Opinion
12-29-1903
DAVIS v. WILSON.
Howard L. Miller, for complainant. Harvey F. Carr, for defendant.
Suit by James P. Davis against John O. Wilson. On motion to dismiss demurrer. Order of dismissal advised.
Howard L. Miller, for complainant.
Harvey F. Carr, for defendant.
GREY, V. C. (orally). The bill in this case alleges that the defendant Wilson, an attorney at law, was engaged by the complainant as his agent to purchase for him a piece of land; that Wilson accepted the agency and undertook the duty; that he ascertained that he could purchase the land at a certain price, and thereupon falsely represented to the complainant, his principal, that he would be obliged to pay a greater one; that he concealed the truth from his principal, and by that means induced him to pay the larger price for the land; that Wilson received the larger price by a subterfuge, and, without disclosing the fact to his principal, paid only the smaller price for the land, and retained the difference for his own benefit; that the principal subsequently heard that this fraud had been perpetrated upon him. The complainant files this bill, calling upon the defendant, his agent, to disclose the truth as to the transaction, and also asks the court, if the facts appear and are established as stated in the bill, that a decree may go for the recovery of the money thus fraudulently obtained from the complainant To that bill a demurrer is filed, and the sole ground attempted to be asserted against it is that there is an adequate remedy at law.
The bill has a dual aspect. It is filed not only for the recovery of the money, but also because of the relation of principal and agent, and the right which a principal has to have the agent disclose to him what the truth was in the agency transaction, which the agent never yet has done. It is a bill for discovery and relief. No court of law can give the complainant the discovery which precedes and is incidental to the relief. If the facts turn out to be true, as the demurrer admits, Mr. Wilson did accept the agency upon the terms named, and did cheat the complainant under the circumstances narrated in the billBy this demurrer he says to his principal: You are obliged to take the chances in a suit at law, without any discovery from me of my transactions as your agent. It is a mere question of my repayment to you of moneys which you claim to be due to you." That is not the law, and never has been. A court of equity will take jurisdiction and compel the agent to disclose his transactions while acting for his principal, and will decree such relief as the facts disclosed may require. I think, therefore, as the demurrer is put solely on the ground that an adequate remedy at law is afforded, while upon the face of the bill it plainly is not, that the demurrer is manifestly frivolous, and presents no issue worthy of consideration by the court, and therefore the motion to strike it out ought to be maintained. Krueger v. Armitage, 58 N. J. Eq. 357, 44 Atl. 167, cited by the defendant, was a case where the parties dealt at arm's length. The defendant was not in any such relation to the complainant that he was obliged to disclose to him his transactions in the matter in question. The complainant in that suit had no right to rely upon what the defendant said as a disclosure of the facts. In this case, assuming the bill to be true, which for the purposes of this inquiry must be done, the defendant was in a position of trust, casting a duty upon him, which the bill says he violated. The demurrer therefore admits that the defendant was guilty of a breach of trust—a failure on his part to tell the truth to the complainant, to whom he was under a legal obligation to reveal it. The complainant is entitled to a disclosure of the facts as to the defendant's conduct, and to an accounting for any money which upon that disclosure may be shown to be due.
I will advise an order dismissing the demurrer as frivolous.