Opinion
CIV. NO. 3:99-CV-1885-G
April 12, 2000
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court are the Findings. Conclusions and Recommendation (the "Findings") of the United States Magistrate Judge in the case of Richard Keith Davis v. Steven G. O'Brien, 3:99-CV-1885-G. For the following reasons, these findings are not adopted.
The Magistrate Judge here recommends that this case be dismissed as a frivolous in forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i). Findings at 4. She first notes that to prevail on a claim of excessive force, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) an injury, which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which was (3) objectively unreasonable." Findings at 3 (quoting Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1996)). The Magistrate Judge then concludes that Richard Keith Davis's ("Davis's") allegation that he sustained a cut wrist as a result of the alleged excessive force used by the defendants is insufficient to meet the "injury" requirement of an excessive force claim. Id. at 3-4. She cites Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a sore bruised ear lasting for three days did not constitute a physical injury as required to state a claim for excessive force), and Luong v. Hatt, 979 F. Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that sore muscles, scratches, abrasions and bruises did not constitute "physical injury" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1 997e(e)), as support for her conclusions. However, the Magistrate Judge does not mention Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1999), which reaffirms that while a prisoner must have suffered a more than de minimis physical injury from the alleged excessive force, there is no categorical requirement that the physical injury be significant, serious, or more than minor. The Gomez court also noted that "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm" has played an important role in past Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue. Id. at 923 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999 (1992)). Thus, it is also appropriate to analyze the degree of force employed in relation to the apparent need for it. Gomez, 163 F.3d at 923.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, provides:
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other correctional facility for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.
Davis alleges that the officers squeezed the handcuffs on his wrist as they were taking him to jail because he gave a smart answer to one of their questions. Objection to Finging [sic] at 3. He then alleges that his wrist was "cut to though [sic] the skin to the flesh." Id. at 5. He also includes a photograph in his Objections to the Findings which reveals that he was still injured on June 18, 1999, two weeks after the allegedly excessive force occurred. Id. at 8; also Adding to Objection on March 23, 2000 (noting abrasion on wrist at time arrest report was made). Taking Davis's allegations as true, which it must at this point, this court may not discount the inference that the officers acted "maliciously and sadistically" to cause Davis harm. Furthermore, this injury seems more serious (and longer lasting) than that described in Siglar. On the limited record before it, this court cannot say as a matter of law that Davis's injuries were de minimis, and thus at this stage Davis's complaint cannot be dismissed as frivolous. Accordingly, the clerk shall issue process in this case.
SO ORDERED.