Summary
In Davis v Ilama (2006 WL 1148702, 2006 Conn Super LEXIS 1087 [Mar. 14, 2006]), the Superior Court of Connecticut, District of Waterbury, held that 49 USC § 30106 preempted the State's vicarious liability statute, Connecticut General Statutes § 14-154a, which provided that the owner of a rented motor vehicle is liable for injuries caused by the operation of the vehicle as if the owner was the operator.
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No. CV05-4007074S
March 14, 2006
MEMORANDUM RE MOTION TO STRIKE #104
The issue presented to the court is whether the plaintiff's action was commenced on the date the defendant, We Rent Minivans, LLC, received the writ or on the date the plaintiff delivered the writ to the marshal. If the former is the operative date, then does 49 U.S.C. § 30106 apply and prohibit the plaintiff from asserting claims of vicarious liability against Minivans.
The court finds that the plaintiff's action was commenced on August 11, 2005, when the marshal served the writ on the defendants. Therefore, the court finds that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 applies, and counts two and three of the plaintiff's complaint are prohibited by federal law and, accordingly, Minivans' motion to strike counts two and three is granted.
FACTS
On August 15, 2005, the plaintiff, Nicola Davis, filed a three-count complaint against the defendants, Milagros Ilama and We Rent Minivans, LLC (Minivans). Count one is in negligence against Ilama. Count two appears to allege common law vicarious liability against both defendants based on Ilama's permission and consent to drive Minivans' vehicle. Count three is in negligence against both defendants pursuant to General Statutes § 14-154a. The plaintiff alleges the following facts in the complaint. The plaintiff and Ilama were driving separate vehicles in Waterbury when Ilama's negligence resulted in his vehicle striking the plaintiff's vehicle, causing her to suffer serious injuries, losses and damages. Ilama's vehicle was owned by Minivans and was rented or leased to Ilama by Minivans. Minivans is in the business of selling, leasing or renting vehicles to individuals and businesses.
General Statutes § 14-154a states in relevant part: "(a) Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner."
On November 25, 2005, Minivans filed a motion to strike counts two and three of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the "Rented or leased motor vehicle safety and responsibility law," Pub.L. No. 109-59, § 10208(a), 119 Stat. 1935, which was enacted on August 10, 2005, and codified as 49 U.S.C. § 30106, of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq., is retroactive in its application and prohibits the imposition of vicarious liability on motor vehicle lessors as a matter of federal law. Minivans submitted a memorandum of law in support of the motion. On December 6, 2005, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to Minivans' motion. The matter was heard on the short calendar on December 12, 2005.
On September 12, 2005, the court granted Minivans' request for an extension of time of thirty days to respond to the plaintiff's complaint.
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 315 A.2d 1188 (2003). "[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual finding by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 400, 876 A.2d 522 (2005). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a [pleading] challenged by a [party's] motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotations omitted.) Commission of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004).
COMMENCEMENT DATE AND APPLICABILITY OF 49 U.S.C. § 30106
Minivans argues that this action commenced on the date of service of the writ, summons and complaint (writ) upon it on August 11, 2005, as reflected in the marshal's return of service. Minivans further argues that on August 10, 2005, the day before commencement of this action, the President of the United States, George W. Bush, signed into law the "Rented or leased motor vehicle safety and responsibility" statute. Minivans claims that the statute governs cases commenced on or after August 10, 2005, the date of enactment, regardless of whether the conduct or harm that is the subject of the action occurred before or after the date of enactment. Minivans asserts that even though the conduct and harm that is the subject of this action occurred before August 10, 2005, the writ was served after August 10, 2005, and, therefore, § 30106 prohibits the plaintiff's claims.
The plaintiff counters that, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-593a, her cause of action is "not lost" because the writ was personally delivered to a state marshal and subsequently served upon Minivans within thirty days of delivery to the marshal. The plaintiff adds that because § 52-593a preserves her cause of action, the court must deny Minivans' motion to strike.
In Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 848 A.2d 352 (2004), the Connecticut Supreme Court stated that `under the law of our state, an action is commenced . . . when [the writ] is served upon the defendant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 549; see also Rana v. Ritacco, 236 Conn. 330, 337, 672 A.2d 946 (1996). In the present case, the marshal's return states that the writ was served on Minivans on August 11, 2005. This action, therefore, was commenced on August 11, 2005.
Subsection (c) of § 30106 states: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section shall apply with respect to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this section without regard to whether the harm that is the subject of the action, or the conduct that caused the harm, occurred before such date of enactment." 49 U.S.C. § 30106(c). The date of enactment is August 10, 2005. § 10208(a), 119 Stat. 1935. The plaintiff commenced this action on August 11, 2005, the day after. Section 30106, therefore, applies to the plaintiff's action.
The plaintiff argues that § 52-593a preserves her claim by causing her action to be commenced on August 9, 2005, the day before § 30106 was enacted. That statute provides in relevant part that "a cause or right of action shall not be lost because of the passage of the time limited by law within which the action may be brought, if the process to be served is personally delivered to a state marshal authorized to serve the process and the process is served, as provided by law, within thirty days of the delivery." General Statutes § 52-593a(a). Although the Appellate Court has stated that § 52-593a may be an exception to the general rule that an action is commenced on the date service is made on the defendant, § 52-593a(a) only applies in cases where the plaintiff's cause of action is subject to dismissal for violation of the applicable statute of limitations. Stingone v. Elephant's Trunk Flea Market, 53 Conn.App. 725, 729-30, 732 A.2d 200 (1999) (despite plaintiff's failure to serve writ on defendant within applicable statute of limitations period, plaintiff's cause of action was preserved because writ was delivered to proper state official within limitations period and subsequently served on defendants pursuant to § 52-593a(a)); Cartsounis v. Rosenstein, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 00 0176589 (March 6, 2003, Lewis, J.T.R.) ( 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 243, 245) ("purpose of § 52-593a is to save an action which is otherwise barred because process was completed after the statute of limitations expired").
Section 52-593a(a) is inapplicable to the present case. Minivans does not raise the defense of statute of limitations and, further, this action was commenced well within the two-year statute of limitations for negligence actions prescribed by General Statutes § 52-584. The plaintiff relies on this statute to claim that her action was commenced on August 9, 2005, when process was given to the marshal. Her claim, therefore, is that her action was commenced the day before § 30106 was enacted. The plaintiff thus is using § 52-593a (a) to avoid the application of a newly amended federal law to her claim, not to save her claim from dismissal for violating the statute of limitations. Such use of § 52-593a(a) is improper under the case law and inconsistent with the purpose of the statute. Therefore, § 52-593a(a) cannot "preserve" or "save" the plaintiff's claim from being subject to the proscription of § 30106.
General Statutes § 52-584 states in relevant part: "No action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered . . ." General Statutes § 52-584. This action was commenced on August 11, 2005, and the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's negligent conduct occurred on June 9, 2004.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Minivans also argues that § 30106 abolishes vicarious liability for vehicle lessors in connection with the use, operation or possession of motor vehicles owned by them. Minivans maintains that the plaintiff only claims that it is liable because of Ilama's negligence, not because of its own negligence. Minivans asserts, therefore, that the language of § 30106 prevents the plaintiff from bringing any vicarious liability claims against it. The plaintiff has provided no argument in response to this issue.
Subsection (a) of § 30106 states in relevant part: "An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any [s]tate or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if (1) the owner (or affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)." 49 U.S.C. 30106(a).
Connecticut law permits vicarious liability claims against vehicle rental companies solely by virtue of ownership. Section 14-154a states in relevant part: "(a) Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner." General Statutes § 14-154a.
To date, only two cases in the United States have addressed the applicability of § 30106. Most recently, in Infante v. U-Haul Co. of Florida, Docket No. 05-18167, slip op, at 1 (N.Y.Sup.Ct., Queens County, January 18, 2006), the court concluded that the plaintiff's vicarious liability claim against U-Haul was barred by § 30106: "[Congress's recent enactment of 49 U.S.C. § 30106] resolved a long-standing debate as to the propriety of imposing vicarious liability on car owners who rent or lease their vehicles which are subsequently involved in motor vehicle accidents. By enacting [this law], Congress has prohibited vicarious liability against these owners and preempted the law in states, such as New York, that previously permitted it.
"As [the] plaintiff's claim against either U-Haul entity is under the theory of vicarious liability, his claim cannot stand." Infante v. U-Haul Co. Of Florida, supra, Docket No. 05-18167.
In Piche v. Nugent, Docket No. 05-82-B-K, 2005 WL 2428156 (D. Me. September 30, 2005), to which the Infante v. U-Haul Co. Of Florida court cites, the Piche court succinctly stated: "Among other things, [§ 30106] amends U.S. Code Title 49, Chapter 301 to preempt state statutes that impose vicarious liability on rental car companies for the negligence of their renters."
The Piche court ultimately did not apply 49 U.S.C. § 30106 because the plaintiff filed the lawsuit prior to its enactment. Piche v. Nugent, supra, 2005 WL 2428156 at *4.
This is the first time in Connecticut and only the third time in the United States that a court has addressed § 30106. Regardless, the language of § 30106 and the decisions of Infante and Piche clearly require the court in the present case to strike counts two and three of the plaintiff's complaint. Subsection (a) states that owners of motor vehicles that rent or lease those vehicles to a person shall not be liable under the law of any [s]tate for the negligence of the renter, " by reason of being the owner of the vehicle," if the owner is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing vehicles and there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner. (Emphasis added.) 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1) and (2).
Minivans satisfies the statutory criteria. First, the plaintiff alleges in counts two and three that Minivans is in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles and that it is the owner of the vehicle that Ilama rented. Second, the plaintiff does not allege any negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of Minivans. Further, the plaintiff concedes in her memorandum of law that counts two and three seek to impose vicarious liability on Minivans. Under count two, the plaintiff claims that Minivans is liable by virtue of giving Ilama permission and consent to operate a vehicle that Minivans owned and rented to Ilama. Under count three, the plaintiff claims Minivans is liable under § 14-154a to the extent Ilama would be liable had Ilama been the owner of the vehicle. Hughes v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc., 22 Conn.App. 586, 588, 577 A.2d 1132, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 817, 58 A.2d 57 (1990) (§ 14-154a "holds the owner of the rented vehicle liable for injuries caused by the operation of the vehicle as if he were the operator"). The plaintiff thus is seeking to impose precisely the type of liability that § 30106 (a) prohibits: liability solely by virtue of ownership. Based on the language of the statute and the guidance from the New York and Maine courts, the court finds that Minivans' motion to strike counts two and three must be granted because § 30106 prohibits claims of vicarious liability against vehicle rental companies and preempts laws in states that previously permitted vicarious liability.
While Infante v. U-Haul Co. Of Florida, supra; Docket No. 05-18167 at 1, suggests that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 prohibits all vicarious liability claims against vehicle rental companies, Piche v. Nugent, supra, 2005 WL 2428156, could be read as interpreting § 30106 only to preempt state statutes that impose vicarious liability. The plaintiff's second count appears to impose common-law vicarious liability on Minivans because the plaintiff does not base the count on § 14-154a, Connecticut's vicarious liability statute. Even if § 30106 only preempts statutory vicarious liability, the court must still strike the plaintiff's second count. The Connecticut Appellate Court has stated: "Section 14-154a imposes a vicarious liability unknown at common law. The statute creates what has been termed a `statutory suretyship' and holds the owner of the rented vehicle liable for injuries caused by the operation of the vehicle as if he were the operator." Hughes v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc., 22 Conn.App. 586, 588, 577 A.2d 1132, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 817, 58 A.2d 57 (1990). The plaintiff thus cannot impose vicarious liability upon Minivans without the authority of § 14-154a. Because § 30106 preempts Connecticut's vicarious liability statute, the plaintiff has no authority to impose any vicarious liability on Minivans and, therefore, the court should grant Minivans' motion to strike count two.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Minivans' motion to strike in its entirety because 49 U.S.C. § 30106 prohibits the plaintiff from asserting any claims of vicarious liability against vehicle rental companies like Minivans.