material fact and the Court would be logically prevented from rendering summary judgment. This line of decisions includes: Intel Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 14 Fed. Cir. (T) ___, 83 F.3d 1416 (1996); Medline Industries, Inc. v. United States, 13 Fed. Cir. (T) ___, 62 F.3d 1407 (1995); Marubeni America Corp. v. United States, 12 Fed. Cir. (T) ___, 35 F.3d 530 (1994); Marcel Watch Co. v. United States, 12 Fed. Cir. (T) ___, 11 F.3d 1054 (1993); Lynteq, Inc. v. United States, 10 Fed. Cir. (T) ___, 976 F.2d 693 (1992); W.R. Filbin Co., Inc. v. United States, 9 Fed. Cir (T) 155, 945 F.2d 390 (1991); Digital Equipment Corp. v. United States, 8 Fed. Cir. (T) 5, 889 F.2d 267 (1989); Simod America Corp. v. United States, 7 Fed. Cir. (T) 82, 872 F.2d 1572 (1989); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. United States, 3 Fed. Cir. (T) 20, 748 F.2d 663 (1984); Childcraft Education Corp. v. United States, 2 Fed. Cir. (T) 121, 742 F.2d 1413 (1984); Daw Industries, Inc. v. United States, 1 Fed. Cir. (T) 146, 714 F.2d 1140 (1983). The "two-step" process originated from a classification case involving "prosthetic socks", where the court ruled that:

Defendant offers numerous cases where the Court allegedly relied on subsequent definitions as evidence of Congressional intent. See, e.g., Daw Indus., Inc. v. United States, 1 Fed. Cir. (T) 146, 147 n. 4, 714 F.2d 1140, 1141 n. 4 (1983); Nippon Kogaku, Inc. v. United States, 69 CCPA 89, 93 n. 2, 673 F.2d 380, 382 n. 2 (1982); Toyota Motor Sales, Inc. v. United States, 7 CIT 178, 182, 585 F. Supp. 649, 653, aff'd, 3 Fed. Cir. (T) 93, 753 F.2d 1061 (1985). The cases defendant cites do not require this Court to give significant weight to a subsequent definition.

Defendant offers numerous cases where the Court allegedly relied on subsequent definitions as evidence of Congressional intent. See, e.g., Daw Indus., Inc. v. United States, 1 Fed. Cir. (T) 146, 147 n. 4, 714 F.2d 1140, 1141 n. 4 (1983); Nippon Kogaku, Inc. v. United States, 69 CCPA 89, 93 n. 2, 673 F.2d 380, 382 n. 2 (1982); Toyota Motor Sales, Inc. v. United States, 7 CIT 178, 182, 585 F. Supp. 649, 653 (1984), aff'd, 3 Fed. Cir. (T) 93, 753 F.2d 1061 (1985). The cases defendant cites do not require this Court to give significant weight to a subsequent definition.

The meaning of a specific tariff term is a question of law, and therefore subject to de novo review. E.g., Daw Indus. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1140, 1142, 1 Fed. Cir. (T) 146, 148 (1983). The provision at issue, Headnote 1 of Schedule 1, Part 12, Subpart B, states in pertinent part: "The provisions of this subpart cover only products fit for use as beverages ...."

Id. FED.R.CIV.P. 52(a); Daw Indus., Inc. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1140, 1142, 1 Fed. Cir. (T) 146, 148 (1983). The trial court also was correct in holding that the supplement filed by Pagoda challenged the same "decisions" as those challenged in the original protest.

The meaning of terms, such as "toy," is a question of law. Daw Industries, Inc. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1140, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Both parties, as well as the CIT, relied upon the definition set forth in the TSUS (Schedule 7, part 5, subpart E, headnote 2) as adopted by a line of cases including B. Shackman Co. v. United States, 67 Cust.Ct. 372, 380, C.D. 4300, (1971), that a toy is an article "chiefly used for the amusement of children or adults."

The second definition adds that "`all wearing apparel is to a degree (often a high degree) designed and worn to provide comfort and protection, often for very specific situations.'" Pl.'s Mem. at 26 (quoting Daw Indus., Inc. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1140, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Because the subject merchandise also must be classifiable under Chapter 62, the scope of that chapter must be examined.

A cardinal doctrine of statutory interpretation is the presumption that Congress's “use of different terms within related statutes generally implies that different meanings were intended.” 2A Norman Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06 (7th ed.2007); see, e.g., Daw Indus., Inc. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1140, 1143 (Fed.Cir.1983) (“The congressional choice of words has a further and more significant consequence.... Congress' choice of the different term suggests an intentional difference in meaning.”). Here, we must presume that Congress understood the difference between expressions of a particularized form of competition, i.e., “full and open,” versus the broader notion represented by “competitive basis.”

The fact that articles are specialized or intended for specific purposes, such as for sports, does not alone remove them from the category of apparel. Indeed, Chapter 62 includes heading 6211 for “track suits, ski-suits and swimwear; other garments,” which are, by their nature, items used in particular athletic activities. It is true, moreover, that “[v]irtually all wearing apparel is to a degree (often a high degree) designed and worn to provide comfort and protection, often for very specific situations.” Daw Indus., Inc. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1140, 1143 (Fed.Cir.1983). Despite LeMans's argument to the contrary, the merchandise in this case does not contain protective or specialized features to the same degree as the “crash helmets” used by motorcycle and auto racers in Antonio Pompeo, 40 Cust.Ct. at 366 (finding that “crash helmets” “would not be considered in ordinary parlance to be ‘wearing apparel’ ”). Accordingly, because we find that the CIT correctly applied the dictionary definitions of the terms in the headings and subheadings and then correctly concluded that the subject merchandise was wearing apparel, we agree that Customs properly classified LeMans's goods under Chapters 61 and 62 of the HTSUS.

Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Intel Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 83 F.3d 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Casio, Inc. v. United States, 73 F.3d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Nidec Corp. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Medline Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 F.3d 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530 (Fed. Cir. 1994); National Advanced Sys. v. United States, 26 F.3d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Sports Graphics, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Marcel Watch Co. v. United States, 11 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Lyntec, Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1992); W.R. Filbin Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Digital Equip. Corp. v. United States, 889 F.2d 267 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Simod Am. Corp. v. United States, 872 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. United States, 748 F.2d 663 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Childcraft Educ. Corp. v. United States, 742 F.2d 1413 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Daw Indus., Inc. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The ultimate question in a classification case is whether the merchandise is properly classified under one or another classification heading.