The general rule is that “separate facilities are separate sites.” Davis v. SignalInt'l Texas GP, L.L.C., 728 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 54 Fed Reg. 16042, 16050 (Apr. 21, 1989)); see also Rifkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 78 F.3d 1277, 1280 (8th Cir. 1996); Jordan v. Mechel Bluestone, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-04413, 2018 WL 1582727, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 29, 2018) (citing Davis, 728 F.3d at 485). The regulations clarify that, for mobile workers without a fixed place of work, their “home base” will be deemed the “single site of employment”
Whether the drilling rigs within a Patterson-UTI operational area "constituted a single site of employment under the WARN Act is a mixed question of fact and law." See Davis v. Signal Int'l Tex. GP, L.L.C., 728 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2013). "We review the district court's findings of underlying fact for clear error" and "review the legal question of whether there was a single site of employment based on the underlying historical facts de novo."
“The general rule is that ‘separate facilities are separate sites.'” Davis v. Signal Intern. Tx. GP, L.L.C., 728 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 54 F.R. 16042, 16050 (Apr. 21, 1989)).
The WARN Act itself does not define what a “single site of employment” is, but courts have held that “[a]s a general rule, geographically related facilities are single sites of employment whereas geographically separate facilities are separate sites.” Rifkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 78 F.3d 1277, 1280 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Davis v. Signal Int'l Texas GP, L.L.C., 728 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2013). Furthermore, Department of Labor regulations give examples of what constitutes a “single site of employment,” depending on the type of work, employer, employee, and workplace at issue.
We review the district court's interpretation of the applicable Labor Department regulations de novo. See Davis v. Signal Int'l Texas GP, L.L.C. , 728 F.3d 482, 488 (5th Cir. 2013). II.
We review the district court's interpretation of the applicable Labor Department regulations de novo. See Davis v. Signal Int'l Texas GP, L.L.C. , 728 F.3d 482, 488 (5th Cir. 2013). II.
As this court has noted, "two plants across town will rarely be considered a single site."Davis v. Signal Int'l Tex. GP, L.L.C., 728 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification, 54 Fed. Reg. 16042–01, 16050 (Apr. 20, 1989) ). Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification, 54 Fed. Reg. 16042–01, 16049 (Apr. 20, 1989) ).
Toval does not challenge the district court's reasoning, thus waiving review of the district court's ruling that the November letter was not an amendment. See Davis v. Signal Int'l Tex. GP, L.L.C., 728 F.3d 482, 490 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Toval now asserts an entirely new argument, namely, that the November letter was a "new charge" that the EEOC failed to investigate.
” Davis v. Signal Int'l Texas GP, L.L.C., 728 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification, 54 FR 16042, 16050, 54 FR 16042-01, 16050 and Viator v. Delchamps Inc., 109 F.3d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1997)). “[S]eparate facilities are only to be treated as a single site of employment if all three factors identified in [20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i)(3)] are met, namely: 1) [sic] the separate facilities are in reasonable geographic proximity of one another; 2) they are used for the same purpose; 3) and they share the same staff and equipment.” Viator, 109 F.3d at 1127
In general, “separate facilities are separate sites.” Davis v. Signal Int'l Tex. GP, 728 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2013).