Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC 272149, Edward Ferns, Judge.
Gregory Grantham for Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Hall & Lim, Timothy A. Hall; Law Offices of Fred Rucker and Fred Rucker for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FLIER, J.
A stipulated judgment for $1.4 million in favor of respondent Marian Davis as Trustee of the R.T. Asset Trust (Trust) and against appellant G.J. Siegel & Associates, Inc. (GJS), was entered on July 1, 2005. On January 2, 2008, GJS and Ronald Taxe filed a motion to vacate this judgment (Motion), as well as to strike and vacate three other orders we describe below. The Motion was denied in its entirety.
There is some ambiguity in the notice of appeal; it is not clear whether appeals were taken from all four orders. We resolve the ambiguity in appellants’ favor and construe the notice of appeal as extending to all four orders.
We notified the parties under Government Code section 68081 that we were considering the question whether the four orders from which the appeals were taken were appealable orders. The parties have filed letter briefs on this question and also addressed this matter during oral argument.
We conclude that three of the four orders are not appealable and that the remaining order is long since final and therefore not reviewable in this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2003, Trust sought leave to file a second amended complaint in Los Angeles civil action BC 272149 (underlying action), naming GJS, Euromex, Inc., and Ronald Taxe as defendants in an action for breach of contract. The complaint sought approximately $2.8 million in damages for the breach of various agreements, all of which appear to have been loans made by persons who assigned their claims to Trust. GJS did not oppose the filing of this complaint, which was done as of March 10, 2003.
The record contains a certified copy of a document that shows GJS to be a Nevada corporation and that lists Charles J. Crozier as president, secretary, treasurer and sole director of GJS. This document appears to be an excerpt from the records of the Nevada Secretary of State and is dated April 28, 2004.
On April 21, 2003, Crozier filed a notice in the underlying action associating Crozier as GJS’s attorney of record. Among others, the notice was served on attorney Gregory Grantham, who states that he represents GJS and Taxe in the instant appeal. We will refer to this as the notice of association of counsel. Among other requests detailed below, the Motion seeks an order striking this document.
On April 25, 2003, the Trust, represented by Attorney Fred Rucker, filed an ex parte application in the underlying action in which it sought the entry of a stipulated judgment that was based on a settlement between Trust and GJS. Grantham opposed this application, claiming to be the attorney for GJS and Ronald Taxe. Grantham’s papers stated that there was no settlement between Trust and GJS, that Attorney Crozier was a beneficiary of the Trust and that Crozier had no authority to appear for GJS. The Trust’s ex parte application was denied.
The record contains a lengthy declaration made under penalty of perjury by Crozier, dated January 23, 2008. The declaration recounts Crozier’s association with GJS, disputes Grantham’s claim that Grantham was authorized to represent GJS and states that Crozier settled the underlying action with Trust for $1.4 million in order to protect GJS from a possible $2.8 million judgment. Crozier’s declaration recounts many more facts that are not necessary to detail here.
On May 5, 2003, Rucker, on behalf of the Trust, filed a notice of settlement of the underlying action. The notice stated that Trust and GJS had agreed to dismiss GJS without prejudice and requested that the court retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 to enforce the settlement. The notice was served on Grantham. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Grantham objected to the settlement. Grantham does not claim in his brief on appeal that he objected to this settlement.
On July 1, 2005, Trust, now represented by Sullivan, Workman & Dee, filed a motion for the entry of the stipulated judgment; the motion also sought to set aside GJS’s dismissal without prejudice. The court granted both requests and, as noted, a judgment of $1.4 million was entered against GJS on July 1, 2005. Grantham claims that he did not receive notice of this motion.
The motion gave the date of dismissal as March 1, 2004. The record, however, shows that GSJ was dismissed without prejudice on May 5, 2003.
On September 6, 2007, Trust, represented by Hall & Lim, and acting through and by Davis and a new, additional trustee (Steven Powers), moved for an order assigning GJS’s interest in a note of $750,000 to Trust, in payment of the stipulated judgment which now stood at $1.68 million. Grantham objected to the motion, again claiming to be GJS’s sole authorized attorney. Trust’s motion was granted on October 30, 2007.
THE MOTION
The Motion, brought by Grantham, purports to be made by GJS and Ronald Taxe; it was filed on January 2, 2008.
The Motion seeks to strike the notice of association of counsel filed by Crozier on April 21, 2003. In addition, the Motion seeks to have set aside the order vacating GJS’s dismissal without prejudice and the order assigning GJS’s interest in the $750,000 note to Trust. Respectively, the dates of these orders are July 1, 2005, and October 30, 2007. Finally, the Motion seeks an order vacating and setting aside the stipulated judgment of July 1, 2005.
DISCUSSION
1. The Order Denying the Motion to Strike the Notice of Association of Counsel Is Not an Appealable Order
“It is well settled by the decisions of this court that no appeal can be taken from an interlocutory order unless the order be designated by statute as one of those from which an appeal may be taken.” (Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Calif. etc. Co. (1911) 159 Cal. 484, 486.) “Because the right of appeal is wholly statutory (see supra, §2), no judgment or order is appealable unless expressly so declared, i.e., unless it comes within one of the classes enumerated in the main statute or is made appealable by a specific statute.” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 85, p. 145.)
There is no statute that authorizes an appeal from the order denying the motion to strike the notice of association of counsel. Appellants concede this but contend that the “validity” of the notice of association may be reviewed in connection with their contention that the judgment is void. We do not agree. The order denying the motion to strike the notice of association, entered in 2008, was interlocutory and independent of the judgment that was entered in 2005. The “validity” of the notice of association is not a matter that can be reviewed three years after the case in which it was filed was terminated by a judgment.
2. The Order Denying the Motion to Reinstate the Dismissal of GJS Is Not an Appealable Order
There are two reasons why this purported appeal must be dismissed.
First. There is no statute that authorizes an appeal from an order denying the motion to reinstate GJS’s dismissal.
Second. On July 1, 2005, the voluntary dismissal of GJS was vacated; this means that GJS again became a defendant, in July 2005, in the underlying action. While this order may have been reviewable in an appeal from the 2005 judgment if the judgment had been on the merits, appellants made their request to reinstate GJS’s dismissal three years after the fact by way of a motion. There is no authority for such a motion. It follows that there can be no appeal from an order that disposes of an unauthorized request addressed to the trial court.
There is no appeal from a stipulated judgment.
3. The Order Denying the Motion to Vacate the Order Assigning GJS’s Interest in the Note to Trust Cannot Be Reviewed in This Appeal
The order assigning GJS’s interest in the $750,000 note to Trust was entered on October 30, 2007. While appellants’ motion to vacate this order was filed in January 2008, their notice of appeal from a denial of this order was not filed until June 19, 2008.
An order entered after a judgment is appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2) if it affects the judgment by enforcing it. (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 651-652.) The order of October 30, 2007, operated to enforce the stipulated judgment and was therefore an appealable order.
By June 19, 2008, when the notice of appeal was filed, the order of October 30, 2007, was long since final. The time to file a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. (Estate of Hanley (1943) 23 Cal.2d 120, 123.) Accordingly, the order of October 30, 2007, cannot be reviewed in this appeal.
Appellants request that we treat their purported appeal from this order as a petition for a writ of mandate. Appellants have wholly failed to provide even a minimal showing that would warrant the exercise of this extraordinary remedy and we therefore deny their request.
4. The Order Denying the Motion to Vacate the Stipulated Judgment Is Not Appealable
Appellants acknowledge that the general rule is that an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment is not appealable. (See generally 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 197, pp. 273-274.) An exception to this rule is that an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to vacate a void judgment; appellants seek to invoke this exception.
A judgment is void when the court entering the judgment lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley County Water Dist. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1801, 1805.)
Appellants provide two reasons why, in their opinion, the court entering the stipulated judgment lacked subject matter jurisdiction. First. The settlement did not contain a reservation of jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. Second. Once the clerk entered the dismissal, without prejudice, of GJS on May 5, 2003, the court was divested of subject matter jurisdiction.
Subject matter jurisdiction is the competence of the court to adjudicate a particular civil action; it is regulated by the Constitution and by statute. (Marlow v. Campbell (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 921, 928.) The competence of the court to act is predicated on the amount in controversy or the type of case. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Jurisdiction, § 11, p. 584.)
As far as Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 is concerned, this provision does not require a reservation of jurisdiction; it simply empowers the court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement if the parties request this, as the parties requested in this case. The reservation of jurisdiction obviously does not divest the court of jurisdiction.
“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6.)
GJS was dismissed without prejudice on May 5, 2003. While it is true that the dismissal of an entire action terminates the court’s jurisdiction (Harris v. Billings (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1405), in this instance the parties requested that the court reserve its jurisdiction to enforce the judgment. Moreover, GJS’s dismissal was vacated on July 1, 2005. Thus, the court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction when it entered the stipulated judgment.
In sum, the general rule governs and the appeal from the order denying the motion to vacate the stipulated judgment must also be dismissed.
5. Grantham’s Authority to Represent GJS
We recognize that it is a contested issue whether Grantham is authorized to represent GJS. For the purposes of disposing of the purported appeals from the aforementioned four orders, we have assumed that Grantham is authorized to represent GJS. This is only a working assumption, especially appropriate in light of the summary disposition of the appeals, and it is not a finding that Grantham is authorized to represent GJS. It is also true that this is a question of fact, which is best resolved in the trial court and not by us upon the fragmentary record before us. Because it is not necessary for us to decide whether Grantham is in fact authorized to represent GJS, we decline to address and decide this issue.
Finally, appellants request that we augment the record with two orders of the court entered on January 21, 2004, and March 3, 2004. These orders are not pertinent to the disposition of these appeals. Accordingly, the request to augment the record is denied.
DISPOSITION
Appeals have been taken from the following: (a) the order denying the motion to strike the notice of association of counsel filed by Crozier on April 21, 2003; (b) the order denying the motion to vacate G.J. Siegel & Associates, Inc.’s dismissal; (c) the order denying the motion to vacate the order assigning G.J. Siegel & Associates, Inc.’s interest in the $750,000 note to the R.T Asset Trust; and (d) the order denying the motion to vacate the stipulated judgment. These appeals are dismissed. Respondent is to recover its costs on appeal.
We concur: BIGELOW, P. J., LICHTMAN, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.