Davis v. Office of Child Sup. Enforcem't

21 Citing cases

  1. Office of Child Supp. Enf. v. Morgan

    364 Ark. 358 (Ark. 2005)   Cited 9 times

    Ark. R. Sup. Ct. 1-2(b)(6) (2005). On appeal, OCSE challenges (1) the circuit court's determination that the original paternity suit should have been dismissed with prejudice and (2) the subsequent dismissal with prejudice of the second suit. Specifically, OCSE suggests that the rulings are clearly erroneous because dismissals with prejudice are void in paternity actions, pursuant to the rulings in Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995) and State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Flowers, 57 Ark. App.223, 944 S.W.2d 558 (1997). In Davis, the appellant appealed a judgment finding him the father of Kerwin Sheppard and ordering him to pay child support.

  2. Norris v. Davis

    2015 Ark. 442 (Ark. 2015)   Cited 2 times

    The judgment is void on the face of the record.”). Although the issue was not raised by the parties, the record demonstrates that the circuit court failed to adhere to our precedent that the court must look into the merits of any consent decree to determine whether the decree was for the benefit of the minor. Rankin v. Schofield, 71 Ark. 168, 70 S.W. 306 (1902); Kuykendall v. Zachary, 179 Ark. 478, 16 S.W.2d 590 (1929); Davis v. Ark. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995); Ark. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Morgan, 364 Ark. 358, 219 S.W.3d 175 (2005). This review also requires an investigation by the court.

  3. State v. Flowers

    944 S.W.2d 558 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 1 times

    2. PARENT CHILD — WELFARE OF CHILD ALWAYS PARAMOUNT — PROTECTION OF MINOR CHILD'S RIGHT TO CONTINUING SUPPORT OUTWEIGHS APPLICATION OF ARK. R. Civ. P. 41. — In balancing the application of Ark. R. Civ. P. 41, which states that when an action has been previously dismissed without prejudice a subsequent dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits, against the public policy that a minor's right to support cannot be permanently settled by a parent, the scales tip heavily in favor of protecting the minor's well-guarded right to continued support as the welfare of the child is paramount. 3. PARENT CHILD — DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE VOID — CHANCELLOR'S RULING MODIFIED TO DISMISS APPELLANT'S PATERNITY ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE. — Where the dismissal with prejudice was void because, pursuant to the holding in Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995), it would contravene public policy protecting a minor child's right to continued support, it did not bar future proceedings; the appellate court modified the chancellor's ruling to dismiss appellant's paternity action without prejudice, and affirmed. Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; Joyce Williams Warren, Chancellor; affirmed as modified.

  4. Jordan v. Circuit Court

    366 Ark. 326 (Ark. 2006)   Cited 31 times
    Granting writ of certiorari where previous dismissals involved same claims in third complaint

    We have previously denied a request for a writ of prohibition after a lower court has denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41. See Davis v. Office of Child Sup. Enforcem't, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995) (noting, on appeal, our previous denial of appellant's petition for writ of prohibition based upon the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41). Consequently, Dr. Jordan's arguments that a writ of prohibition should be granted based upon the doctrine of res judicata and the application of Rule 41(b) are without merit.

  5. Holmes v. Jones

    2022 Ark. App. 517 (Ark. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 3 times
    In Holmes v. Jones, 2022 Ark.App. 517, 658 S.W.3d 462, this court encouraged circuit courts to take a more flexible approach to res judicata in order to track with the spirit of the law.

    See id.; see also Davis v. Off. of Child Support Enf't, 322 Ark. 352, 356, 908 S.W.2d 649, 652 (1995). The welfare of the child is paramount.

  6. Ogden v. Hughes

    454 S.W.3d 758 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    ”In making their arguments, the Ogdens rely on three cases in which the supreme court did not hew to the literal language of the rule: Richard v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., supra ; Jonesboro Healthcare, supra ; and Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995). Each of these cases is distinguishable, however, as will be discussed.

  7. Schubert v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Services

    2010 Ark. App. 325 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 1 times

    A judicial inquiry into the appropriateness of compromise regarding a minor's interests is mandatory. In Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995), a mother brought a suit to establish paternity after a prior action had been dismissed with prejudice based on a settlement of all contested and disputed issues. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the judgment of dismissal with prejudice was void on its face, stating that under its laws, the interests of a minor could not be compromised by a guardian without approval by the court.

  8. Roark v. Child Support

    101 Ark. App. 382 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 2 times

    OCSE contended that the agreement ignored the court's May 21, 1999 order that abated Mr. Rascoe's support obligation and the February 9, 2000 order that stated Mr. Rascoe owed no child support arrearage. OCSE argued that the effect of the agreement was to bargain away B.R's right to future support to her detriment, and the court had held no hearing to determine whether this agreement was in the best interest of B.R. To support its argument, OCSE cited Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995), in which our supreme court stated: It has long been the law in Arkansas that the interests of a minor cannot be compromised by a guardian without approval by the court. It is not sufficient that a court be made aware of a compromise agreement and that it is agreeable to the guardian; rather, the court must make a judicial act of investigation into the merits of the compromise and into its benefits to the minor.

  9. Lee v. Lee

    95 Ark. App. 69 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 7 times
    In Lee, the children received a large personal-injury settlement as a result of an accident and a special trust provided for their needs.

    Second, it has long been the law in Arkansas that the interests of a minor, such as in receiving support, cannot be compromised by a guardian without approval by the court. Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995). Our supreme court has further provided that:

  10. Chitwood v. Chitwood

    92 Ark. App. 129 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 14 times
    Affirming circuit court's finding that Jane Chitwood was equitably estopped from asserting her claim for unpaid support during the same period, February 1999 to May 2004

    State v. Burger, supra. It has long been the law in Arkansas that the interests of a minor cannot be compromised by a guardian without approval by the court. Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 322 Ark. 352, 908 S.W.2d 649 (1995). Our supreme court has further provided that: