Opinion
No. 05-11-00585-CR
04-05-2012
MARCEL DAVIS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
AFFIRM; Opinion Filed April 5, 2012.
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F09-57260-R
OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Fillmore, Myers
Opinion By Justice Myers
Appellant, Marcel Davis, was convicted pursuant to an open plea of guilty of first degree felony injury to a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a), (e) (Supp. 2006). He was sentenced to fifty years in prison. In one issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by finding him guilty of intentional or knowing injury to a child because the evidence supported a conviction for reckless injury to a child. We affirm.
Discussion
Appellant argues the evidence establishes that he is guilty of a reckless act as opposed to an intentional or knowing act, and that, as a result, the trial court should have found him guilty of reckless injury to a child, which is a second-degree felony offense. See id. § 22.04(e). A person commits the offense of injury to a child if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence by act or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly by omission, causes to a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual, serious bodily injury, serious mental deficiency, impairment or injury, or bodily injury. Id. § 22.04(a). Injury to a child is a result-oriented crime because the statute penalizes the result of the conduct that occurred. Id; Schultz v. State, 923 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Haggins v. State, 785 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Beggs v. State, 597 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1974); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). When, however, a defendant pleads guilty to an offense, the federal and state constitutional sufficiency of the evidence standards do not apply. McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 331 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2006, no pet.); Hill v. State, No. 05-09-00905-CR, 2010 WL 3769531, at *1 (Tex. App.--Dallas Sept. 29, 2010, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The State is nonetheless bound by statute to support a plea with sufficient evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (West 2005). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty plea, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed if the evidence embraces “every essential element of the offense charged.” McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 330. A judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient evidence to support a guilty plea and satisfy the requirements of article 1.15. See Breaux v. State, 16 S.W.3d 854, 856 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd); see also Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Hill, 2010 WL 3769531, at *1
In this case, appellant entered an open plea of guilty to the first degree felony offense of injury to a child, as charged in the indictment. He signed a judicial confession admitting his guilt to the offense, including the element that he caused serious bodily injury to the complainant, N.D., intentionally and knowingly. The plea and accompanying judicial confession satisfy the requirements of article 1.15 and are sufficient to prove the offense. If appellant wanted to challenge the evidence supporting his guilt, he was required to seek to withdraw his guilty plea. See McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 331. Appellant never sought to withdraw his plea, nor has he argued the plea was involuntary. We therefore overrule appellant's issue.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
110585F.U05
Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
MARCEL DAVIS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
No. 05-11-00585-CR
Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. F09- 57260-R).
Opinion delivered by Justice Myers, Justices Morris and Fillmore participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered April 5, 2012.
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE