Under the first theory, defendants have no claim: if Lucas breached duties arising from his position at MPI, then the claim for that breach runs to MPI, not to Chiu or Vetements. See, e.g., Davis v. Magavern, 237 A.D.2d 902, 902 (4th Dep't 1997). As for the second theory, it fails because the allegations of knowing participation against Pan Am concern breaches of Lucas's duties to MPI, not duties to Chiu or Vetements as independent "coventurers" in the merchandising scheme.

Initially, we conclude that plaintiff has abandoned any contention with respect to the propriety of the dismissal of the derivative claims by failing to raise the issue in his brief on appeal (seeCiesinski v. Town of Aurora , 202 A.D.2d 984, 984, 609 N.Y.S.2d 745 [4th Dept. 1994] ). In any event, plaintiff alleges harm to him personally, not the corporation, and thus the court properly granted defendants’ motion insofar as it sought summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action and so much of the first and third causes of action that were brought on a derivative basis (seeMatter of Lazar v. Robinson Knife Mfg. Co. , 262 A.D.2d 968, 969-970, 692 N.Y.S.2d 539 [4th Dept. 1999] ; cf.Davis v. Magavern , 237 A.D.2d 902, 902, 654 N.Y.S.2d 517 [4th Dept. 1997] ; see generallyAccredited Aides Plus, Inc. v. Program Risk Mgt., Inc. , 147 A.D.3d 122, 132, 46 N.Y.S.3d 246 [3d Dept. 2017] ). We agree with plaintiff that the court erred in granting those parts of defendants’ motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action insofar as it alleges breach of the shareholder agreement as asserted by plaintiff, individually, and the third cause of action insofar as it was asserted by plaintiff, individually, and that plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on those causes of action, and we therefore modify the order accordingly.

Plaintiffs' claim that Fox (aided and abetted by defendants Shanahan and Antares, LLC) looted Phoenix is not time-barred. However, this is a claim that belongs to Phoenix, not plaintiffs ( see e.g. Davis v Magavern, 237 AD2d 902). Therefore, the motion court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty against Fox, aiding and abetting against Shanahan and Antares, and unjust enrichment against Fox, Shanahan, and Antares, with leave to replead them as derivative claims.

Initially, we agree with Supreme Court's conclusion that, notwithstanding plaintiff's status as a 95% shareholder of Usheco, a closely held subchapter S corporation, he lacked standing to sue in his own name for injuries to the corporation ( see, Glenn v. Hoteltron Sys., 74 N.Y.2d 386, 392-393; Abrams v Donati, 66 N.Y.2d 951, 953; Quatrochi v. Citibank, 210 A.D.2d 53). The general rule is that "[f]or a wrong against a corporation a shareholder has no individual cause of action, though he loses the value of his investment or incurs personal liability in an effort to maintain the solvency of the corporation" ( Abrams v Donati, supra, at 953; see, Davis v. Magavern, 237 A.D.2d 902; Elenson v. Wax, 215 A.D.2d 429), and this case presents no established exception ( see, Glenn v. Hoteltron Sys., supra; Abrams v. Donati, supra). It is our further view that Supreme Court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to add Usheco as an additional plaintiff because there is no evidence that defendant committed legal malpractice with regard to that entity.

Although June Siegel asserts that there was "near priority" between her and Gersten Savage because she was a shareholder of Blue Ridge and because Gersten Savage represented her in claims made by creditors, her contentions are unavailing. As a shareholder of Blue Ridge, she had no individ ual cause of action to recover for a wrong against Blue Ridge even if she had lost the value of her investment (see Davis v Magavern, 237 AD2d 902 [1997]). Further, the actions brought by creditors against Blue Ridge, in which she was likewise named as a defendant, are unrelated to the issues in this action.