Opinion
No. 17-15798
03-19-2019
GLENN DAVIS, Sole and Separate Borrower, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL TRAILOR, Chairman of the Arizona Home Foreclosure Prevention Funding Corporation (AHFPFC); et al., Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 4:16-cv-00458-RCC MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona
Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding Before: LEAVY, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Glenn Davis appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of defendants' denial of financial assistance to Davis under the Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP"). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Berg v. Popham, 412 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Davis's breach of contract claims because Davis failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was a third-party beneficiary of the contracts between the Department of the Treasury and the Arizona Home Foreclosure Prevention Funding Corporation ("AHFPFC") in the administration of the TARP in Arizona or that AHFPFC breached any contracts with Davis. See Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Before a third party can recover under a contract, it must show that the contract was made for its direct benefit—that it is an intended beneficiary of the contract."); Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini, 83 P.3d 1103, 1111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (elements of a breach of contract claim under Arizona law).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Davis's motion for reconsideration because Davis failed to establish any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).
We do not consider matters on appeal that are not distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Int'l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20, AFL-CIO v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985).
AFFIRMED.