Upon the State's subsequent tender of the test results, Elmore did not make a formal request for any specific amount of additional time, but merely suggested the vague possibility of having the fingerprints tested by an out-of-state expert. See Davis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 657, 658 (4) ( 420 S.E.2d 349) (1992). Compare Miller v. State, 208 Ga. App. 20, 22 (2) (b) ( 430 S.E.2d 159) (1993).
See OCGA § 16-6-3 (a) (A conviction for statutory rape requires that the victim’s testimony be supported by other evidence.); see also In the Interest of B. L. S. , 264 Ga. 643, 644 (2), 449 S.E.2d 823 (1994) (Evidence was sufficient to uphold adjudication ofdelinquency based upon statutory rape because "[i]t was not necessary that the victim’s testimony be corroborated in every particular[.]"); Davis v. State , 204 Ga. App. 657 (1), 420 S.E.2d 349 (1992) (It is not necessary for the State to present evidence to corroborate the victim’s identification of the defendant as the person who committed the statutory rape. "The quantum of corroboration needed in a [statutory] rape case is not that which is in itself sufficient to convict the accused, but only that amount of independent evidence which tends to prove that the incident occurred as alleged.") (citation and punctuation omitted).
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Davis v. State, 204 Ga.App. 657(1), 420 S.E.2d 349 (1992). In this case, Williamson was convicted of statutory rape based upon his having had sexual intercourse with B.E. As shown above, in addition to B.E.'s testimony about the acts, her sister testified about B.E.'s statements to her and about her observation of B.E. and Williamson going into his bedroom together during the relevant time period.
OCGA § 17-8-20. See also Davis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 657, 658 (4) ( 420 SE2d 349) (1992) ("[n]othing in our law either requires or permits defendants to rely solely on information provided by the State for their pretrial investigation, and before they are entitled to continuance, they must show the exercise of due diligence") (citation omitted). 3. Robbins also claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police investigator because the statement was obtained "through hope of benefit and promise of reward through the actions of a law enforcement officer."
The jury listened to the taped interview and heard Trejo's own inculpatory revelations that he had engaged in consensual sex with the twelve-year-old girl but had stopped after she said it was hurting her. Taken as a whole, this evidence was sufficient to corroborate the victim's testimony and to sustain the statutory rape conviction within the meaning of Jackson v. Virginia.Davis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 657 (1) ( 420 S.E.2d 349) (1992); see Simpson v. State, 234 Ga. App. 729, 730-731 (2) ( 507 S.E.2d 860) (1998); see OCGA § 16-6-3 (a).Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979); Turner v. State, 223 Ga. App. 448, 450 (2) ( 477 S.E.2d 847) (1996).
Prior decisions have recognized a broad discretion on the part of the trial court in controlling the trial of a case, have allowed a great deal of latitude in the examination of young, timid, or otherwise disadvantaged witnesses, and have generally found no abuse of discretion in permitting a familiar person to sit or stand near a young witness during their testimony. Davis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 657, 658 (5) ( 420 S.E.2d 349); Boatright v. State, 192 Ga. App. 112, 114 (5) ( 385 S.E.2d 298); Benton v. State, 184 Ga. App. 684, 686 (4) ( 362 S.E.2d 421). In this instance, the grandmother was also a witness in the case and the trial court resolved any sequestration issues by requiring the grandmother to testify first.
Under that statute, if the State wishes to use scientific reports at trial, it must provide copies of the reports to the defense "no later than ten days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court." As Law, supra; Davis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 657 ( 420 S.E.2d 349) (1992); and Daniel v. State, 180 Ga. App. 179 ( 348 S.E.2d 720) (1986), relied on by the State, addressed the applicability of OCGA § 17-7-211, they are not controlling. Here, defense counsel did not receive a copy of the written report within the ten-day period as required by the new statute. It is true that a continuance is not the only remedy where violation of discovery requirements has occurred.
Our courts have allowed a great deal of latitude in the examination of young or timid witnesses. See Davis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 657, 658-659 (5) ( 420 S.E.2d 349) (1992); Boatright v. State, 192 Ga. App. 112, 115 (5) ( 385 S.E.2d 298) (1989). A trial court may render aid to a witness if, because of age, timidity or fraility, the witness requires aid in order to testify.
" (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Davis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 657 ( 420 S.E.2d 349) (1992). This enumeration is without merit.
Further, defense counsel made no showing of due diligence in trial preparation or that they had conducted their own discovery, instead of relying solely upon the prosecution. See Davis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 657 ( 420 S.E.2d 349) (1992); Mojica v. State, 210 Ga. App. 826 ( 437 S.E.2d 805) (1993). Defense counsel failed to reveal that the witnesses' had identities, that they were under subpoena, and that the witnesses were to testify as to relevant and material facts set forth in a proffer of proof.