Opinion
1:23-CV-00222-SPB
02-07-2024
ANTHONY DAY, Plaintiff v. DR. LAUREL HARRY, SECRETARY OF CORRECTIONS/PA DOC; PATRICIA THOMPSON, SUPERINTENDENT; STEVEN SEITCHIK, MAT STATEWIDE COORDINATOR; ERICA BENNING, DIRECTOR BUREAU OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES; DR. LISA BAIRDD.O., SITE MEDICAL DIRECTOR @ S.C.I. ALBION; MICHAEL EDWARDS, CHIEF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATOR @ S.C.I. ALBION; DANIEL STROUP, PHYSICIAN'S ASSISTANT @ S.C.I. ALBION; ZACHARY IACOBSON, PHYSICIAN'S ASSISTANT @ S.C.I. ALBION; TIFFANY WILLS, REGISTERED NURSING SUPERVISOR @ S.C.I. ALBION; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, JANE/JOHN DOE, **THESE DEFENDANTS WILL BE NAMED & IDENTIFIED AFTER DISCOVERY, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ORDER ON MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ECF NO.2
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Anthony Day's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (ECF No. 2) be DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.
II. Report
Plaintiff Anthony Day, an individual incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution (“SCI”) at Houtzdale, initiated this pro se civil rights action on July 26, 2023 based on the medical treatment he received for his Opioid Use Disorder (“OUD”) while he was incarcerated at SCI Albion. See ECF No. 1-1. The Complaint asserts claims for violations of Day's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and Pennsylvania tort law. See ECF No. 14. Defendants are the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), DOC Secretary Dr. Laurel Harry, Medication Assisted Treatment (“MAT”) Statewide Coordinator Steven Seitchik, Bureau of Health Care Services Director Erica Benning, and SCI Albion Superintendent Patricia Thompson, Site Medical Director Dr. Lisa Baird, Chief Healthcare Administrator (“CHCA”) Michael Edwards, Physician's Assistants (“PA”) Daniel Stroup and Zachary Jacobsen, Registered Nursing Supervisor Tiffany Wills, and Jane/John Does. See id. Day seeks a “preliminary injunction to provide treatment with Sublocade,” “permanent injunctive relief to maintain treatment with Sublocade while in custody of the PA DOC,” declaratory relief, and monetary relief against Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Id., p. 20. Pending before the Court is Day's motion for a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (“TRO”). See ECF Nos. 2 (motion), 3 (brief). For relief, Day asks the Court for “the relief requested in his Complaint.” ECF No. 2.
A. Standard of Review
A temporary restraining order is assessed under the same standards as a preliminary injunction. See, e.g, Alves v. Main, 747 Fed.Appx. 111, 112 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285 (3d Cir. 2018)). As a threshold procedural matter, however,
[t]he court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
As a matter of substance, the party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass 'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187,191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Day bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, he must provide facts that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100,102 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiff's confinement simply because they are “in court”. . . â€' . Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
B. Discussion
As a threshold procedural matter, Day's request for a TRO must be denied based on his failure to state “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show[ing] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition” and identifying “any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1). Substantively, Day's allegations fail to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or “the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). As noted above, the burden on a party seeking injunctive relief is “particularly heavy” where the party is seeking to alter (rather than preserve) the status quo. Punnett, 621 F.2d at 582. See also Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits.”). Thus, a request for mandatory proactive injunctive relief, such as Day's demand for a change in a DOC medical policy, must be viewed with exacting scrutiny and extreme caution. Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *6.
The crux of the Complaint is that Defendants are limiting Day's medical treatment for his OUD because of a DOC Policy that limits recipients of Sublocade (o/k/a Buprenorphine) to inmates who entered the DOC with an active prescription for this type of medication for OUD (“MOUD”) after 2019. In his verified Complaint, Day asserts that he had an active prescription for the interchangeable drug Suboxone when he entered DOC custody in 2005. However, upon his transfer to SCI-Albion in 2016, prison officials allegedly refused to prescribe him this MOUD. He specifies that because of the DOC's MOUD policy, Dr. Baird and PAs Stroup and Jacobsen refused Day's numerous requests for Suboxone or Sublocade and CHCA Edwards and Superintendent Thompson denied his ADA request for this treatment. Day contends that the only MOUD the DOC will offer him is Naltrexone-“a medication that is not interchangeable with [Sublocade], does not stop Mr. Day's overwhelming cravings for opioids, and led to Mr. Day's suicide attempt on February 3,2023.” ECF No. 14, ¶ 135. To quell his withdrawal symptoms and cravings, Day purchases illicit MOUDs or, when MOUDs are unavailable, opiates, from other inmates. He has consequently overdosed from the “black-market drugs” four times, and is constantly at risk of another overdose and “physical danger if he cannot pay his bills.” ECF No. 3, p. 3. Day avers that the DOC policy denies inmates “equal access to MOUD” and “strips the prisons [sic] medical staff of discretion to authorize treatment with [Sublocade], fully removing that treatment option without regard to medical necessity.” ECF No. 14, ¶ 136. He further avers that the MOUD policy, and individual Defendants' routine enforcement of it, violates his Eighth Amendment rights by “arbitrarily] exclu[ding]” him from “needed medical treatment.” ECF No. 3, pp. 2-3.
Day has not met his heavy burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits for several reasons. While Day “need not prove his case with airtight certainty, the moving party nevertheless bears a heavy burden on a motion for a preliminary injunction of establishing a reasonable probability of success on the merits.” Burton v. Wetzel, 2017 WL 4284345, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 27,2017) (internal citations, quotations, and additions omitted). First, the motion is moot to the extent Day seeks injunctive relief from SCI Albion personnel, as he informed the Court on November 22, 2023 that he has been transferred to SCI-Houtzdale. See ECF No. 9. Day has not filed any supplemental pleadings indicating that he has experienced similar medications limitations or continues to experience withdrawal symptoms since his transfer to SCI-Houtzdale. Next, because Day did not have an approved accommodations request for Sublocade, the allegations do not support that any individual SCI Albion medical provider knew or should have known of the imminent threat Naltrexone posed to Day's health and safety. Further, Day's assertion that Naltrexone is an inferior OUD treatment essentially entails a disagreement between Day and medical providers over the course of his treatment, which ordinarily does not rise to a constitutional claim, as “the exercise by a doctor of his professional judgment is never deliberate indifference.” Gindraw v. Dendler, 967 F.Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274,278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights.”)). See also Gause v. Diguglielmo, 339 Fed.Appx. 132 (3d Cir. 2009) (characterizing a dispute over pain medication as the type of “disagreement over the exact contours of [plaintiff's] medical treatment” that does not violate the constitution)). And Day's request that the Court direct Defendants to contravene or change the DOC MOUD policy and prescribe Sublocade to Day would require the Court to interject itself into matters of routine prison administration, which it is loath to do. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 527; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
Day's allegations also fail to demonstrate an extant “probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Defendants' past denial of medication and ADA accommodation requests, and Day's prior withdrawal symptoms and suicidal ideation, do not constitute a present threat of imminent harm. See Synthes, Inc. v. Gregoris, 228 F.Supp.3d 421, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“Any irreparable harm must be imminent.”); Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *9 (declining to grant preliminary relief in the absence of evidence “that there is an imminent risk of irreparable injury”) (emphasis in original). See Boyd v. Larson, 2017 WL 1904278, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017) (“A preliminary injunction cannot be issued based on past harm.”) (quoting Fischer v. Goord, 981 F.Supp. 140, 168 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)). The risk that Day will buy illicit MOUDs and opiates and suffer an overdose or withdrawal symptoms in the future is too speculative to constitute an immediate, irreparable injury. See Bailey v. Gagnon, 2009 WL 982694, at *2 (W.D. Pa 2009) (citing Dice v. Clinicorp, Inc., 887 F.Supp. 803, 809 (W.D. Pa 1995)) (to show irreparable harm, “the claims injury cannot merely be possible, speculative, or remote.”). Buttressing this position is the absence of additional requests for injunctive relief filed by Day since he submitted the Complaint and instant motion over six months ago. And Day's request for monetary damages in the Complaint as relief for the conduct complained of in the present motion suggests that such damages “may be adequate redress.” Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *9 (noting that, where an inmate-plaintiff is alleging that damages may be an adequate remedy, a preliminary injunction is often not appropriate”). As such, these claims are inappropriate for injunctive relief. See e.g, Alston v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 2015 WL 136334, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2015).
Day has, however, filed other documents since July 2023. See e.g., ECF Nos. 8, 9.
Consistent with Third Circuit precedent, the Court need not analyze every factor of the temporary restraining order analysis because Day has not established irreparable harm. See Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 374 (3d Cir. 2012) (declining to address the remaining injunction factors when the plaintiff failed to meet one factor). Accordingly, because Day has not shown irreparable harm, his motion for a temporary restraining order should be DENIED and Day's motion for a preliminary injunction should be DISMISSED pending service upon Defendants.
I. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Day's motion (ECF No. 2) for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction should be DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part. Specifically, Day's request for a TRO should be DENIED and his request for preliminary injunctive relief should be DISMISSED pending service upon Defendants.
II. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).