Opinion
3:02-CV-2363-D
November 25, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b), and an order of the court in implementation thereof, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, as evidenced by his signature thereto, are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
Type of Case: This is a civil rights complaint brought by a state inmate pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Parties: Plaintiff is presently confined at Alfred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID) in Iowa Park, Texas. Defendants are the Director of the Dallas County Jail and Gary Johnson, TDCJ Executive Director. The court has not issued process in this case.
Statement of Case: The complaint seeks monetary relief for Plaintiffs allegedly unlawful conviction in Cause No. F90-03473-S for which he was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment on September 21, 1990. (Complaint at pp. 3-4). The complaint also requests access to police reports and trial transcripts pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). (Id.).
Findings and Conclusions: The court has permitted Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis. His complaint is, thus, subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which imposes a screening responsibility on the district court. Section 1915A reads in pertinent part as follows:
The court shall review . . ., as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b) (emphasis added). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B).
Both sections 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) provide for sua sponte dismissal if the Court finds that the complaint is "frivolous" or that it "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." A complaint is frivolous, if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Plaintiff cannot bring a civil rights action challenging his felony conviction in Cause No. F90-03473 until the requirements of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), are satisfied, which — based upon the allegations in the complaint — have not been met.
Pursuant to Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, Plaintiff must demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Insofar as Plaintiff seeks a copy of his police report and of his trial transcript under FOIA, his claim should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. This court lacks jurisdiction over a claim challenging the denial of state agency records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a), et seq. (FOIA applies only to requests for federal agency records).
RECOMMENDATION:
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiffs claims be dismissed without prejudice to them being reasserted when the conditions under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), are met.
It is further recommended that any claim challenging the denial of state agency records be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
A copy of this recommendation will be mailed to Plaintiff.
NOTICE
In the event that you wish to object to this recommendation, you are hereby notified that you must file your written objections within ten days after being served with a copy of this recommendation. Pursuant toDouglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), a party's failure to file written objections to these proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law within such ten-day period may bar a de novo determination by the district judge of any finding of fact or conclusion of law and shall bar such party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the district court.