Opinion
24-155
12-24-2024
ASTARTE DAVIS, Representing herself, Real Party In Interest, Successor in Interest, Successor Trustee, and legal representative of her husband Loyal Davis, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JOAN MAHER; BETTY DAVIS; LOYAL D. DAVIS; STEPHEN KAUFMANN; MARIN COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT; COURT TRUSTEE FOR DAVIS ESTATE ASSETS, Defendants - Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted December 17, 2024 [**]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California D.C. No. 3:23-cv-04147-TLT Trina L. Thompson, District Judge, Presiding
Before: WALLACE, GRABER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Astarte Davis appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing her action alleging various claims arising from a state court proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Davis's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Davis's claims are a "de facto appeal" of a prior state court judgment or are "inextricably intertwined" with that judgment. See id. at 1163-65 (discussing proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2012) (claims are "inextricably intertwined" for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where "the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Contrary to Davis's contention, the extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable because Davis was not prevented from presenting her claim in state court. See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider Davis's motion for default judgment because the clerk never entered a default. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of review and factors to consider before entering default judgment).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).