Opinion
No. 99 C 1186
June 2, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Marie Davis, individually and as special administrator of her husband's estate, brought a complaint against Nissan Motor Corporation in U.S.A., Nissan North America, Inc., and Nissan Motor Manufacturing Corporation, alleging that her husband's 1994 Nissan Sentra was unreasonably dangerous for several reasons, including its lack of an air bag, resulting in her husband's death. Defendants move for partial summary judgment on the "no airbag" claim, arguing that it is pre-empted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard ("FMVSS") 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S.4.1.4.1, S4.5.3, and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (b) and (e) (the "Act").
The Act was recently recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 30102 et seq., moving from Title 15 of the U.S. Code to Title 49. The pre-emption provisions of the Act were previously codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (d) and (k).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Michael Davis was driving a 1994 Nissan Sentra on December 20, 1996, when another vehicle struck his vehicle. Mr. Davis was fatally injured in the accident. (Plaintiff's Response, ¶ 2.) The 1994 Nissan Sentra did not have an airbag.For vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1989, but before September 1, 1996, FMVSS 208 sets forth minimum requirements for the protection of occupants of motor vehicles encouraging, but not requiring, manufacturers to install airbags in their vehicles. (Plaintiff's 12(n) (3)(b) Statement of Additional Undisputed Facts, ¶ 1.) The Act contains a clause expressly pre-empting state standards that conflict with the federal standards. See 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (b)(1995) (formerly 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (d)). It also contains, however, a "saving" clause, providing that compliance with the federal standards "does not exempt any person from liability under the common law." See 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (e) (1995) (formerly 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (k)). The National Highway Traffic and Safety Association noted that the "most effective" occupant crash protection system was "an airbag plus a lap and shoulder belt." (Plaintiff's 12(n)(3)(b) Statement of Additional Undisputed Facts, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff argues that the vehicle manufactured by Defendants was unreasonably dangerous because it lacked an airbag. Defendants argue this claim is pre-empted by FVMSS 208 and the Act.
The same issue was before the Supreme Court in a case decided last week. See Gejer v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc., No. 98-1811, 2000 WL 645536 (U.S. May 22, 2000). Geier involved a woman who was seriously injured when her car, not equipped with an air bag, collided with a tree. Similar to the present case, she and her parents brought suit against the car manufacturer, alleging that her 1987 Honda Accord was unreasonably dangerous, in part because it lacked a driver's side airbag. See id. at *3. In affirming the lower court's decision that the claim was pre-empted, the Court held that: 1) the Act does not expressly pre-empt "no airbag" claims; 2) the saving clause does not bar the working of ordinary principles of pre-emption; and 3) "no airbag" claims do in fact conflict with the standards set forth in FMVSS 208. See id. at *1.
Notably, the Geier Court agreed with the plaintiff that FMVSS 208 and the Act do not expressly pre-empt "no airbag" claims. See Gejer, 2000 WL 645536 at *4 Further, the Court cautioned, the statute must be read narrowly to pre-empt only state legislative and regulatory standards that conflict with the federal standards, not state common-law actions. See id. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the existence of a saving clause in the Act evidences an assumption that there are a number of such cases to save. See id.
"The Court also held that the pre-emption clause and saving clause do not limit the operation of ordinary pre-emption principles. Geier, 2000 WL 645536 at *5. Relying on Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 1128. Ct. 2608 (1992), and Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 115 S.Ct. 1483 (1995), Plaintiff argues that the presence of an express pre-emption provision in the Act creates an inference that there is no implied pre-emption precluding her from bringing her "no-air bag" claim. (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Claimant's Motion for Granting Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's No Airbag Claim (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Opposition"), at 10.) The Supreme Court, however, determined that nothing in the saving clause suggests an intent to save common-law actions that actually conflict with federal regulations and, thus, ordinary pre-emption principles apply. Geier, 2000 WL 645536 at *5-6.
With respect to "no-air bag" claims, the Court held that such claims actually conflict with FMVSS 208, and are therefore pre-empted. Geier, 2000 WL 645536 at *9 The Court reasoned that the one of the purposes of the Act was to create flexibility, which would "lower costs, overcome technical safety problems, encourage technological development, and win widespread consumer acceptance," all promoting the primary goal of safety. Geier, 2000 WL 645536 at *9. This language defeats Plaintiff's argument here that flexibility was not a primary goal of the Act. (Plaintiff's Opposition, at 11, citing Minton v. Honda of America Manufacturing, 684 N.E.2d 648 (Ohio 1997).) Allowing "no airbag" suits would, in the Court's view, reduce flexibility and thus create an obstacle to the safety objectives of the Act. Geier, 2000 WL 645536 at *12. For cars manufactured in 1994, FMVSS 208 still encouraged manufacturers to explore different types of passive restraint systems. Allowing a "no airbag" claim to proceed would have the effect of requiring all manufacturers to install airbags to avoid suits and would eliminate the choices given by the federal standards.
Plaintiff's argument that uniformity was not a goal of the statute can be quickly disposed of. As long as "no-air bag" claims conflict with established regulatory standards, the claims are pre-empted.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 20-1) is granted.