Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9951.
February 10, 2010.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, John Suddock, Judge, Trial Court No. 3AN-04-11682 CR.
Josie Garton, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Richard A. Svobodny, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Several days after his trial, Michael J. Davis Jr. filed a motion for a new trial asserting that his right to a fair and impartial jury was violated because one of the jurors, Stephen R. Manuel, was the pastor of his church. On appeal, Davis argues that Pastor Manuel consciously withheld information because he did not mention their alleged acquaintance during voir dire. We conclude that the record supports the superior court's finding that Davis did not make a sufficient inquiry to establish that Manuel failed to disclose any relevant information.
Background
Davis was charged with felony driving under the influence and driving while his license was suspended after he was found slumped against the steering wheel of his vehicle, which was crashed against a tree. Davis proceeded to trial, and a jury found him guilty on both counts.
AS 28.35.030(n).
AS 28.15.291(a)(1).
After his jury was discharged, Davis filed a motion for new trial in which he argued that his right to a fair and impartial jury was violated because a juror failed to disclose his relationship with Davis. In an affidavit attached to his motion for a new trial, Davis stated that after the verdict was announced and while the jury was being polled, it occurred to him that one of the jurors, Stephen Manuel, was his pastor from Bethel Chapel. Davis stated that he had known Manuel for seven years: Manuel participated as a deacon in Davis's marriage ceremony; Davis attended Bethel Chapel where Manuel served as deacon; Manuel baptized Davis and his wife in 2003; and Manuel baptized Davis's son. Davis alleged that Manuel knew that Davis had previously been incarcerated and knew of the marital difficulties leading to the dissolution of Davis's marriage.
In support of his motion, Davis also stated that he did not recognize Pastor Manuel during jury selection because Davis was not wearing his glasses. Davis admitted that he did wear his glasses later during the trial, but he stated that he did not study the jury because he did not want to make them uncomfortable. Davis did not explain why he did not recognize Manuel from the juror questionnaire form in which Manuel stated that he was a member of Bethel Chapel, and listed his occupation as "youth pastor."
Superior Court Judge John Suddock denied Davis's motion without a hearing; Davis now appeals.
Discussion
If a defendant presents sufficient factual assertions that a juror failed to disclose relevant information during voir dire, then the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the juror consciously withheld this information in the face of questions that reasonably called for it. If the judge determines that the juror did consciously withhold information in the face of questions that called for it, then the judge must determine: (1) whether the defendant would have challenged the juror had the juror not concealed the information; (2) whether the improperly withheld information was directly relevant to the decision of the case, or was merely collateral to the issues being litigated; and (3) whether there was a reasonable possibility that the withheld information affected the juror's ability to decide the case.
Soundara v. State, 107 P.3d 290, 298 (Alaska App. 2005); see also West v. State, 409 P.2d 847, 852 (Alaska 1966).
Soundara, 107 P.3d at 298; see also Swain v. State, 817 P.2d 927, 931 (Alaska App. 1991) (discussing the standard for determining whether juror misconduct requires a new trial).
Davis argues that Pastor Manuel withheld the fact that he was personally acquainted with Davis, that he had prejudicial knowledge of Davis's previous incarceration, and that he had knowledge of Davis's marital trouble. Davis argues that this information likely affected Manuel's ability to be an impartial juror. The problem with this argument, however, is that neither the parties nor the trial court asked Manuel or any of the other potential jurors if they knew Davis. Under these circumstances, our decision in Manrique v. State suggests that the parties did not ask Manuel sufficient questions to establish that he consciously withheld information.
177 P.3d 1188, 1192 (Alaska App. 2008).
In Manrique, the defendant argued that a juror named Darrough failed to disclose his social relationship with a nurse who had worked closely with the victim and the fact that he had been in the victim's residence. During voir dire, Darrough volunteered that he knew the victim. Defense counsel asked Darrough if knowing the victim would affect his ability to render a fair verdict, and Darrough replied, "No, I don't believe so." Manrique later learned that Darrough also knew a nurse that had worked with the victim and that Darrough had been in the victim's residence. Based on this information, Manrique made a motion for a new trial.
Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1192.
Id.
Id. at 1190-91.
Id.
On appeal, we declared that "[a]n attorney must ask sufficient questions, and sufficiently precise questions, to elicit all desired information from prospective jurors," and that "[i]f the attorney fails to do this, the attorney will not be heard to complain later that newly revealed information, had it been disclosed earlier, would have prompted the attorney to exercise one or more additional peremptory challenges." We held that the trial judge "could properly conclude that Manrique had not shown that Darrough had consciously withheld information in the face of questioning that reasonably called for the juror to respond."
Id. at 1192 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Soundara, 107 P.3d at 296).
Id.
In Manrique, the juror disclosed that he knew the victim, and defense counsel responded by asking if his knowledge would affect his verdict. But this question was not enough to establish that the juror had withheld information that he had been in the victim's home and knew a nurse that worked with the victim. Similarly, in the instant case, the court and defense counsel both asked if the potential jurors could be fair; but no one asked if any of the jurors knew Davis. Davis cannot show that Pastor Manuel consciously withheld information about their acquaintance because no one asked Manuel any questions calling for him to disclose theiracquaintance.
Soundara, 107 P.3d at 296, 298.
Davis also argues that Pastor Manuel should have been disqualified for implied bias, citing Tinsley v. Borg. We note that Alaska Criminal Rule 24(c)(4)-(14) already allows numerous challenges for cause based on a juror's relationship to the parties or the matter in controversy, and that we have declined to adopt the theory of implied bias where one of these challenges is available. We have also noted that the theory of implied bias appears to conflict with the spirit of prior Alaska decisions that focus on whether a juror displays actual bias. The facts of this case do not present any compelling reason to augment Rule 24(c) or to reexamine our prior decisions.
895 F.2d 520, 528 (9th Cir. 1990).
See Zartman v. State, 667 P.2d 1256, 1257-58 (Alaska App. 1983).
See Smock v. State, Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No. 1064 (Alaska App., Feb. 5, 1986), 1986 WL 1165536 at *3 (citing Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 748 (Alaska 1980); Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221, 230 (Alaska 1979); Vail v. State, 599 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Alaska 1979); Ketzler v. State, 634 P.2d 561, 566 (Alaska App. 1981)).
Davis failed to make a sufficient inquiry at trial to establish that Manuel consciously withheld information during voir dire. Additionally, Manuel's acquaintance with Davis does not raise any constitutional concerns that would require us to reconsider our prior decisions on the issue of implied bias.
We therefore AFFIRM the superior court's judgment.
I write separately to address Davis's argument that Juror Manuel should have been disqualified for "implied bias".
The doctrine of "implied bias", as exemplified in Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1990), is the doctrine that certain circumstances or relationships can require the disqualification of a juror even when (1) there is no proof that the juror is actually biased, and (2) there is no applicable ground for disqualifying the juror for cause under the pertinent statute or court rule.
The extensive discussion of this point in Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 526-29, reveals that the doctrine of "implied bias" has no direct relationship to a particular juror's actual bias. In other words, the doctrine of "implied" bias does not refer to the process of inferring, from surrounding circumstances, that a particular juror is actually biased even though they claim that they are not. Rather, "implied bias" is a label that courts employ to describe their exercise of a common-law power to create new categories of disqualifying circumstances or relationships — categories that require disqualification of all similarly situated jurors.
In essence, these courts are relying on a judicial common-law authority to expand the statutory list of circumstances or relationships that are grounds for challenging a juror for cause.
Under Alaska law, it is clearly established that courts may not use their common-law authority in disregard of existing statutory provisions. This same limitation applies when the existing law is contained in a court rule enacted by our supreme court under the authority conferred by Article IV, Section 15 of our state constitution.
Dayton v. State, 120 P.3d 1073, 1080 (Alaska App. 2005) ("[When] the legislature enacts a statute to govern the same matter, the statute controls."); Dandova v. State, 72 P.3d 325, 333 (Alaska App. 2003). See also Roberts v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue, 162 P.3d 1214, 1220-21 (Alaska 2007) (applying this same rule).
Dominguez v. State, 181 P.3d 1111, 1114 (Alaska App. 2008).
The Alaska rules governing juror disqualification in criminal cases are contained in two places: a statute, AS 09.20.020, and a court rule, Criminal Rule 24(c).
AS 09.20.020 declares that a person is disqualified from serving as a juror if they have served as a juror within the previous one year, or if they have been convicted of a felony and are still under supervision for that offense.
Criminal Rule 24(c) bars jurors who are actually biased, and it also bars jurors who are subject to the two statutory disqualifications listed in AS 09.20.020. Criminal Rule 24(c) then lists numerous other grounds for juror disqualification, apart from actual bias or statutory disqualification:
• The person has opinions or conscientious scruples which would improperly influence the person's verdict.
• The person has been subpoenaed as a witness in the case.
• The person has already sat upon a trial of the same issue.
• The person has served as a petit juror in a civil case based on the same transaction.
• The person was called as a juror and excused either for cause or peremptorily in a previous trial of the same action, or in another action by the same parties for the same cause of action.
• The person is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to one of the parties or attorneys.
• The person is the guardian, ward, landlord, tenant, employer, employee, partner, client, principal, agent, debtor, creditor, or a member of the family of the defendant, or of the person alleged to have been injured by the crime charged in the indictment, or of the person on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted, or of one of the attorneys.
• Within the previous two years, the person has been a party adverse to the challenging party or to their attorney in a civil action, or the person has complained against, or been accused by, the challenging party or their attorney in a criminal prosecution.
• The person has a financial interest other than that of a taxpayer or a permanent fund dividend recipient in the outcome of the case.
• The person was a member of the grand jury returning an indictment in the case.
• The person is employed by an agency, department, or political unit of the State of Alaska, including a municipal corporation, and the agency, department, or political unit is directly involved in the case to be tried.
Thus, Criminal Rule 24(c) contain an extensive list of grounds for juror disqualification that apply regardless of whether there is proof that the juror is actually biased. The fact that this court rule covers the matter of juror disqualification so extensively suggests to me that the supreme court intended Rule 24(c) to comprise all of the grounds for juror disqualification — and that courts are not free to improvise new categories of disqualification. In other words, I am dubious regarding any claim that this Court has the common-law authority (under the rubric of "implied bias" or otherwise) to augment the list in Rule 24(c) by adding new categories of circumstances or relationships that will automatically require a juror's disqualification.
However, as Judge Bolger's lead opinion points out, the facts of Davis's case fall far short of suggesting a compelling reason to augment the grounds for disqualification so as to exclude jurors like Pastor Manuel. For this reason, there is no current need for this Court to decide whether to adopt or reject the doctrine of "implied" juror bias.