Davis v. State

5 Citing cases

  1. Drummer v. State

    167 So. 3d 1180 (Miss. 2015)   Cited 11 times
    Finding no error in giving a flight instruction where the defendant's "proffered explanation that he fled to avoid a ticket for running a stop sign was not legally sufficient in light of the facts"

    ¶ 45. The Court of Appeals then applied Pittman when it was asked to decide if prior convictions of aggravated assault and burglary that occurred within minutes of each other were sufficiently separate incidents to sentence the defendant as a habitual offender for his present robbery charge. Davis v. State, 850 So.2d 176, 179 (Miss.Ct.App.2003). Davis burgled a home and stole a gun.

  2. Manuel v. State

    364 So. 3d 917 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)

    We held that the defendant's crimes against the property of two different persons were "separate" even though they "occurred in close proximity to each other and on the same day." Id. at 371 (¶22) ; see alsoDavis v. State , 850 So. 2d 176, 179-80 (¶¶13-17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that prior convictions for burglary of a dwelling and aggravated assault arose from "separate incidents at different times"—even though the crimes were committed "within minutes of each other," and the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault for firing a gun he took from the dwelling). ¶34.

  3. Jones v. State

    304 So. 3d 702 (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 1 times
    Finding charges were sufficiently separate and distinct when both offenses occurred on the same date, but the record showed the State proffered indictments and sentencing orders describing grand larceny and burglary of two different automobiles, presumably with different two different victims

    ¶8. In Davis v. State , 850 So. 2d 176, 180 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), this Court also upheld a court's finding that a defendant's prior convictions of aggravated assault and burglary, which occurred within minutes of each other, were sufficiently separate incidents to sentence the defendant as a habitual offender. Davis had committed the crime of burglary of a dwelling, and stealing a gun; upon his leaving the dwelling, a neighbor gave chase, which resulted in the subsequent aggravated assault.

  4. Drummer v. State

    167 So. 3d 1222 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 1 times

    In contrast with Bergeron, however, the supreme court found “[i]n Garrison v. State, 950 So.2d 990, 995 (¶ 19) (Miss.2006), ... that the defendant's prior convictions constituted two separate felonies as there were ‘two separate victims and two types of criminal intent.’ ” Bergeron, 60 So.3d at 216 (¶ 11) (citing Davis v. State, 850 So.2d 176, 179–80 (¶¶ 13–15) (Miss.Ct.App.2003), for the “finding that the defendant's convictions, although committed in a series of events, were separate incidents as they involved two different victims and the second crime occurred at ‘some point later in time and location had nothing to do with the first case’ ”). ¶ 45.

  5. Bergeron v. State

    2009 CA 1722 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 6 times
    Finding a defendant's prior convictions did not support habitual-offender status because he had only one intent when he broke into a car dealer's office, stole a key, and used the key to steal a vehicle

    2006), the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the defendant's prior convictions constituted two separate felonies as there were "two separate victims and two types of criminal intent." See also Davis v. State, 850 So.2d 176, 179-80 (¶¶ 13-15) (Miss.Ct.App. 2003) (finding that the defendant's convictions, although committed in a series of events, were separate incidents as they involved two different victims and the second crime occurred at "some point later in time and location ha[d] nothing to do with the [first] case"). Thus, we find that Bergeron's two 1993 Georgia convictions — burglary and theft by taking — arose from the same incident. As such, they cannot alone support his habitual-offender status.