On March 24, 2018, in response to [Appellant's] motion to proceed in forma pauperis , Hon. Idee C. Fox issued an order granting the IFP but also dismissing the action sua sponte under Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. That order cited the analogous case Dawson v. Zayre Department Stores , 346 Pa.Super. 357, 499 A.2d 648 ( [ ] 1985), discussed in greater detail below. [Appellant] did not appeal Judge Fox's order.

Kazatsky v. King David Mem'l Park, 527 A.2d 988, 993 (Pa. 1987). Further, liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress is limited to those cases in which the conduct complained of is extreme and outrageous. Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 499 A.2d 648, 469 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct which is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Strickland v. University of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 987 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). Generally, it is insufficient "that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by malice, or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.

Even assuming, as Plaintiff argues, that the sufficiency of medical evidence was outside the scope of adversarial issues presented for summary judgment, there is insufficient evidence as a matter of law to allow a reasonable jury to find the Diocesan Defendants and Brother Antonucci liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress is limited to those cases in which the conduct complained of is extreme and outrageous. Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 499 A.2d 648, 649 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1985). Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct which is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society."

Pennsylvania courts have also indicated they will be more receptive where there is a continuing course of conduct. See Pierce v. Penman, 357 Pa. Super. 225, 236, 515 A.2d 948, 953 (1986) (repeated failure over period of years to provide records to former patient with known emotional difficulties), allocatur denied, 515 Pa. 608, 529 A.2d 1082 (1987); Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 346 Pa. Super. 357, 361, 499 A.2d 648, 650 (1985) (no liability for one racial insult of customer and noting that there were no "continuous malicious actions"). Here, there is not only a landlord-tenant relationship, but also a series of acts approaching a course of conduct.

I note that “it is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the actor's conduct can reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.” Reimer v. Tien, 514 A.2d 566, 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (citing Dawson v. Zayre Dept. Stores, 499 A.2d 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 46, comment (h) (1965)). Plaintiff correctly states that Pennsylvania follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts for IIED claims, and that the Restatement specifies that the “extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position . . . which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests.

. See, e.g., Kazatsky, 527 A.2d at 991 (“The availability of recovery under [IIED] is highly circumscribed.”); John v. Phila. Pizza Team, Inc., 209 A.3d 380, 383-84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (holding that repeated use of racial epithets not outrageous conduct) (citing Dawson v. Zayre Dept. Stores, 499 A.2d 648, 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (same)); Strain v. Ferroni, 592 A.2d 698, 703 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that obstetrician's statement “‘if you lose it, you lose it,' with reference to [plaintiff's] unborn child” was insufficiently outrageous).

It is for the court to determine whether the alleged conduct can be regarded as so extreme and outrageous so as to permit recovery. Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 499 A.2d 648, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). Where reasonable minds may differ, it is for the jury to determine whether the conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous so as to result in liability.

Id. at 1274 n.9 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. h). See, e.g., Kazatsky, 527 A.2d at 991 (“The availability of recovery under section 46 is highly circumscribed.”); John v. Philadelphia Pizza Team, Inc., 209 A.3d 380, 383-84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (holding that repeated use of racial epithets not outrageous conduct) (citing Dawson v. Zayre Dept. Stores, 499 A.2d 648, 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (same)); Strain v. Ferroni, 592 A.2d 698, 703 (Pa. Super. 1991) (holding that obstetrician's statement “‘if you lose it, you lose it,' with reference to [plaintiff's] unborn child” was insufficiently outrageous).

It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct can reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous so as to permit recovery and "[t]he liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities." Dawson v. Zayre Department Stores, 346 Pa. Super. 357, 359, 499 A.2d 648 (1985)(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 46, comment (h)). Finally, to state a claim, physical harm must accompany the emotional distress.

Even alleging a continuing course of conduct, Students fail to satisfy the outrageousness element. Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 499 A.2d 648, 650 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). Id.