Davis v. Naugatuck Valley Crucible Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. Chief Info. Officer v. Computers Plus Ctr., Inc.

    310 Conn. 60 (Conn. 2013)   Cited 38 times
    Explaining distinction drawn by this court between certain actions seeking equitable relief and those seeking damages

    This conclusion is also consistent with this court's previous decisions in the related context of federal sovereign immunity. In Davis v. Naugatuck Valley Crucible Co., 103 Conn. 36, 40, 130 A. 162 (1925), this court concluded that, because of sovereign immunity, a company could not maintain a counterclaim against a United States official without first following the procedure established in the relevant statutes for bringing such claims and, accordingly, reversed the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the company on that counterclaim. In reaching this conclusion, this court stated that, “[w]hen [a] statute says that an action may be brought against [a United States official], it means that it shall be so brought, and this is equivalent to saying that it must be brought in this way, since this is the only way in which it can be brought against the United States.

  2. Sparico v. Munzenmaier

    56 A.2d 165 (Conn. 1947)   Cited 6 times

    The allegation on which the request to charge was based appeared neither in the complaint nor in the answer and special defense but in the plaintiff's answer to the defendant's cross-complaint. It is, of course, true that the two actions were independent. Davis v. Naugatuck Valley Crucible Co., 103 Conn. 36, 37, 130 A. 162; Moran v. Lewis, 131 Conn. 680, 681, 41 A.2d 905. Technically, the error committed, therefore, did not affect the action tried on the plaintiff's complaint. Where, however, the issues are as closely interwoven as they are in this case and, generally, in cafes of this character, it is within the discretion of the trial court to set the verdict aside in its entirety if justice to all of the parties requires that course.

  3. Moran v. Lewis

    41 A.2d 905 (Conn. 1945)   Cited 8 times

    In effect it was an action brought by the defendant against the plaintiff. Dwyer v. Redmond, 100 Conn. 393, 397, 124 A. 7; Davis v. Naugatuck Valley Crucible Co., 103 Conn. 36, 37, 130 A. 162. The defendant prevailed, for he received judgment upon his counterclaim. The plaintiff relies on 116, 221 and 223 of the Practice Book.

  4. Reilly v. State

    119 Conn. 217 (Conn. 1934)   Cited 49 times
    In Reilly, the state brought an action against a trustee who had failed to pay the state for the support of an inmate of the Connecticut state hospital as required by the trust.

    The rule undoubtedly is that the State cannot be made a party defendant to an action without its consent; but if the State itself invokes the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative relief, it subjects itself to any proper cross demand involved in the subject-matter of the action. State v. Kilburn, 81 Conn. 9, 12, 69 A. 1028; State v. Anderson, 82 Conn. 392, 394, 73 A. 751; Davis v. Naugatuck Valley Crucible Co., 103 Conn. 36, 130 A. 162. A fortiori, by bringing an action, the State subjects itself to the procedure established for its final and complete disposition in the courts, by way of appeal or otherwise.

  5. Mellon v. Am. Flour Grain Co.

    9 Tenn. App. 383 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929)   Cited 8 times

    To the same effect is the holding of the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Shiell v. Davis, 31 Ga. Apps., 87, that where an amendment, offered more than two years after the passage of the Act, sought only to make as defendant James C. Davis as "Director-General of Railroads in charge of the said railroads" (the carrier having been sued) without essential facts either showing that such person was the designated agent of the President for the purpose of maintaining such suit, or otherwise indicating an intention to proceed against the agent designated by the President under the Act, was not a proper amendment. In Davis v. Crucible Co., 103 Conn. 36, 130 Atl., 162, a suit brought by James C. Davis as Director-General of Railroads under the Transportation Act for unpaid transportation charges, a counter claim was filed against him as Director-General, setting forth an independent cause of action, without naming him as the agent designated by the President. In holding that although the same person who was the designated agent was thus sued as Director-General, the counterclaim would not thus lie against the United States, the Supreme Court of Connecticut said:

  6. Marshall v. Balfour

    2000 Ct. Sup. 9363 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000)   Cited 1 times

    Although the court finds it unnecessary to reach the sovereign immunity issue, it is of questionable value in that this petition was brought by the State. Our courts have held "that the State cannot be made a party defendant to an action without its consent; but if the State itself invokes the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative relief, it subjects itself to any proper cross demand involved in the subject-matter of the action. State v. Kilburn, 81 Conn. 9, 12, 69 A. 1028; State v. Anderson, 82 Corut 392, 394, 73 A. 7571; Davis v. Naugatuck Valley Crucible Co., 103 Conn. 36, 130 A. 162." Reilly v. State, 119 Conn. 217, 219, 175 A. 582 (1934).

  7. Greco v. Almstead

    1991 Ct. Sup. 1243 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991)

    The rule undoubtedly is that the State cannot be made a party defendant to an action without its consent; but if the State itself invokes the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative relief, it subjects itself to any proper cross demand involved in the subject-matter of the action. State v. Kilburn, 81 Conn. 392, 394, 73 A. 751; Davis v. Naugatuck Balley Crucible Co., 103 Conn. 36, 130 A. 162. A fortiori, by bringing an action, the State subjects itself to the procedure established for its final and complete disposition in the courts, by way of appeal or otherwise. State v. Moore, 77 W. Va. 325, 328, 87 S.E. 367; Colorado S. Ry. Co. v. People, 53 Colo. 571, 573 128 P. 886.

  8. Mulville v. Brown

    9 Conn. Supp. 387 (Conn. C.P. 1941)   Cited 6 times

    3. To paraphrase Davis vs. Naugatuck Valley Crucible Co., 103 Conn. 36, 37: the counterclaim sets forth an independent cause of action which might have been made the basis of a separate action by a defendant and is open to the same attack as if brought as a separate action. Alsop vs. Nichols, 9 Conn. 357; Gorham vs. Buckley, 49 id. 91.