In Healy v. White, supra, 444, we reasoned that in order to be awarded full compensation for an injury that has not yet manifested itself, a plaintiff must show that there exists a reasonable probability that the injury will in fact occur. Relying upon the case of Davis v. P. Gambardella Son Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365, 373, 161 A.2d 583 (1960), in which we concluded that a "fifty-fifty chance" could not support an award of damages presupposing permanent injury, we reasoned that "[i]n such a situation the ratio of probability is exactly even, and the witness . . . is testifying as to possibilities and not probabilities." Healy v. White, supra.

Where "necessary to the proper disposition of the cause," this court may "remand the case for a further articulation of the basis of the trial court's decision." Practice Book 3060D; Powers v. Powers, 183 Conn. 124, 125, 438 A.2d 845 (1981); Robertson v. Apuzzo, 168 Conn. 671, 337 A.2d 544 (1975), on full hearing, 170 Conn. 367, 370, 365 A.2d 824, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852, 97 S.Ct. 142, 50 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976); Davis v. P. Gambardella Son Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365, 367n, 161 A.2d 583 (1960). For the reasons set forth above, sua sponte we remand this case for further articulation.

Counsel were informed that in the event it were decided to grant the 696 motion and dismiss the appeal this court would, of course, not render a decision on the dismissed appeal; but, in the event the 696 motion were denied, we would then consider the merits of the appeal. It is a basic premise that the supervision and control of proceedings on appeal is in the Supreme Court from the time the appeal is filed; Practice Book 692; Davis v. P. Gambardella Son Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365, 368 n. 1, 161 A.2d 583; and that this court has the inherent power to provide for the imposition of reasonable sanctions to compel the observance of its rules which enable the orderly and expeditious processing of appeals. LaReau v. Reincke, 158 Conn. 486, 264 A.2d 576. It cannot be overemphasized that "`[t]he work of this court is not expedited if counsel are permitted to dally for the purpose of bargaining with the opposition, for personal convenience or because other cases in hand are deemed by them to deserve preferential treatment.'. . . Chanosky v. City Building Supply Co., 152 Conn. 449, . . . 452, 208 A.2d 337."

Nair v. Thaw, 156 Conn. 445, 453, 242 A.2d 757; Kekac v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 149 Conn. 731, 732, 179 A.2d 832; Sadonis v. Govan, 132 Conn. 668, 670, 46 A.2d 895; Nailor v. C. W. Blakeslee Sons, Inc., 117 Conn. 241, 246, 167 A. 548. The determination is within the sound discretion of the trier. Davis v. P. Gambardella Sons Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365, 373, 161 A.2d 583. Concerning both past and future mental and physical pain and suffering, there was ample evidence to uphold a substantial verdict.

The court refused to make such a finding on the ground that the request was not made until nearly a week after the entry of judgment. It based its ruling on Morris v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 73 Conn. 680, 685, 49 A. 180. We have no occasion to review this ruling, since there is nothing to indicate that the plaintiffs were harmed by it. They sought and obtained the usual finding, subject, of course, to the ordinary rights of correction, in connection with their prosecution of this appeal. See Davis v. P. Gambardella Son Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365, 367 n., 161 A.2d 583. The plaintiffs also seem to claim that the Superior Court erred in that, although it held a trial de novo at which all relevant evidence was admitted, it did not substitute its own discretion for that of the Probate Court, but, on the contrary, decided only whether the Probate Court had exercised its discretion reasonably and legally in decreeing that an allowance should be made, its amount and its duration.

"A party whose motion for a special finding under General Statutes 52-226 has been denied may not assign that denial as error. Davis v. P. Gambardella Son Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365, 367 n. 1, 161 A.2d 583 (1960)." Montanaro Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Snow, 4 Conn. App. 46, 50, 492 A.2d 223 (1985); see also Tower v. Camp, 103 Conn. 41, 45, 130 A. 86 (1925).

We are constrained, at this point, to note that the defendants' claim of error based on the court's action upon their motion for special findings is not properly before us. The essence of the defendants' argument is that the trial court's denial of their motion has rendered the record unclear for purposes of this appeal. This claim ignores the intent of General Statutes 52-226. "The purpose of a special finding is to place upon the record the material facts upon which the judgment is based; other matters have no place in it and can only be presented in a finding made for the purpose of an appeal." Practice Book 333. A party whose motion for a special finding under General Statutes 52-226 has been denied may not assign that denial as error. Davis v. P. Gambardella Son Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365, 367 n. 1, 161 A.2d 583 (1960). Here, the trial court prepared a written memorandum of decision in accordance with Practice Book 3060B, which provides, in part, that "when rendering judgments in trials to the court, the court shall, either orally or in writing, state its decision on the issues in the case and, if there are factual issues, the factual basis of its decision."

This involves "an inquiry into the value of the person's capacity to earn money by his labor, physical or intellectual." Davis v. P. Gambardella Son Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365, 370, 161 A.2d 583, 586 (1960).

Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 444, 378 A.2d 540 (1977). As an example, in Davis v. P. Gambardella Son Cheese Corp., 147 Conn. 365, 373, 161 A.2d 583 (1960), we held that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to determine whether the plaintiff had suffered a permanent injury when the doctor only could testify that there was a "`fifty-fifty chance'" that the injury sustained would be permanent. "This finding afforded no basis for an award of damages"; id.; because the expert testimony was "based on pure speculation." Aspiazu v. Orgera, supra, 205 Conn. 632.

In Petriello v. Kalman, 215 Conn. 377, 397-98, 576 A.2d 474 (1990) this court held that "in a tort action, a plaintiff who has established a breach of duty that was a substantial factor in causing a present injury which has resulted in an increased risk of future harm is entitled to compensation to the extent that the future harm is likely to occur." This court overruled the following cases to the extent that they held otherwise: Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 378 A.2d 540 (1977); Davis v. P. Gambardella Son Cheese Corporation, 147 Conn. 365, 161 A.2d 583 (1960); Sheiman v. Sheiman, 143 Conn. 222, 121 A.2d 285 (1956); and Johnson v. Connecticut Co., 85 Conn. 438, 83 A. 530 (1912). Petriello v. Kalman, supra, 398 n. 11.