, the district court erred in directing the Commissioner to make findings "as to why the industrial disability should be reduced from 50% to 25%." (emphasis added).
We next consider whether the Commissioner's findings of fact and conclusions of law were sufficiently detailed to satisfy her legal obligation to explain her decision as to the extent of Day's industrial disability. Iowa Code section 17A.16(1) provides:
A proposed or final decision or order in a contested case shall be in writing or stated in the record. A proposed or final decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated. Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of underlying facts supporting the findings . . . Each conclusion of law shall be supported by cited authority or by a reasoned opinion . . .
Iowa Code § 17A.16(1) (1995).
Factors considered in determining industrial disability include (1) the employee's medical condition prior to and after the injury, (2) the situs and severity of the injury, (3) the length of the healing period, (4) the functional impairment resulting from the injury, (5) the claimant's work experience prior to and after the injury, (6) potential for rehabilitation, (7) the claimant's physical, emotional and intellectual qualifications, (8) earnings before and after the injury, (9) the claimant's age, education, and motivation, and (9) the employer's refusal to give any sort of work to an impaired employee. McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Iowa 1980). The Workers' Compensation Commissioner correctly observed (1) there are no guidelines prescribing how these factors should be weighed in relation to each other; and (2) she must draw upon prior experience as well as general and specialized knowledge to resolve the industrial disability issue.
We conclude the Workers' Compensation Commissioner's Appeal Decision includes sufficiently detailed findings of fact for each of the relevant industrial disability criteria. The decision also sets forth a sufficiently detailed statement of the law to be applied by the agency in the resolution of the industrial disability issue. The district court concluded however, and Day contends on appeal, that the Commissioner nonetheless failed to set forth a sufficient explanation of how or why she determined Day sustained a 25% industrial disability as a result of the April 12, 1996 injury. Thus we are confronted with the issue of whether the Commissioner provided a minimally sufficient explanation of why, after applying the applicable legal principles to the facts, she concluded Day lost only 25% of his earning capacity.
Day notes the Commissioner is obligated "to state the evidence [she] relies upon and specify in detail the reasons for [her] conclusions" and "show the path [she] has taken through conflicting evidence." See Catalfo v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., 213 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1973). The justification for this requirement is the appellate court's need to "ascertain with reasonable certainty the factual basis on which the administrative officer or body acted," Catalfo, 213 N.W.2d at 509, and the losing party's entitlement to a "detailed statement of the Commissioner's legal conclusions and the application of those conclusions upon the facts thus found." Ward v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 236, 238 (Iowa 1981). The Commissioner's duty to provide an explanation of her decision does not require a discussion of each fact in the record or an explanation of why she has accepted or rejected it because "[s]uch a requirement would be unnecessary and burdensome." Terwilliger v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 529 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Iowa 1995). The agency decision need only be sufficiently detailed to allow us to follow her process of analysis. Id.
The question before us is not whether we agree with the Commissioner's decision on the extent of Day's industrial disability. Whether or not we agree with her decision, we are bound to affirm the Commissioner's decision if we can follow her "process of analysis." See Bridgestone/Firestone v. Accordino, 561 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1997) (holding "the commissioner need not discus every evidentiary fact and the basis for its acceptance or rejection so long as the commissioner's analytical process can be followed on appeal"). We conclude the appeal decision provides a minimally sufficient factual and legal explanation of the Agency's industrial disability determination to allow meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's decision remanding this case to the Agency.
V. Conclusion. We affirm the district court's decision insofar as it holds Appellants liable for Day's injury. We reverse the district court's decision only to the extent that it remands this case to the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for further findings on the issue of industrial disability.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.