County commissioners, by contrast, are not required to reside in their precincts for their full terms. Childress County v. Sachse, 310 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.), holding approved, 158 Tex. 371, 312 S.W.2d 380 (1958). The Texas courts have not yet settled whether Art. 1.05 requires that justices of the peace and constables reside in their precincts throughout their terms, or whether the state constitutional provisions establishing a requirement of county residence for all county officers, Tex. Const., Art. 16, § 14; Art. 5, § 24, excuse justices and constables from the requirements of Art. 1.05.

The account, properly verified by the superintendent of the State hospital, when admitted into evidence, is to be taken by the court as prima facie proof of the account. Davis v. State, 309 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1957), writ ref'd n.r.e., 158 Tex. 290, 312 S.W.2d 380 (1958); Dupree v. State, 275 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.). While the statute provides for no specific defense, it does allow the patient or responsible person to show cause why the State should not have judgment against him for the amount due it for his support, maintenance, and treatment. The State is not required by Article 3196a, Section 5, to prove the necessity or reasonableness of its charges, but there is nothing to prevent the patient, under proper pleadings, from contesting the account by showing that the State's charges exceeded the cost to the State. Crawford, 771 S.W.2d at 625; Dupree, 275 S.W.2d at 558.

It has been held that a county cannot be made a party to a suit by naming members of the county commissioners' court, individually and in their official capacities. Childress County v. Sachse, 310 S.W.2d 414, 418 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1958), aff'd, 158 Tex. 371, 312 S.W.2d 380. The same reasoning applies to the City, which is a separate legal entity. Appellee also contends that since the city attorney of Laredo represented the director of the airport in his official capacity, and the mayor in his official capacity, the attorney likewise appeared as the legal representative of the City. He argues the City is therefore bound.

See also Higginbotham v. Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535 (1938); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Moore v. El Paso Commissioners Court, 567 S.W.2d 15 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Attorney General Opinion H-955 (1977). Cf. Childress County v. Sachse, 310 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo, writ ref'd n.r.e.), per curiam, 312 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. 1958) (county commissioner's office not vacated by change of precinct boundaries which removed his residence from his precinct). We conclude, based on Tarrant County v. Ashmore, that the terms of incumbent school board members may constitutionally be shortened pursuant to legislative action.

' These suits must follow the procedures set out by the Texas Legislature in articles 5970-5997, V.T.C.S., and must be sworn to and conducted in the name of the State of Texas. Childress County v. Sachse, 310 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e. by per curiam, 312 S.W.2d 380 (1958). See V.T.C.S. art. 5977 (proceedings conducted in name of state).

In Attorney General Opinion H-564 (1975) and H-220 (1974) we ruled that a justice of the peace does not vacate his office when his residence falls within a new precinct pursuant to redistricting. See Childress County v. Sachse, 310 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e. at 312 S.W.2d 380). In Attorney General Opinion O-6905 (1945) this office advised that a county commissioner could move his residence to another precinct within his county without vacating his office.

The Appellant relied heavily upon three subsequent cases which seem to have reached a different result. In Childress County v. Sachse, 310 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e .; 158 Tex. 371, 312 S.W.2d 380), the Commissioners Court entered an order in March, 1955, abolishing the four existing Commissioners' precincts, after the appellee had taken office on January 1, 1955. In that instance, the Court properly recognized the right of the duly elected and qualified official to serve until his term expired.

In Pate v. El Paso County, D.C., 324 F. Supp. 935, affirmed, 400 U.S. 806, 91 S.Ct. 55, 27 L.Ed.2d 38 (1970), it was held that such constitutional provision establishing staggered terms for County Commissioners did not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of the United States Constitution, although the effect of same would be to deprive certain voters of the right to vote for their County Commissioner at the next General Election. In Childress County v. Sachse, 310 S.W.2d 414(Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e., 158 Tex. 371, 312 S.W.2d 380 (1958)), it was expressly held that changes in precinct boundaries do not create a vacancy in the office of County Commissioner or deprive the incumbent of the right to hold office for the remainder of his term, even though by reason of such changes his residence is not within the precinct as redefined. This holding was enacted into law by Acts 1965, 59th Leg. p. 1523, Ch. 664, Sec. 1, being Article 2351 1/2, Subdivision (b), V.A.C.S. See also: McGuire v. Hughes, 452 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1970, no writ). Under the record before us, Fidel Munoz, was elected as Commissioner of Precinct 4 in the General Election of November, 1970, and on January 1, 1971, qualified and entered upon the duties of such office.

This plea is contrary to and inconsistent with appellees' admissions pleaded in their verified motion for summary judgment, and he cannot now be heard to deny or seek to refute an affirmative admission made in his pleadings. Childress County v. Sachse, 310 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo; wr. ref. n. r. e., 158 Tex. 371, 312 S.W.2d 380); McBean v. McBean, 371 S.W.2d 930 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco 1963, n. w. h.). For these reasons, appellant's third point must be overruled. Appellant's fourth point charges the trial court with error in allowing interest on the judgment in the amount of ten per cent from date of judgment.

While the individual commissioners and other county officials were proper parties, their status in the litigation was fixed at being merely nominal parties. Childress County v. Sachse, Tex.Civ.App., 310 S.W.2d 414, 418, wr. err. ref. n.r.e., 158 Tex. 371, 312 S.W.2d 380. They have no interest in the litigation apart from that of the county, and accordingly when the county, through a majority of the Commissioners Court, sees fit to abstain from further prosecution of its appeal, they have no standing to complain. 3 Tex.Jur.2d p. 468, § 195, Appeal and Error ___; Civil, note 3.