Opinion
No. 108,810.
2013-07-5
Anthony LeRoy DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas and Correct Care Solutions, et al., Appellees.
Appeal from Norton District Court; Preston A. Pratt, Judge. Anthony LeRoy Davis, appellant pro se. Robert E. Wasinger, legal counsel, of Kansas Department of Corrections, for appellee.
Appeal from Norton District Court; Preston A. Pratt, Judge.
Anthony LeRoy Davis, appellant pro se. Robert E. Wasinger, legal counsel, of Kansas Department of Corrections, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., LEBEN and ARNOLD–BURGER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Anthony Leroy Davis appeals the dismissal of his personal injury lawsuit against the State of Kansas, Correct Care Solutions, L.L.C. (CCS), and Aramark Correctional Services, L.L.C. (Aramark), under K.S.A. 60–212(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the district court's judgment.
On January 27, 2012, Davis, while an inmate at the Norton Correctional Facility, filed a pro se personal injury lawsuit against the State of Kansas, CCS, and Aramark. Davis contended that he was entitled to damages in excess of $75,000, an injunction, and a temporary restraining order because the “vindictive [and] careless treatment provided by [the] defendants” caused him “significant harm.” Davis was later transferred to Lansing Correctional Facility. The State subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Davis' petition for failure to state a claim and/or exhaust his administrative remedies.
After reviewing the file, the district court found that Davis' petition was “so vague or ambiguous that the defendants [could not] reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” However, rather than grant the State's motion to dismiss, the district court ordered Davis to file an amended petition. The district court provided Davis with detailed instructions on how to remedy the deficiencies in his petition, and it noted that his action would be dismissed if he failed to file the amended petition by the date specified or did not “provide enough information to apprise the defendants of the facts that support relief.”
On June 6, 2012, Davis filed a pleading entitled “Amended Motion [f]or [a] More Defmate [ sic ] Statement” and assorted attachments, which the district court interpreted as an amended petition. The documents alleged: (1) Aramark's involvement in an embezzlement and racketeering scheme deprived him of an adequate “medical diet”; (2) the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) negligently injured his prostate and denied him medical treatment; and (3) the KDOC negligently placed him in administrative segregation in “[r]eprisal” for filing grievances.
On July 23, 2012, after reviewing Davis' pleadings, the district court dismissed his action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to K.S.A. 60–212(b)(6). The district court, after citing K.S.A. 60–208(a)(l) and (e)(1), explained:
“[E]ven with liberal interpretation with an emphasis on substance rather than form this Court is unable to determine what the facts are upon which [Davis] seeks relief. This Court is also unable to determine which of the multiple defendants [Davis] believes committed the alleged negligent acts.
“This Court previously determined [that Davis'] petition was so vague or ambiguous that the defendants cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading. This Court granted [Davis] an opportunity to correct the deficiencies of his petition, and although [Davis] has attempted to do so [he] continues to fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Davis filed several motions following the dismissal of his petition. On August 27, 2012, the district court denied these motions. Davis filed a notice of appeal.
On appeal, Davis contends that the district court committed reversible error when it dismissed his action under K.S.A. 60–212(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. When reviewing a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss, this court must “accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true, along with any inferences that can reasonably [be] drawn from the facts alleged in the petition.” Berry v. National Medical Services, Inc., 292 Kan. 917, 918, 257 P.3d 287 (2011). Based upon the facts and inferences drawn from the petition, this court must then determine “whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 292 Kan. at 918.
There are a number of procedural and jurisdictional problems with Davis' pro se brief and his notice of appeal. Davis' notice of appeal indicated that he was appealing from the district court's “Order Denying Relief” filed on August 27, 2012. The notice did not specify that Davis was appealing from the district court's “Order of Dismissal” filed on July 23, 2012, which is the order that dismissed Davis' petition for failure to state a claim. But Davis' pro se brief claims as the only issue that the district court committed reversible error when it dismissed his petition for negligence. Generally, an appellate court only obtains jurisdiction over the rulings identified in the notice of appeal. State v. Bogguess, 293 Kan. 743, 756, 268 P.3d 481 (2012).
But even assuming this court has jurisdiction to address the dismissal of Davis' petition for failure to state a claim, his argument still fails. As the State points out, Davis has failed to brief the issue of whether his petition sufficiently set forth a claim for relief. Davis also makes no argument on appeal as to how he complied with the district court's detailed instructions on how to remedy the deficiencies in his petition. An issue not briefed by the appellant is deemed waived or abandoned. See State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 709, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011).
After thoroughly reviewing the record and Davis' brief on appeal, we find that no reversible error of law was committed and that the written order filed by the district court adequately explained the decision to dismiss Davis' lawsuit.
Affirmed under Rule 7.042(b)(5) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 63).