Opinion
1:22-cv-156
07-17-2023
RYAN DAVIS, Petitioner v. BRAD TRATE, Respondent
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
Presently pending is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by pro se Petitioner Ryan Davis (Petitioner) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 5. Petitioner contends that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the agency responsible for implementing and applying federal law concerning the computation of federal sentences, erred in computing his sentence. For the following reasons, Petitioner's § 2241 petition must be dismissed.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
II. Report
A. Background
On May 10, 2019, while on parole from a prior state sentence, Petitioner was tacen into custody by the Kent County Sheriff's Department in Grand Rapids, Michigan. ECF No. 11-1 ¶ 6. On May 23, 2019, the Michigan Department of Corrections (DOC) determined that Petitioner had violated his parole and remanded him to state custody as a parole violator. Id. See also ECF No. 11-3.
While he was in state custody, the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan (the sentencing court) issued an indictment in Case Number l:19-CR-00208-RJJ charging Petitioner with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. ECF No. 11-1 ¶ 7; ECF No. 11-4. On September 19, 2019, Petitioner was temporarily removed from state custody by the United States Marshal Service (USMS) pursuant to a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. ECF No. 11-1 ¶ 8. Following a guilty plea, the sentencing court sentenced Petitioner to a 60-month term of imprisonment for violations of 18 U.S.C.§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Id. ¶ 9. On August 31, 2020, the USMS returned Petitioner to Michigan state authorities to complete the term of his state parole violation. Id. ¶ 10.
The Michigan DOC granted Petitioner parole on November 19, 2020, releasing him into exclusive federal custody. Id. ¶ 10. At that time, the BOP prepared Petitioner's sentence computation based on a 60-month term of imprisonment commencing on November 19, 2020, the date he was released from his Michigan parole revocation term. Id. ¶ 11. The BOP did not grant Petitioner any prior custody credit because he received credit in state court towards his parole violation for the entire period between May 10, 2009, and November 19, 2020. Id. Based on those computations, Petitioner is scheduled for release from BOP custody via Good Conduct Time Release on February 21, 2025. Id.
The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenges the BOP's calculation of his federal release date. Petitioner contends that the BOP failed to award him prior credit for the nineteen months that he spent in state custody between May 10, 2019, and November 19, 2020. See ECF No. 1. This matter is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
Under § 2241, district courts have authority to grant habeas corpus “within their respective jurisdictions.” Petitioner is confined at FCI McKean, which is located within the territorial boundaries of the Western District of Pennsylvania.
B. Analysis
For federal prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers habeas jurisdiction over an inmate's challenge to the execution as opposed to the validity of his sentence. Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533,535 (3d Cir. 2012). Two types of claims may ordinarily be litigated in a § 2241 proceeding. First, a prisoner may challenge conduct undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (the “BOP”) that affects the duration of his custody. For example, a prisoner can challenge the BOP's computation of his federal sentence, see, e.g, Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1990), or the constitutionality of a BOP disciplinary action that resulted in the loss of good conduct sentencing credits, Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008). Secondly, a prisoner can challenge BOP conduct that “conflict[s] with express statements in the applicable sentencing judgment.” Cardona, 681 F.3d at 536; Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243. Because the allegations in the instant habeas action challenge the BOP's computation of Petitioner's federal sentence, this Court has jurisdiction under § 2241 to consider Petitioner's claim.
To determine whether the BOP correctly computed an inmate's federal sentence, a reviewing court must separately determine: (1) the date on which Petitioner's federal sentence commenced, and (2) whether Petitioner was entitled to credit for time spent in custody prior to the commencement of his sentence. Each of these determinations is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585.
With respect to the commencement date, 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) provides that a federal sentence “commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.” When an inmate is only facing service of a federal sentence, the application of § 3585(a) is straightforward: the BOP will simply designate the inmate to a federal detention facility and calculate the federal sentence to have commenced on the date it was imposed. Where a defendant faces prosecution by both state and federal authorities, however, courts apply the “primary custody” doctrine to determine where and how the defendant will serve any resulting sentence of incarceration. See Taccetta v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 606 Fed.Appx. 661, 663 (3d Cir. 2015). Under that doctrine, the sovereign that first arrests an individual has “primary custody” over the defendant and is entitled to have the defendant serve its sentence before that of any other jurisdiction. See id. (citing Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145, 1153 (3d Cir. 1982)). Primary custody remains vested in that sovereign until the defendant completes that sovereign's sentence or the sovereign relinquishes primary custody by releasing the defendant on bail, dismissing the charges, or granting parole. See id. Notably, a temporary transfer of a prisoner on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not constitute a relinquishment. See id.', see also Holloman v. Warden Fairton FCI, 635 Fed.Appx. 12, 14 (3d Cir. 2015) (stating that “[t]he production of a defendant pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not affect the jurisdiction of the sovereign with primary custody over a defendant”).
In the instant case, Petitioner remained in the primary custody of the State of Michigan from May 10, 2019, when he was arrested by state authorities, until November 19, 2020, when the state released Petitioner to the exclusive custody of federal authorities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (“A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.”). Thus, the lone question presented is whether Petitioner received the appropriate amount of credit for the time that he spent in custody prior to the commencement of his sentence.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), a defendant is entitled to receive credit for time served “(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against another sentence.” Id. (emphasis added). The intent of the last clause of § 3585(b) is to prohibit an inmate from receiving double credit for his prior time in detention. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992) (explaining that with the enactment of § 3585(b), “Congress made it clear that a defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention time.”). Thus, the BOP may not grant prior custody credit under § 3585(b) for time that has been credited against another sentence. See, e.g., Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).
In the instant case, Petitioner received credit against his state parole sentence for the periods of time that he spent in state custody between his arrest on May 10, 2019, and his release on parole on November 19, 2020. Because he received credit against his state sentence for that time, the BOP appropriately and correctly determined that he was not entitled to a credit against his federal sentence under § 3585(b). Vega, 493 F.3d at 314. His challenge to the BOP's calculation of his sentence must be dismissed.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.
Because “[f]ederal prisoner appeals from the denial of a habeas corpus proceeding are not governed by the certificate of appealability requirement,” the Court need not make a certificate of appealability determination in this matter. Williams v. McKean, 2019 WL 1118057, at *5 n. 6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11,2019) (citing United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012)); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B).
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).