(Citation omitted.) Dawson v. Leder, 294 Ga.App. 717, 719(1), 669 S.E.2d 720 (2008). Dr. Balk works in the field of pulmonary and critical care medicine.
Nathans v. Diamond, 282 Ga. 804, 806 (1) (654 SE2d 121) (2007). See also Dawson v. Leder, 294 Ga. App. 717, 719-720 (669 SE2d 720) (2008) (doctor who taught medical students and residents in the areas of surgery and critical care asserted that she had "airway training" and that "managing airway compromise and looking at ways to prevent [it] fell within her area of expertise;" but, this did not establish "that she taught and/or practiced in the area of post-surgical airway management with sufficient frequency to establish an appropriate level of knowledge). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Dr. Chou was not actively engaged in the subject specialty for three of the five years prior to the alleged negligence.
(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Dawson v. Leder, 294 Ga. App. 717, 719 (1) ( 669 SE2d 720) (2008). Dr. Ilowide deposed that he did not train or practice as a nurse, did not train nurses, did not supervise nurses outside of normal nurse-physician interactions, and did not hold himself out to be an expert in nursing or in the standard of care of nurses.
Spacht, supra at 901 (3).See Nathans, supra at 805-807 (1); Collins v. Dickman, 295 Ga. App. 601, 606 (2) ( 672 SE2d 433) (2008) (no abuse of discretion in finding doctor's experience insufficient to satisfy time requirement); Dawson v. heder, 294 Ga. App. 717, 719-720 (1) ( 669 SE2d 720) (2008) (doctor failed to show that she taught and/or practiced in the area of post-surgical airway management "with sufficient frequency to establish an appropriate level of knowledge") (punctuation omitted); Akers v. Elsey, 294 Ga. App. 359, 361-362 (2) ( 670 SE2d 142) (2008) (same as Collins). 2. Vaughan likens Weekley's credentials, and thus her competency, to those of the nurse found competent in Houston v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp. Vaughan's reliance on Houston is misplaced for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the factual dissimilarities in the experience levels of the nurses.
See Bonds v. Nesbitt, 322 Ga. App. 852, 858, 747 S.E.2d 40, 46 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (" 'But a minimum level of knowledge in the area in which the opinion is to be given is insufficient; instead, an expert must be both familiar with the standard of care at issue and also demonstrate specific experience in the relevant practice area.' " (quoting Dawson v. Leder, 294 Ga. App. 717, 719, 669 S.E.2d 720 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)); Anderson v. Mountain Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 306 Ga. App. 412, 417, 702 S.E.2d 462, 466 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Pendley v. S. Reg'l Health Sys., Inc., 307 Ga. App. 82, 89, 704 S.E.2d 198, 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). Finally, Plaintiffs also discuss their challenge of a different expert, Dr. Reese, and contend that "if Blais is excluded from providing testimony on the LPN standard of care, then Reese must also be excluded" as "Reese is less qualified than Blais to testify on the LPN standard of care."
Nathans v. Diamond, 282 Ga. 804, 806(1), 654 S.E.2d 121 (2007).” Dawson v. Leder, 294 Ga.App. 717, 719, 669 S.E.2d 720 (2008). A minimum level of knowledge in the area in which the expert opinion is to be given is not sufficient. Nathans, 282 Ga. at 806, 654 S.E.2d 121. Rather, under OCGA § 24–7–702(c)(2)(A), the expert must have been regularly engaged in the active practice of the area of specialty in which the opinion is to be given “for at least three of the last five years” preceding the alleged malpractice, and must have done so “with sufficient frequency to establish an appropriate level of knowledge ... in performing the procedure, diagnosing the condition, or rendering the treatment which is alleged to have been performed or rendered negligently by the defendant whose conduct is at issue.”
Nathans v. Diamond, 282 Ga. 804, 806(1), 654 S.E.2d 121 (2007). See also Dawson v. Leder, 294 Ga.App. 717, 719–720, 669 S.E.2d 720 (2008) (doctor who taught medical students and residents in the areas of surgery and critical care asserted “that she had ‘airway training’ and that ‘managing airway compromise and looking at ways to prevent [it] fell within her area of expertise’ ”; but, this did not establish “that she taught and/or practiced in the area of post-surgical airway management ‘with sufficient frequency to establish an appropriate level of knowledge’ ”). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Dr. Chou was not actively engaged in the subject specialty for three of the five years prior to the alleged negligence.