In the instant case, the justice had jurisdiction over the subject matter, the administration of the oath, and the trial court found that he decided in good faith and without malice that he had jurisdiction of the person of the plaintiff. While this is stated among the conclusions of the court, it is clearly a finding of a fact from evidence and not a deduction; in fact, if there were doubt as to this, a short excerpt from the evidence quoted in the finding to present a ruling of the court definitely establishes it to be so. As such a finding, it is open to attack only on the ground that the evidence fails to support it; Cumbo v. E. B. McGurk, Inc., 124 Conn. 433, 436, 200 A. 328; Davis v. Davis, 128 Conn. 243, 248, 21 A.2d 393; and as the evidence, except as we have noted, is not printed, the finding must stand. The justice was wrong in deciding that service on the 17th was notice "four days inclusive before the day specified for administering such oath," that is, the 20th.
24, including $221.67 of interest added to the principal, with the possible addition of interest apparently unpaid for a period of some six months. That was the value of the lien of the Fazzano mortgage, the surrender of which was the consideration of the $3500 then paid in cash by Roberts and the making of the $2500 note. Unless it be because of the circumstances hereafter discussed, in the case as it stands before us there was a substantial failure of consideration for the note to the benefit of which the defendants were entitled. Davis v. Davis, 128 Conn. 243, 246, 21 A.2d 393. While the court has not specifically found that the defendants are estopped to deny the fact that there was a mortgage debt to the plaintiff in the amount of $21,800, as stated in the conveyance to them and in the assumption agreement, the plaintiff makes this claim before us. Ordinarily, one who accepts a deed which recites that the land is subject to, or that he assumes the payment of, a mortgage to a certain amount is estopped to dispute that recital.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cotter v. Cotter, 82 Conn. 331, 332, 73 A. 903 (1909); see Davis v. Davis, 128 Conn. 243, 247, 21 A.2d 393 (1941); Daly v. Blinstrubas, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-99-0156584-S (December 12, 2002). The plaintiffs argue that the improvements were made pursuant to an agreement between the parties and that as evidence of this agreement, Crowell promised them a three year future estate in the property after the termination of her own life estate.
Failure of consideration is a valid defense to the enforcement of a note. Davis v. Davis, 128 Conn. 243, 246, 21 A.2d 393 (1941). The court finds, however, that Fountain Pointe has failed to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to this defense.
In situations where an indebtedness existed, once the debt is paid the mortgage interest ends. Palmer v. Uhl, 112 Conn. 125, 128. As between the parties, the failure in whole or part of the consideration is a good defense in whole or in part to action on the note. Davis v. Davis, 128 Conn. 243, 246. It is equally true that whatever extinguishes the debt discharges the mortgage. Peck v. Lee, 110 Conn. 374, 378.
Where valuable services are rendered or moneys advanced from one stranger to another, there is strong basis for an inference or implication that the debt is to be paid. Bartlett v. Raidart, 107 Conn. 691. But the situation is different where the parties are members of one family living in one household. Cotter v. Cotter, 82 Conn. 331, 332; Burke v. Burke, 92 Conn. 306, 308; Davis v. Davis, 128 Conn. 243, 247. Applying these principles to the facts shown here, no promise to pay is to be implied or inferred. Likewise, there is no foundation of an obligation based on quasi contract.