The judgment of a sister State is not subject to collateral attack in the Illinois court except for the defenses of fraud in the procurement of the judgment or lack of jurisdiction. ( Thompson v. Safeway Enterprises, Inc. (1978), 67 Ill. App.3d 914, 916; Carlson v. Prestige Casualty Co. (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 926, 931; Davis v. Nehf (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 318, 321-22.) We hold that the Act which covers the registration of this judgment is the Foreign Judgments Act.
Wessel Co., at 940; see Rosenthal Co. v. Dodick (N.D. Ill. 1973), 365 F. Supp. 847. In Davis v. Nehf (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 318, 302 N.E.2d 382, the plaintiff, a licensed New York real estate broker, sued the defendant in New York for payment of an alleged brokerage commission. The only contact the parties had with each other was by telephone and mail correspondence regarding rental space in a certain building in Chicago.
• 1, 2 Upon a motion to register a foreign judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 77, par. 88 et seq.), "this court may inquire into the proceedings of a court of a sister State to determine whether such court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties." ( Evans v. Advance Schools, Inc. (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 947, 950, 388 N.E.2d 1003, citing Davis v. Nehf (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 318, 321, 302 N.E.2d 382.) If the foreign court had no jurisdiction over the defendant according to general principles of due process and the law of the forum State, "the foreign judgment has no constitutional claim to full faith and credit." ( Evans, 70 Ill. App.3d 947, 950.)
Count II is a misrepresentation claim based on purportedly intentional fraud, but the complaint's equivocation about whether Safety-Kleen “knew” or “should have known” about the falsity of its representations further sinks Count II in view of the particularity requirement. See Davis v. Nehf, 14 Ill.App.3d 318, 325-26 (1st Dist. 1973).
Hollymatic Corp. v. Holly Systems, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1366, 1369 (N.D.Ill. 1985). It can be fairly inferred from the survey allegations that defendants knew that the representations as to current public use and their ability to determine that use were false. However, the fraud claim hinges on the other representations of false projections and promises, and the Landons allege only that ISACOMM "knew or should have known" that those representations were false. Such allegations are insufficient to plead scienter and intent. Polivka v. Worth Dairy, Inc., 26 Ill. App.3d 961, 328 N.E.2d 350, 354 (1st Dist. 1974); Davis v. Nehf, 14 Ill. App.3d 318, 302 N.E.2d 382, 388 (1st Dist. 1973). For this reason, we dismiss the claim of fraud. As we noted in relation to the RICO claim, there are no allegations linking the named defendants to the alleged misrepresentations of ISACOMM and US Sprint employees, and we dismiss Count II on this basis as well. Again, the Landons advance, without providing any basis in Illinois law, the joint venture theory.
Some Illinois courts, inexplicably, have not recognized the distinction between the two Acts. In Davis v. Nehf, 14 Ill. App.3d 318, 302 N.E.2d 382 (1st Dist. 1973), the court was asked to enforce a New York judgment. In analyzing the propriety of enforcing that state's judgment, the court relied on the UFMJR and not the UEFJ.
In order to sustain an action for fraud it must be established that the defendant made false representations as to a material fact, knowing or believing it to be untrue, with the intent to deceive the plaintiff and that the plaintiff believed these representations, reasonably relied on them and acted on them to his injury. Johnston v. Shockey, 335 Ill. 363, 167 N.E. 54 (1929); Davis v. Nehf, 14 Ill. App.3d 318, 302 N.E.2d 382 (1st Dist. 1973). Fraud may consist of the concealment or suppression of the truth as well as the positive assertion of a falsehood.
It is the opinion of the Court, however, that the letters, telegrams and phone calls do not amount to the "minimum contacts" required. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Salisbury, 401 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1968); Davis v. Nehl, 14 Ill. App.3d 318, 302 N.E.2d 382 (1973). This cause of action appears to arise out of the transaction of business (i.e., the execution of the agreement) which occurred in another state.
It alleges that the defendant's failure to abide by an agreement made with the city of Bloomington to make certain repairs to the plaintiff's house constituted an act of fraud upon the plaintiff. A complaint in fraud must allege that a false statement of material fact was made, that the party making the statement knew or believed it to be untrue, that the party to whom the statement was made had a right to rely on it and did so, that the statement was made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act, and that reliance by the person to whom the statement was made led to his injury. Davis v. Nehf (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 318; Lincolnland Properties, Inc. v. Butterworth Apartments, Inc. (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 907; 37 C.J.S. Fraud sec. 3 (1943). The plaintiff fails to allege that the representations concerning repairs to be made by the defendant were made with an intent on the part of the defendant to induce action on the plaintiff's part.
The presence of counterclaims can complicate the inquiry with extraneous issues and thus defeat the purpose of the summary proceeding. The cases from Illinois and Arkansas cited by defendant as implying that counterclaims may be asserted under the 1948 Uniform Act are no authority for its position. There is no indication that Davis v. Nehf, 14 Ill. App.3d 318, 302 N.E.2d 382 (1973) was brought under the Illinois version of the Uniform Act but, even assuming that it was, Illinois retained the language allowing for counterclaims. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 77, § 95 (1966). Arkansas also retained the provision for counterclaims. Ark. Stat. Ann. tit. 29, § 808 (1962).