I concur in opinion of Grady, J. The order appointing appraisers determined the rights of the parties to the controversy; hence, it is an appealable order. The record before us is sufficient for us to review the order and determine the question of law which is presented. An analogous situation was before us in Davis v. Woollen, 191 Wn. 379, 71 P.2d 172. A pure question of law, we held, was there presented; hence, the absence of a statement of facts was not fatal to the appeal. BLAKE, BEALS, STEINERT, and MALLERY, JJ., dissent.

It would, however, be irrational to apply this strict definition to § 638-1, because to do so would restrict the jurisdiction of the court with reference to the judgment debtor's property to instances where the third party claimant of that property is personally within the jurisdiction of the court. In Davis v. Woollen, 191 Wn. 379, 71 P.2d 172, we treated § 638-1 as authorizing the court, upon proper service, to proceed with the adjudications there provided for, even though the adverse claimant was a nonresident. In this connection, we said:

In order for jurisdiction to attach when a summons is served by publication, there must be strict compliance with the statute. Davis v. Woollen, 191 Wn. 379, 71 P.2d 172 (1937); Schmelling v. Hoffman, 111 Wn. 408, 191 P. 618 (1920); State ex rel. Hopman v. Superior Court, 88 Wn. 612, 153 P. 315 (1915); Felsinger v. Quinn, 62 Wn. 183, 113 P. 275 (1911); Thompson v. Robbins, 32 Wn. 149, 72 P. 1043 (1903); State ex rel. Boyd v. Superior Court, 6 Wn. 352, 33 P. 827 (1893). When there is a recital in a default judgment that proper service of process has occurred, a presumption of jurisdiction arises, but such presumption may be overcome by showing that publication was based on a defective affidavit.

[1] It must be remembered that the exercise of jurisdiction over a person who is not within the state by service outside of the state is of purely statutory creation and is in derogation of the common law. The statute authorizing such service must be strictly pursued, Davis v. Woollen, 191 Wn. 379, 71 P.2d 172 (1937); Lutkens v. Young, 63 Wn. 452, 115 P. 1038 (1911); Ryland v. Universal Oil Co., 8 Wn. App. 43, 504 P.2d 1171 (1972), and the pursuit must result in substantial compliance with the statute in order for jurisdiction to be conferred upon the court. Golden Gate Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66 Wn.2d 469, 403 P.2d 351 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1025, 15 L.Ed.2d 539, 86 S.Ct. 644 (1966); Sowers v. Lewis, 49 Wn.2d 891, 307 P.2d 1064 (1957).

In three cases distinguishable from the case here, the court has refused to hold the statute applicable. Davis v. Woollen, 191 Wn. 379, 71 P.2d 172 (1937); State ex rel. Hopman v. Superior Court, 88 Wn. 612, 153 P. 315 (1915); State ex rel. Fugita v. Milroy, 71 Wn. 592, 129 P. 384 (1913). [1, 2] RCW 2.28.150 is broad enough to permit a motion or show cause procedure that will enable the court upon notice and hearing to determine whether the claim "to recover on a contract, express or implied," is at least probably valid so as to permit the writ of attachment to issue.

The cases are distinguishable. Schmelling v. Hoffman, 111 Wn. 408, 191 P. 618 (1920) and Muncie v. Westcraft Corp., 58 Wn.2d 36, 360 P.2d 744 (1961), involved constructive service by publication and substituted service, respectively, and are therefore cases requiring strict compliance with the statutory requirements. State ex rel. Hopman v. Superior Court, 88 Wn. 612, 153 P. 315 (1915), and Davis v. Woollen, 191 Wn. 379, 71 P.2d 172 (1937), were decided under a statute making personal service outside the state the equivalent of service by publication. The statute under consideration here, RCW 4.28.180, makes personal service outside the state the equivalent of personal service within the state when the person so served has submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.