Opinion
No. 1-556 / 00-1770.
Filed April 10, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, DOUGLAS S. RUSSELL, Judge.
Jeanne Dawson appeals from a grant of a motion for summary judgment dismissing her case. AFFIRMED.
David M. Nelson of Nelson Law Office, Mason City, for appellant.
Edward M. Blando and Robert M. Hogg of Elderkin Pirnie P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
Heard by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings .
In this case Jeanne Dawson sued William Tucker and his law firm, Phelan, Tucker, Boyle Mullen (Tucker), for intentional interference with Dawson's expected inheritance from Esther Smith. Dawson also claimed Tucker breached his fiduciary duty to Smith with resulting damages to Dawson.
Prior to commencement of discovery, Tucker moved for summary judgment citing the preclusive effect of an earlier judgment dismissing Dawson's challenge to the validity of Smith's will. Tucker and his firm also argued that Dawson, as a matter of law, could not recover damages for any breach of his fiduciary duty to Smith.
Dawson resisted by disputing the merits of Tucker's preclusion theory. Dawson also alleged that Tucker's recitation of undisputed facts originated in Dawson's earlier will contest and were not matters of record in this case. Dawson accordingly requested that Tucker's motion for summary judgment be denied pending conclusion of discovery.
In its ruling, the trial court rejected Tucker's preclusion argument citing the elements of proof that distinguish intentional interference with expected inheritance claims from will contests premised on lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence, the two theories Dawson advanced in her challenge to Smith's will. The court nevertheless sustained Tucker's motion on this count finding "no evidence to support Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Tucker used fraud, duress, or other tortious means to deprive Plaintiff of an inheritance." The court also noted Dawson's failure to show any "dispute as to the facts in the record."
The court similarly rejected Dawson's breach of a fiduciary relationship claim after taking "judicial notice of the prior proceeding involving the will contest." The court reached this conclusion based on Dawson's inability to establish that Tucker interfered with Smith's testamentary intentions with the resulting loss of Dawson's expected inheritance.
The court lastly rejected Dawson's request for additional discovery prior to ruling on the merits of Tucker's motion for summary judgment. Dawson's failure to file the requisite affidavit supporting the request for additional time was cited as the court's reason for denying her request.
On appeal Dawson challenges the trial court's ruling granting Tucker's motion for summary judgment and order dismissing her lawsuit. She argues that the court improperly took judicial notice of the prior will contest. Dawson also argues that her response to Tucker's motion for summary judgment was sufficient in the absence of Tucker's failure to establish the absence of genuine issues of material facts.
II. Standard of Review .
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981 (formerly rule 237); Howell v. Merritt Co., 585 N.W.2d 278, 280 (Iowa 1998). The moving party has the burden to show an absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bennett v. M.C. No. 619, Inc., 586 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Iowa 1998). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Sievers v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 581 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Iowa 1998). The facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 635-36. However, when a motion for summary judgment is properly supported, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings; his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5); Bitner v. Ottumwa Cmty. Sch. Dist., 549 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Iowa 1996).
III. The Merits .
The gist of Dawson's argument is that, absent the collateral matters of which the trial court improperly took judicial notice, Tucker failed to meet his burden to show the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Even if we assume, without deciding, that the trial court improperly took judiciary notice of a collateral proceeding and limit our review to the remaining record, we still reach the same result as the trial court.
The tort of intentional interference with an inheritance has been defined as follows:
One who by fraud or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to others for the loss of the inheritance or gift.Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Iowa 1992) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B (1979)).
Contrary to Dawson's assertions, we find Tucker properly pled and supported his motion for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was Tucker's sworn testimony stating that changes to Smith's will affecting Dawson's inheritance were made at Smith's request and, prior to execution, were again reviewed and approved by Smith. Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981, the burden then shifted to Dawson to produce or present specific, material facts to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for the jury. Dawson's unsupported resistance to Tucker's summary judgment motion, however, failed to set forth any evidence supporting her claim that Tucker engaged in fraud or other tortious conduct to intentionally deprive Dawson of her inheritance.
We also reject Dawson's breach of fiduciary duty claim for the same reason. In order for Dawson to prevail on this theory, she was required to prove that as a direct result of Tucker's professional misconduct, Smith's testamentary intent was frustrated and, as a result, Dawson's expected interest in her estate was lost, diminished, or unrealized. Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 1987). Tucker's affidavit was also sufficient on this count to implicate Dawson's burden to respond as provided in rule 1.981. Because Dawson failed to respond as required or otherwise meet her burden to show the existence of genuine issues of fact, the trial court properly granted Tucker's motion for summary judgment.
Lastly, we hold that the trial court properly declined to defer its ruling pending further discovery based on Dawson's failure to file the appropriate supporting affidavit. See Iowa R. Civ. 1.981(6); Bitner, 549 N.W.2d at 301 (resister must set forth by affidavit reasons she cannot proffer evidentiary affidavits and what additional factual information is necessary).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.