The constitution has been construed as requiring that to be valid, a mechanic's and materialman's lien contract must be executed before the materials are furnished and improvements are constructed. See, e.g., Hill v. Engel, 89 S.W.2d 219, 220 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1935, writ ref'd); Davis v. Peck, Wright, Peck Investment Co., 94 S.W.2d 1245 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1936, writ dism'd). The appellants point out that this was not accomplished here and assert that consequently, any lien on their homestead was void.
Moreover, the general rule is that one may testify as to his intent and motive when motive and intent are put in issue. Davis v. Peck, etc., 94 S.W.2d 1245 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1936, writ dism'd); United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Henderson, 53 S.W.2d 811 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1932, no writ); Millerman v. Walton, 278 S.W. 483 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin 1925, no writ); Dittman v. Weiss, 31 S.W. 67 (Tex.Civ.App. 1895, no writ); Robertson v. Gourley, 84 Tex. 575, 19 S.W. 1006 (1892); Hamburg v. Wood, 66 Tex. 168, 18 S.W. 623 (1886); 23 Tex.Jur.2d 713; McCormick Ray, 'Texas Law of Evidence', § 1428. Appellants' fifth point is sustained.