Opinion
CR-20-0787
08-05-2022
Deangelo Edward DAVIS v. STATE of Alabama
Vallee V. Connor of Connor Law, LLC, Thomasville, for appellant. Steve Marshall, att’y gen., and Jordan Shelton, asst. att’y gen., for appellee.
Vallee V. Connor of Connor Law, LLC, Thomasville, for appellant.
Steve Marshall, att’y gen., and Jordan Shelton, asst. att’y gen., for appellee.
MINOR, Judge.
In this case, we must decide whether the circuit court correctly allowed evidence of Deangelo Edward Davis’s suspended driver’s license status that, along with other evidence, resulted in Davis’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide, see § 13A-6-4, Ala. Code 1975. And, if so, whether Davis’s sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment, split so that he would serve 60 days’ imprisonment followed by 12 months’ unsupervised probation is legal under Collier v. State, 293 So. 3d 961 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019). We uphold the circuit court’s admission of evidence and affirm Davis’s conviction, but we remand this case with instructions to correct Davis’s illegal split sentence under Collier.
The circuit court ultimately suspended Davis’s 60-day split sentence.
Because Davis does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, only a brief recitation of the facts is necessary.
In March 2019, Davis ran a stop sign at the intersection of Highway 280 and County Road 34 in Camp Hill and collided with a motorcycle. Sarah Sparks, the driver of the motorcycle, died from her injuries.
Dr Lauren Tanner testified that, at the time of Sparks’s death, Sparks tested positive for amphetamine, cannabis, and cocaine. But, Dr. Tanner testified, Sparks’s cause of death was severe traumatic brain injury resulting in brain death consistent with a motorcycle collision.
Davis testified that he had a stroke in February 2016 and that he spent three months in the hospital suffering from physical impairments caused by the stroke. While Davis was recovering from his stroke, his driver’s license expired. After later renewing his license, Davis received a letter from the State of Alabama in January 2019, stating that Davis’s license would be suspended until he had a neurologist submit a letter stating that he or she had conducted a neurological test and had cleared Davis to drive again. At the time of the accident, Davis’s driver’s license was still suspended.
Officer Daniel Motley, who was working for the Camp Hill Police Department at the time of the accident, testified that Davis was issued a citation for driving with a suspended license at the time of the accident. He also testified that he recovered the crash-data recorder or "black box" from Davis’s vehicle and that it showed Davis did not make a complete stop at the stop sign before pulling onto Highway 280 (R. 50, 55, 124, 160, 172)
[1] In his brief, Davis argues that "because the existence or nonexistence of a driver’s license does not establish the competency or incompetency of a driver," the evidence that his license was suspended was irrelevant and the circuit court erred by allowing evidence of Davis’s suspended license to be presented. (Davis’s brief, p. 8.) He also argues that the admission of the irrelevant evidence is prejudicial and requires reversal. (Davis’s brief, p. 9.)
[2] "The question of admissibility of evidence is generally left to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s determination on that question will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion." Ex parte Loggins, 771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 (Ala. 2000).
Section 13A-6-4(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides "A person commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide if he or she causes the death of another person by criminal negligence." Section 13A-2-2(4), Ala. Code 1975, defines "criminal negligence" as follows:
"A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance which is defined by statute as an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation."
And "[a] court or jury may consider statutes or ordinances regulating the defendant’s conduct as bearing upon the question of criminal negligence." § 13A-2-2(4), Ala. Code 1975.
[3–5] Relevant evidence is defined as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Rule 401, Ala. R. Evid. "Alabama recognizes a liberal test of relevancy." Hayes v. State, 717 So. 2d 30, 36 (Ala. Crim. App 1997) "A fact is admissible against a relevancy challenge if it has any probative value, however slight, upon a matter in the case." Knotts v. State, 686 So. 2d 431, 468 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). "Relevant evidence should be excluded only ‘if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid. And "[t]rial courts are vested with considerable discretion in determining whether evidence is relevant." Capote v. State, 323 So. 3d 104, 121 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020).
[6] Under the facts here, the evidence that Davis was driving with a suspended license at the time of the accident was relevant to show that Davis acted with criminal negligence. That evidence, along with other evidence indicating that Davis ran a stop sign, all went to prove Davis’s mental culpability. See § 13A-6-4(b). Although Davis argues that the admission of the "irrelevant" evidence is prejudicial, he does not show how this evidence prejudiced him, other than stating: "The only purpose the license status served was to prejudice the minds of the jury that anyone who drives without a license must be irresponsible." (Davis’s brief, p. 12.) That argument is unpersuasive. Further, the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of it being prejudicial. See Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid. Thus, the circuit court did not err by allowing evidence of Davis’s suspended license, and Davis is due no relief on this issue.
[7] That said, because Davis’s conviction is a misdemeanor, his split sentence is illegal under Collier v. State, 293 So. 3d 961 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019); thus we remand this ease for the circuit court to correct Davis’s sentence.
Section 13A-6-4(c), Ala Code 1975, provides. "Criminally negligent homicide is a Class A misdemeanor, except in cases in which the criminally negligent homicide is caused by the driver or operator of a vehicle or vessel who is driving or operating the vehicle or vessel in violation of Section 32-5A-191 or 32-5A-191 3; in these cases, criminally negligent homicide is a Class C felony."
In Collier, this Court held:
"Alabama’s Split-Sentence Act, codified at § 15-18-8, Ala. Code 1975, authorizes a trial court to split a defendant’s sentence under certain circumstances. Because of the nature of the issue presented here, it is necessary to review the relevant legislative history of the Split-Sentence Act.
"In Ex parte McCormick, [932 So. 2d 124 (Ala. 2005),] the Alabama Supreme Court explained the legislative history of the statute in part, stating:
" ‘ "Section 15–18-8, Ala. Code 1975, commonly referred to as the Split Sentence Act (‘the Act’), was enacted in 1976. The original version of the Act allowed a trial court to split a sentence if the sentence did not exceed 10 years. The length of sentence eligible for split-sentence consideration was increased to 15 years in 1985 and to 20 years in 2000. See Act No. 85–905, Ala. Acts 1985, and Act No. 2000–759, Ala. Acts 2000. When the sentence eligible for split-sentence consideration was increased in 1985, the Legislature also amended § 15–22–50, Ala. Code 1975—which grants a court the authority to order probation for any sentence that does not exceed 15 years. However, the Legislature did not amend § 15–22-50, Ala. Code 1975, in 2000 when it increased the eligible sentence under the Act to 20 years and that statute still provides that a court may order probation only for a sentence that does not exceed 15 years." ’
"932 So. 2d at 130 (quoting State v. Gaines, 932 So.2d 118, 121 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)). In 2005, the legislature amended the Split-Sentence Act to prohibit a trial court from splitting a defendant’s sentence or granting probation in cases where the defendant was convicted of a ‘criminal sex offense involving a child as defined in Section 15–20-21(5), which constituted a Class A or Class B felony.’ See Act No. 2005-301, Ala. Acts 2005 (1st Special Session), p. 571, § 1.
"In 2015, the legislature amended the Split-Sentence Act twice. First, in an amendment effective on September 1, 2015, the legislature merely deleted the word ‘criminal’ preceding ‘sex offense’ in subsections (a) and (f), and substituted ‘15-20A-4(26)’ for ‘15-20-21(5)’ in subsections (a) and (f). See Act No. 2015-463, Ala. Acts 2015, § 1. In a separate amendment, which became effective on January 30, 2016, the legislature made the changes to the statute that give rise to this appeal.
"In the second 2015 amendment, the legislature amended the Split-Sentence Act to read, in pertinent part, as follows:
" ‘(a) When a defendant is convicted of an offense, other than a sex offense involving a child as defined in Section 15-20A-4(26), that constitutes a Class A or Class B felony offense, and receives a sentence of 20 years or less in any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the State of Alabama and the judge presiding over the case is satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, he or she may order: " ‘(1) That a defendant convicted of a Class A or Class B felony be confined in a prison, jail-type institution, or treatment institution for a period not exceeding three years in cases where the imposed sentence is not more than 15 years, and that the execution of the remainder of the sentence be suspended notwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary and that the defendant be placed on probation for such period and upon such terms as the court deems best.
" ‘(2) That a defendant convicted of a Class A, Class B, or Class C felony with an imposed sentence of greater than 15 years but not more than 20 years be confined in a prison, jail-type institution, or treatment institution for a period of three to five years for Class A or Class B felony convictions and for a period of three years for Class C felony convictions, during which the offender shall not be eligible for parole or release because of deduction from sentence for good behavior under the Alabama Correctional Incentive Time Act, and that the remainder of the sentence be suspended notwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary and that the defendant be placed on probation for the period upon the terms as the court deems best.
" ‘This subsection shall not be construed to impose the responsibility for offenders sentenced to a Department of Corrections facility upon a local confinement facility not operated by the Department of Corrections.
"‘(b) Unless a defendant is sentenced to probation, drug court, or a pretrial diversion program, when a defendant is convicted of an offense that constitutes a Class C or D felony offense and receives a sentence of not more than 15 years, the judge presiding over the case shall order that the convicted defendant be confined in a prison, jail-type institution, treatment Institution, or community corrections program for a Class C felony offense or in a consenting community corrections program for a Class D felony offense, except as provided in subsection (e), for a period not exceeding two years in cases where the imposed sentence is not more than 15 years, and that the execution of the remainder of the sentence be suspended notwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary and that the defendant be placed on probation for a period not exceeding three years and upon such terms as the court deems best. In all cases when it is shown that a defendant has been previously convicted of any three or more felonies or has been previously convicted of any two or more felonies that are Class A or Class B felonies, and after such convictions has committed a Class D felony, upon conviction, he or she must be punished for a Class C felony. This subsection shall not be construed to impose the responsibility for offenders sentenced to a Department of Corrections facility upon a local confinement facility not operated by the Department of Corrections.’
"§ 15-18-8 (emphasis added).
"When the entire statute is read as a whole, the language of the statute as amended is unambiguous. Applying the well settled principles of statutory construction, we must agree with Collier that the plain language of the\
statute, as amended, now authorizes trial courts to split sentences only in cases involving Class A, Class B, Class C, or Class D felonies. We note that, in previous versions of the statute, the language of the statute did not speak specifically to either felony or misdemeanor offenses and, instead, spoke only to convictions ‘in any court having jurisdiction to try offenses in the State of Alabama,’ and the statute dictated the parameters of the split sentence where the imposed sentence was not more than a specified number of years, depending on the applicable version of the statute, which effectively included sentences of misdemeanors where the sentences were capped at 12 months. However, after the most recent amendment to the Split-Sentence Act, the statute now expressly limits the trial court’s authority to split a sentence to felony cases only.
"Although it is unclear whether the legislature intended to prohibit the trial court from splitting sentences for misdemeanor offenses or whether that result was merely an accidental effect of the most recent amendment to the statute, this Court has a duty to ‘ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent as expressed in the statute’; it is not our role to ‘displace the legislature by amending statutes to make them express what we think the legislature should have done’ or ‘to assume the legislative prerogative to correct defective legislation or amend statutes.’ See Ex parte Webb, 53 So.3d 121 at 128 [(Ala. 2009)]. Because we determine that the plain language of § 15-18-8, as amended, is unambiguous, ‘there is no room for judicial construction." Ex parte Waddail, 827 So. 2d 789, 794 (Ala. 2001). Consequently, the Split-Sentence Act no longer grants the trial court the authority to split a sentence for a misdemeanor offense, and Collier’s split sentence, thus, is illegal.
"The proper remedy for cases in which the trial court had no authority to apply the Split-Sentence Act has been to remand the case to the trial court for that court to remove the split portion of the sentence. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 879 So. 2d 1218 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that the circuit court had no authority to split a sentence and remanding the case to the circuit court for that court to set aside the split portion of the sentence); Morris v. State, 876 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (same). Here, the 12-month sentence was valid; however, the circuit court must set aside the split portion of Collier’s sentence. See Wood v. State, 602 So. 2d 1195 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)."
Collier, 293 So. 3d at 972-75.
[8] After Collier, the legislature amended § 15-18-8 to authorize the splitting of misdemeanor sentences. But that amendment did not become effective until May 31, 2019, after Davis committed the offense. Thus, we remand this case to the circuit court for that court to set aside the split portion of Davis’s sentence. Due return must be filed with this Court within 42 days of the date of this opinion and must include a transcript of the sentencing hearing conducted on remand as well as the circuit court’s amended sentencing order. AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
As in Collier, because the 12-month sentence was valid, the circuit court may not change it. The circuit court, however, has discretion to suspend the 12-month sentence. See§ 15-22-50, Ala Code 1975.
Note from the reporter of decisions: On February 3, 2023, on return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, without opinion.
Windom, P.J., and Kellum, McCool, and Cole, JJ., concur.