Day v. Durie Props., LLC

4 Citing cases

  1. SWZ Fin. II, LLC v. Miller (In re United Tax Grp., LLC)

    Bankr. Case No. 14-10486-LSS (D. Del. Mar. 7, 2018)   Cited 2 times
    Affirming bankruptcy court's determination that VistaCare only recognized the Estate Business Exception, and the Third Circuit has not recognized the Ultra Vires Exception, and therefore the bankruptcy court was not required to analyze the exception's applicability at all

    On May 26, 2017, Appellants filed the Barton Motion, seeking permission to sue the Trustee and his bankruptcy counsel, Ciardi Ciardi & Astin ("Ciardi"), including for claims of conversion and tortious interference with business relationships against the Trustee. (D.I. 10 at 3) The Barton doctrine is traced to the Supreme Court's decision Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 128-29 (1881), and it "requires a party-in-interest to seek stay relief from the bankruptcy court in order to sue a bankruptcy trustee in another forum." In re Day, 2014 WL 636797, *22 (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2014). "It is for the appointing court, in its discretion, to decide whether it will determine for itself all claims of or against the receiver, or will allow them to be litigated elsewhere."

  2. Durie Props., LLC v. Wasserman (In re Day)

    Civil Action No. 14-01908 (SRC) (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2014)   Cited 3 times

    According to the Bankruptcy Court, neither the proposed countersuit against the Trustee and Special Counsel nor the frivolous ligation claims had any foundation whatsoever; consequently, the Barton doctrine, in concert with "applicable immunities," operated to bar those claims. In re Day, No. 08-18384 (MS), 2014 WL 636797, at *27 (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2014). The Bankruptcy Court further concluded that Appellants could not pursue the Debtor for frivolous litigation sanctions in state court because the Debtor was never actually a party to the state action.

  3. In re Christensen

    598 B.R. 658 (Bankr. D. Utah 2019)   Cited 5 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding Barton doctrine required leave to sue trustee for negotiating short-sale for improper motive, explaining " trustee becomes a fiduciary vis-à-vis a debtor because he holds property that belongs to the debtor by operation of law. The scope of his duty, therefore, is strictly limited to safeguarding property of the estate in the trustee's possession or the proceeds from the sale thereof to which the debtor is entitled and ensuring that the debtor receives that property."

    The Trustee did not operate a business in the administration of these cases, so the statutory exception to the Barton doctrine is inapplicable.Wasserman v. Durie Props., LLC (In re Day) , Adv. No. 13-1959, 2014 WL 636797, at *23 (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2014), aff'd sub nom.Durie Props., LLC v. Wasserman (In re Day) , No. 14-01908 (SRC), 2014 WL 4271647 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2014).In re VistaCare Grp., LLC , 678 F.3d 218, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2012).

  4. Kaliner v. Antonoplos (In re DMW Marine, LLC)

    509 B.R. 497 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2014)   Cited 14 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Observing that "[o]ver the years, courts have curtailed the scope of ultra vires exception to the Barton Doctrine. While no court has said as much definitively, it may be no exaggeration to state that the exception applies only in cases in which a receiver wrongfully seizes or controls non-receivership property," and that "all actions for damages against receivers, with the possible exception of damage actions arising from the wrongful seizure of non- receivership property, are subject to the Barton doctrine and fall outside the 'ultra vires' exception to the doctrine."

    • the “ ultra vires ” exception.E.g., In re Day, 2014 WL 636797, at *23 (Bankr.D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2014) (per Stern, J.); Summit Metals, 477 B.R. at 496. The Trustee asserts that both of these exceptions apply.