See also Carver v. Tift County Hosp. Auth.Day v. Burnett, 189 Ga. App. 905, 906 ( 377 SE2d 734) (1989).Carver v. Tift County Hosp. Auth., 268 Ga. App. 153, 154-155 ( 601 SE2d 475) (2004).
Day filed a personal injury action against Burnett but that action was subsequently dismissed on the basis that Day failed to exercise due diligence in attempting to perfect timely service on Burnett. See Day v. Burnett, 189 Ga. App. 905 ( 377 S.E.2d 734) (1989). Day filed the present action on December 5, 1988, seeking property damage to her automobile and punitive damages.
[Cit.]" Day v. Burnett, 189 Ga. App. 905, 906 ( 377 S.E.2d 734) (1989). We find the factual setting in the instant case analogous to that in Roberts v. Bienert, 183 Ga. App. 751 (1) ( 360 S.E.2d 25) (1987) and Daughtry v. Cohen, 187 Ga. App. 253 ( 370 S.E.2d 18) (1988), wherein this court found in each circumstance that the trial court had not abused its discretion by finding a lack of diligence in effecting service.
" "Ordinarily, whether a cause of action should be barred by the statute of limitations is a mixed question of law and fact to be decided by a jury. '[B]ut where the facts are undisputed, it is for the Court to determine whether they take the case out of the statute or not.'" Day v. Burnett, 377 S.E.2d 734, 734 (Ga. App. 1989) (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original). The facts in this case as related to the statute of limitations issue are undisputed. Accordingly, the court may appropriately determine whether Plaintiffs' PVPA claim is barred by the applicable limitations period.
In light of the foregoing account of events preceding denial of GMAC's claim, the Court cannot rule as a matter of law that the contractual limitations period is an absolute bar to the claims raised in the Complaint. See Day v. Burnett, 377 S.E.2d 734, 734 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) ("Ordinarily, whether a cause of action should be barred by the statute of limitations is a mixed question of law and fact to be decided by a jury."). On the contrary, the Court finds that issues of fact exist as to whether Amica waived the limitations period.
Wimbush, 201 Ga.App. 280, 281(2), 410 S.E.2d 776 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds, Ragan, supra; Bennett v. Matt Gay Chevrolet Oldsmobile, 200 Ga.App. 348, 349(1), 408 S.E.2d 111 (1991); Capra v. Rogers, 200 Ga.App. 131, 134(3), 407 S.E.2d 101 (1991); Williams v. Colonial Ins. Co., supra; Dunson v. Golden, 199 Ga.App. 513, 405 S.E.2d 332 (1991); Day v. Burnett, 199 Ga.App. 494, 495(1), 405 S.E.2d 316 (1991); Smith v. Winn, 198 Ga.App. 459(1), 402 S.E.2d 79 (1991); Ennis v. Bradshaw, 197 Ga.App. 744, 745, 399 S.E.2d 493 (1990); Pickens v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 Ga.App. 550, 551, 398 S.E.2d 792 (1990); Green v. Young, 197 Ga.App. 101, 397 S.E.2d 509 (1990); Anderson v. Hughes, 196 Ga.App. 186, 187(1), 395 S.E.2d 623 (1990); Shears v. Harris, 196 Ga.App. 61, 395 S.E.2d 300 (1990); Land v. Casteel, 195 Ga.App. 455, 456, 393 S.E.2d 710 (1990); Robinson v. Stuck, 194 Ga.App. 311, 312(1), 390 S.E.2d 603 (1990); Davis v. Johnson, 193 Ga.App. 19, 21(1), 386 S.E.2d 900 (1989); Day v. Burnett, 189 Ga.App. 905, 906, 377 S.E.2d 734 (1989); Garrett v. Godby, 189 Ga.App. 183, 185(3), 375 S.E.2d 103 (1988); Ellerbee v. Interstate Contract Carrier Corp., 183 Ga.App. 828, 830(2)(b), 360 S.E.2d 280 (1987); Brumbalow v. Fritz, 183 Ga.App. 231, 232(2), 358 S.E.2d 872 (1987); Brim v. Pruitt, 178 Ga.App. 321, 323, 342 S.E.2d 690 (1986) (physical precedent only); Siler v. Johns, 173 Ga.App. 692, 327 S.E.2d 810 (1985) (physical precedent only); Brumit v. Mull, 165 Ga.App. 663, 665(3), 302 S.E.2d 408 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Brent v. Hin, 254 Ga.App. 77, 561 S.E.2d 212 (2002); Scoggins, supra, 156 Ga.App. at 410, 274 S.E.2d 775 (1980).In Parker v. Shreve, 244 Ga.App. 350, 535 S.E.2d 332 (2000) (physical precedent only), the rule was restated in yet another way.
Ga.App. 280, 281(2), 410 S.E.2d 776 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds, Ragan, supra; Bennett v. Matt Gay Chevrolet Oldsmobile, 200 Ga.App. 348, 349(1), 408 S.E.2d 111 (1991) ; Capra v. Rogers, 200 Ga.App. 131, 134(3), 407 S.E.2d 101 (1991) ; Williams v. Colonial Ins. Co., supra; Dunson v. Golden, 199 Ga.App. 513, 405 S.E.2d 332 (1991) ; Day v. Burnett, 199 Ga.App. 494, 495(1), 405 S.E.2d 316 (1991) ; Smith v. Winn, 198 Ga.App. 459(1), 402 S.E.2d 79 (1991) ; Ennis v. Bradshaw, 197 Ga.App. 744, 745, 399 S.E.2d 493 (1990) ; Pickens v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 Ga.App. 550, 551, 398 S.E.2d 792 (1990) ; Green v. Young, 197 Ga.App. 101, 397 S.E.2d 509 (1990) ; Anderson v. Hughes, 196 Ga.App. 186, 187(1), 395 S.E.2d 623 (1990) ; Shears v. Harris, 196 Ga.App. 61, 395 S.E.2d 300 (1990) ; Land v. Casteel, 195 Ga.App. 455, 456, 393 S.E.2d 710 (1990) ; Robinson v. Stuck, 194 Ga.App. 311, 312(1), 390 S.E.2d 603 (1990) ; Davis v. Johnson, 193 Ga.App. 19, 21(1), 386 S.E.2d 900 (1989) ; Day v. Burnett, 189 Ga.App. 905, 906, 377 S.E.2d 734 (1989) ; Garrett v. Godby, 189 Ga.App. 183, 185(3), 375 S.E.2d 103 (1988) ; Ellerbee v. Interstate Contract Carrier Corp., 183 Ga.App. 828, 830(2)(b), 360 S.E.2d 280 (1987) ; Brumbalow v. Fritz, 183 Ga.App. 231, 232(2), 358 S.E.2d 872 (1987) ; Brim v. Pruitt, 178 Ga.App. 321, 323, 342 S.E.2d 690 (1986) (physical precedent only); Siler v. Johns, 173 Ga.App. 692, 327 S.E.2d 810 (1985) (physical precedent only); Brumit v. Mull, 165 Ga.App. 663, 665(3), 302 S.E.2d 408 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Brent v. Hin, 254 Ga.App. 77, 561 S.E.2d 212 (2002) ; Scoggins, supra, 156 Ga.App. at 410, 274 S.E.2d 775 (1980).five-day grace period could begin running on the same day the complaint is filed when the clerk provides the summons and complaint to the person making service on the same day, the date of filing is not always the start date for the five-day grace period.