Ark. R. Sup. Ct. 1-2(b)(6) (2005). On appeal, OCSE challenges (1) the circuit court's determination that the original paternity suit should have been dismissed with prejudice and (2) the subsequent dismissal with prejudice of the second suit. Specifically, OCSE suggests that the rulings are clearly erroneous because dismissals with prejudice are void in paternity actions, pursuant to the rulings in Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995) and State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Flowers, 57 Ark. App.223, 944 S.W.2d 558 (1997). In Davis, the appellant appealed a judgment finding him the father of Kerwin Sheppard and ordering him to pay child support.

The judgment is void on the face of the record.”). Although the issue was not raised by the parties, the record demonstrates that the circuit court failed to adhere to our precedent that the court must look into the merits of any consent decree to determine whether the decree was for the benefit of the minor. Rankin v. Schofield, 71 Ark. 168, 70 S.W. 306 (1902); Kuykendall v. Zachary, 179 Ark. 478, 16 S.W.2d 590 (1929); Davis v. Ark. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995); Ark. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Morgan, 364 Ark. 358, 219 S.W.3d 175 (2005). This review also requires an investigation by the court.

2. PARENT CHILD — WELFARE OF CHILD ALWAYS PARAMOUNT — PROTECTION OF MINOR CHILD'S RIGHT TO CONTINUING SUPPORT OUTWEIGHS APPLICATION OF ARK. R. Civ. P. 41. — In balancing the application of Ark. R. Civ. P. 41, which states that when an action has been previously dismissed without prejudice a subsequent dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits, against the public policy that a minor's right to support cannot be permanently settled by a parent, the scales tip heavily in favor of protecting the minor's well-guarded right to continued support as the welfare of the child is paramount. 3. PARENT CHILD — DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE VOID — CHANCELLOR'S RULING MODIFIED TO DISMISS APPELLANT'S PATERNITY ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE. — Where the dismissal with prejudice was void because, pursuant to the holding in Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995), it would contravene public policy protecting a minor child's right to continued support, it did not bar future proceedings; the appellate court modified the chancellor's ruling to dismiss appellant's paternity action without prejudice, and affirmed. Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; Joyce Williams Warren, Chancellor; affirmed as modified.

We have previously denied a request for a writ of prohibition after a lower court has denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41. See Davis v. Office of Child Sup. Enforcem't, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995) (noting, on appeal, our previous denial of appellant's petition for writ of prohibition based upon the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41). Consequently, Dr. Jordan's arguments that a writ of prohibition should be granted based upon the doctrine of res judicata and the application of Rule 41(b) are without merit.

See id.; see also Davis v. Off. of Child Support Enf't, 322 Ark. 352, 356, 908 S.W.2d 649, 652 (1995). The welfare of the child is paramount.

”In making their arguments, the Ogdens rely on three cases in which the supreme court did not hew to the literal language of the rule: Richard v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., supra ; Jonesboro Healthcare, supra ; and Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995). Each of these cases is distinguishable, however, as will be discussed.

A judicial inquiry into the appropriateness of compromise regarding a minor's interests is mandatory. In Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995), a mother brought a suit to establish paternity after a prior action had been dismissed with prejudice based on a settlement of all contested and disputed issues. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the judgment of dismissal with prejudice was void on its face, stating that under its laws, the interests of a minor could not be compromised by a guardian without approval by the court.

OCSE contended that the agreement ignored the court's May 21, 1999 order that abated Mr. Rascoe's support obligation and the February 9, 2000 order that stated Mr. Rascoe owed no child support arrearage. OCSE argued that the effect of the agreement was to bargain away B.R's right to future support to her detriment, and the court had held no hearing to determine whether this agreement was in the best interest of B.R. To support its argument, OCSE cited Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995), in which our supreme court stated: It has long been the law in Arkansas that the interests of a minor cannot be compromised by a guardian without approval by the court. It is not sufficient that a court be made aware of a compromise agreement and that it is agreeable to the guardian; rather, the court must make a judicial act of investigation into the merits of the compromise and into its benefits to the minor.

Second, it has long been the law in Arkansas that the interests of a minor, such as in receiving support, cannot be compromised by a guardian without approval by the court. Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995). Our supreme court has further provided that:

State v. Burger, supra. It has long been the law in Arkansas that the interests of a minor cannot be compromised by a guardian without approval by the court. Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995). Our supreme court has further provided that: