Opinion
Civil Action 24-8473 (KMW) (MJS)
10-31-2024
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Hon. Karen M. Williams, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on the application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3-1) and complaint submitted in this civil rights matter by Plaintiff Reginal Lee Davis. (ECF No. 1.) Also before the Court is Petitioner's request for a restraining order, which is not clearly related to the substance of his complaint. (ECF No. 3.) Because this Court finds that leave to proceed in forma pauperis is warranted in this matter, Plaintiffs application shall be granted, As Plaintiff shall be granted in forma pauperis status, this Court is required to screen his purported amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute, this Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiffs request for a restraining order shall be denied as a result, “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 Fed.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir, 2000)). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed, R, Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F,3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfi.illy-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “that offers Tabeis and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,'” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it provides only “'naked assertionfs]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S, 544, 555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570), “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides facts “merely consistent with” the defendant's liability “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in conducting such an analysis, pro se litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
Because Plaintiff claims that he is now being held in Ancora Psychiatric Hospital and is no longer in a county jail, it appears that he may no longer be a “prisoner” for purposes of the IFP statute, See 28 U.SC. § 1915(h). Thus, this Court evaluates his request under the non-prisoner standard and finds that he has adequately shown an inability to pay the filing fees in this matter. It is not abundantly clear why Plaintiff was moved to Ancora. If it becomes apparent, however, that Plaintiff in fact is still a prisoner for purposes of the statute at this time, Plaintiff may be required to repay the filing fee in this matter pursuant to § 1915(b).
Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint seeking to raise a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed, Rule Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Each allegation in a complaint must therefore be “concise and direct.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1). A district Court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to comply with Rule 8. Rather v. State Kentucky Officers, 556 Fed.Appx. 91, 92 (3d Cir. 2014). A complaint may therefore be dismissed pursuant to Rule 8 where the “‘complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.'” Id. (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff is a frequent filer with this Court. His current complaint, like many of his previous complaints, is made up of a number of disjointed words, phrases, assertions, and ideas which appear to be joined only by a series of “hidden” words, several of which are obscene, made up of the first letter of each line of his complaint that similarly fail to set forth any clear claim, basis for relief, or other basis to hold the identified Defendants liable to Plaintiff, but appear to express Plaintiffs anger at unclear persons who may be among the Defendants, Having thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff s complaint, this Court cannot determine what claims Plaintiff intended to bring, or which named Defendant was meant to be subject to Plaintiffs claims. Plaintiffs complaint is thus so “unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised” and must as a result be dismissed without prejudice for failure to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8. Rather, 556 Fed.Appx. at 92. Because Plaintiffs complaint will be dismissed for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 8, his request for a restraining order (ECF No. 3) shall in turn be denied without prejudice as Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits at this time. See Bennington Foods, LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance Group, LLP, 528 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2008) (restraining order not appropriate where Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits).
For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiffs in forma pauperis application (ECF No. 3-1) shall be granted, Plaintiffs complaint (ECF No. 1) shall be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 8, and Plaintiffs request for injunctive relief is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.