Davis v. District of Columbia

7 Citing cases

  1. Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors

    Civil Action No. 17-612 (RDM) (D.D.C. Sep. 14, 2020)   Cited 2 times

    The Board's explanation for Plaintiff's reassignment is thus both legitimate and non-retaliatory—employers routinely (and permissibly) make assignment decisions based on their employees' qualifications. See, e.g., Mount v. Johnson, 174 F. Supp. 3d 553, 562 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 664 F. App'x 11 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Francis v. D.C., 731 F. Supp. 2d 56, 80 (D.D.C. 2010); Gonzales v. Holder, 656 F. Supp. 2d 141, 145 (D.D.C. 2009); Davis v. D.C., 503 F. Supp. 2d 104, 129 (D.D.C. 2007). This then, puts the burden back on Plaintiff: He must rebut the legitimacy of the Board's explanation by pointing to evidence of pretext.

  2. Salamone v. Cent. Piedmont Cmty. Coll.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-00298-GCM (W.D.N.C. Feb. 11, 2020)

    The Court declines to do so. See Davis v. District of Columbia, 503 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2007) (For purposes of summary judgment, perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived.); Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 557 (7th Cir. 2010) ("It is not the obligation of this court to research and construct legal arguments open to parties, especially when they are represented by counsel, and we have warned that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived.").

  3. Polanco v. HSBC Bank USA NA

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-00466-GCM (W.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2020)

    The Court declines construct Plaintiff's legal argument in her stead. See Davis v. District of Columbia, 503 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2007) (For purposes of summary judgment, perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived.). Thus, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against Defendants' economic loss rule is DENIED.

  4. Escamilla v. Nuyen

    200 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D.D.C. 2016)   Cited 4 times
    Contrasting the case with prior cases in this Circuit in which a party violated Local Rule 7(h) by failing to file any affidavits or simply incorporating evidence into the memorandum without reference to particular facts

    The invocation of this discretion is appropriate here because Defendant's "conduct is not sufficiently egregious," and the purposes of Local Rule 7(h) have been satisfied. Davis v. Dist. of Columbia , 503 F.Supp.2d 104, 122 n. 20 (D.D.C.2007). Namely, this Court is able "to decide [this] motion[ ] for summary judgment efficiently and effectively" based on the parties' briefings and has not been "obliged to sift through hundreds of pages of depositions, affidavits, and interrogatories" in order to do so.

  5. Jarmon v. Genachowski

    720 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2010)   Cited 4 times
    In Jarmon, the plaintiff, an African–American male who worked as an auditor at the Federal Communications Commission, unsuccessfully sought a promotion within the Commission. Jarmon, 720 F.Supp.2d at 32–33.

    This Court has often stated that three months is the outer bound. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Paulson, 542 F. Supp. 2d 37, 58 (D.D.C. 2008); Walker v. Johnson, 501 F. Supp. 2d 156, 174 (D.D.C. 2007); Davis v. District of Columbia, 503 F. Supp. 2d 104, 125 (D.D.C. 2007); McIntyre, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 133. That requirement applies, however, only where a plaintiff is relying solely on temporal proximity to prove causation.

  6. Hamilton v. Paulson

    542 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 2008)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that where there were no inconsistencies in defendant's witnesses' statement or the inconsistencies failed to give rise to any inference of discriminatory motive plaintiff had failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the authenticity of the defendant's explanation for the selection of another candidate over the plaintiff

    "While courts have not definitely established the maximum time lapse between protected Title VII activity and alleged retaliatory actions, . . . [t]his Court has often followed a three-month rule to establish causation on the basis of temporal proximity alone." McIntyre v. Peters, 460 F. Supp. 2d 125, 133 (D.D.C. 2006) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Walker v. Johnson, 501 F. Supp. 2d 156, 174 (D.D.C. 2007) ("This Court has held that a span of three months between the employee's EEO activity and the employer's adverse action may be too long to support a presumption of causation."); Davis v. District of Columbia, 503 F. Supp. 2d 104, 125 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that delays between a plaintiff's engagement in protected activities and supposed retaliatory acts by an employer of three to four months are "too tenuous to support an inference of causation"). As the Court has noted in the past, this practice accords with precedent from both the District of Columbia Circuit and the Supreme Court.

  7. Gibbs v. Nationstar Mortg. (In re Gibbs)

    No. 19-54809 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2022)

    Consequently, a litigant has an obligation to 'spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly[.]'" Davis v. District of Columbia, 503 F.Supp.2d 104, 126 (D.D.C. 2007).