Opinion
Nos. 05-02-01079-CR, 05-02-01080-CR, 05-02-01081-CR, 05-02-01082-CR, 05-02-01083-CR.
Opinion Issued April 8, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH, Tex.R.App.P. 47.
Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F01-74127-WS, F01-74205-US, F01-74965-KS, F01-75045-KS, F01-76108-LS. Affirmed.
Before Justices JAMES, BRIDGES, and RICHTER.
OPINION
Daniel Lakeith Davis appeals from four convictions for burglary of a habitation (cause nos. 05-02-01079-CR, 05-02-01080-CR, 05-02-01081-CR, and 05-02-01082-CR) and one conviction for possession of cocaine in an amount less than one gram (cause no. 05-02-01083-CR). See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 30.02 (Vernon 2003); Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 2003). In the burglary cases, appellant waived a jury trial, entered non-negotiated guilty pleas, and pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs. The trial court deferred adjudicating guilt, placed appellant on ten years' probation, and assessed a $500 fine in each case. In the cocaine possession case, appellant waived a jury trial, entered a negotiated guilty plea, and pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs. Pursuant to the plea bargain agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to two years' confinement, probated for five years, and assessed a $300 fine. Subsequently, the State moved to proceed with adjudication of guilt in the burglary cases and to revoke probation in the drug case, alleging appellant violated the terms of his probation. The trial court granted the State's motions. The trial court adjudicated appellant guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment in each burglary case. In the cocaine possession case, the trial court revoked appellant's probation, sentenced him to two years' confinement, and assessed a $300 fine. In two points of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in (1) sentencing him to life confinement when there was no finding the enhancement paragraphs were true, and (2) assessing punishment without pronouncing sentence. We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case. In his first point of error, appellant argues that when the trial court granted the State's motion to proceed with adjudication, it found him guilty and assessed a life sentence without finding the enhancement paragraphs to be true. The State responds appellant did not object at trial and has waived any error caused by the trial court's failure to orally state its enhancement findings. In the alternative, the State argues the trial court impliedly found the enhancement paragraphs true when it sentenced appellant to life confinement. The record shows appellant pleaded true orally and in writing to the allegations in the enhancement paragraphs in each case. A plea of true constitutes sufficient proof to support the enhancement allegations and makes punishment at the enhanced level mandatory. See Wilson v. State, 671 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). The trial court's judgment in each case finds the enhancement allegations were true, and the court assessed punishment accordingly. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.42(c)(2) (Vernon 2003). While it may be a better practice for trial courts to orally read the enhancement paragraphs and find them to be true or false on the record, failing to do so is not error. See Garner v. State, 858 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref'd). Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first point of error. In his second point of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in assessing punishment without sentencing him. The State responds the trial court did not err because it pronounced the sentence in appellant's presence. We agree with the State. The record shows the trial court pronounced the sentences in appellant's presence after adjudicating his guilt in the burglary cases and revoking his probation in the cocaine possession case. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.03, § 1(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003). The trial judge asked counsel if there was any legal reason why the sentence should not be pronounced, and counsel said no. The judge then asked appellant if he would like to say anything else to the court, and appellant said no. Appellant has not overcome the presumption of regularity of the court's proceedings. See Christian v. State, 865 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd). Accordingly, we overrule appellant's second point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.